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American Politics
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Directed byi
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Self-identified Independent voters in the

presidential electorates of 1952-1972 are examined

utilizing data compiled by the Survey Research Center
of the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research.
In an electorate-by-electorate analysis, Independents

are compared with Republican and Democratic party

identifiers in terms of their demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, positions on political issues,
and electoral behavior.

Changes in the character of the

Independent vote which have occurred over time are
examined in an effort to discern trends and predict
future probabilities.

In general the study concludes

(in support of literature previously published on the

subject) that Independents, particularly in the last
two presidential electorates, resemble Republicans

more closely than Democrats.

vi

It is argued that th®

e

socioeconomic and 'ideoligical

•

similarities between

Independents and Republicans will continue to lead the

majority of Independents into the Republican column
(in presidential elections) unless the repercussions

of Watergate and a faulty economy are so strong as to

reverse the pattern which has been established during
the past decade.
The 'political responsibility' of Independents
is examined to determine whether they possess the 'ideal

citizen* traits generally ascribed to them by con-

ventional wisdom, or whether they conform to the less
laudatory picture of them painted by modern social
scientists.

Analysis reveals a mixed picture in this

regard with Independents conforming to parts of both
images.

They appear highly knowledgeable about

political affairs and exhibit well-developed issue
positions (as traditional wisdom claims) but are less

likely to participate in or be concerned about partisan
elections (as argued by

modem

social science research)

In trying to explain the phenomenon of self-

identified Independence, and the reasons for its
increase in contemporary times, the study cites a

number of explanations and examines their validity in
light of the survey data.

Disaffection with the party

vii

system, sociological and ideological cross-pressures,
youth, and the uncertainty attendant to transition

from one party to the other all are shovm to affect
(positively) the incidence of Independence.

The

large number of young voters currently in the

electorate, disaffection with the political parties
as a result of Watergate and the Viet Nam War, the

large number of 'transitional' voters generated by
the recent political realignment, and the tendency for

traditional partisan cleavages to have been 'out of
synch' with the important issues of the late 1960's

all are seen as having precipitated the large increase
in Independence which occurred between 196^ and 1972.

Because many of the phenomena responsible for
the currently high rates of Independence are temporal

phenomena which will shortly pass into history (if they
the rate
have not already done so), it is concluded that

and begin
of Independence will shortly stop its ascent
to return to more normal levels.

Despite the impending

it is
'return to normalcy' (or at least 'near-normalcy')
196i+-1972
felt that the long range effects of the
American
Independence 'boom' will be beneficial to the
of issue
party system by nudging it in the direction

definition and political responsiveness.
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INTRODUCTION
The average citizen will
give close and constant
attention to public affairs,
recognizing that it is in
his interest as well as
his duty. He will try to
comprehend the main issues
of policy, bringing to them
an independent and impartial
mind, which thinks first not
of his own but of the general
interest.

— James

Bryce, Modern Democracies

In looking at the recent history of electoral

behavior in this country it is apparent that a number of
changes are occurring in the electorate.

The most obvious

change, of course, is that only eight years after according
a presidential candidate of the Democratic party the

largest electoral landslide in our country's history,

American voters gave an equally impressive majority to a
Republican candidate in 1972.

And, judging from the public's

ressonses to politically oriented public opinion polls taken

during the past decade, it appears that this large Democratic-

to-Republican shift was precipitated not only by the
personalities and styles of the candidates involved

»

1

j

but

2

by shifts in the voters' attitudes (in a generally conservative direction) on some issues.^

There have been other changes as well.

The once

"solid" South, upon which the Democratic party has been

dependent for many of its presidential election victories
since the Civil War, now seems

vacillation

— to

— the

two decades of

be rather firmly in Republican hands, at

least in national elections. ^

Coalition

— after

And the fabled New Deal

agglomeration of workers, city dwellers.

Catholics, blacks, first generation "ethnics," and poor

^Chapter II discusses this phenomenon in some
detail, outlining how the electorate's attitudes on
political issues have changed over the years. The conservatizing trend referred to here was perhaps most noticeable
when the electorates of 1964 and I968 were compared.
Especially on issues dealing with how much the federal
government should be involved in the lives of its citizens,
the voters of I968 felt more strongly than they had in 1964
"~
that the government in Washington was becoming "too powerful
a position traditionally associated with political conservatism.
This tendency, and possible explanations for it, are discussed
at some length in Chapter II.

2john Fenton reports the increase of Republican
strenrth in the South in "An Analysis of the Results of the
Presidential Election of 1972," in Stanley Bach and George
Sulzner, eds.. Perspectives on the Presidency (Lexington,
Fenton 's analysis
Mass.. D-.C. Heath. 1974), pp. 116-128.
and 197^
of eleven southern states shows that, between 1948
has
the number of Republican Senators from those states
increased from zero to seven, the number of Republican U.S.
Representatives has increased from two to thirty- four, and
won none
that, while the Republican candidate for President
and 11
of those states in 1948, he has captured 4, 5. 3» 5.
elections
of those states in the last five presidential
respectively.

1

.

53

3

people, allied in support of the party of Franklin Roosevelt-seems somewhat less cohesive today than it has been in the past.

Looking at the picture from a different perspective—
again with the aid of population polling techniques

— we

can see that today's electorate is younger, more affluent,
and possesses a higher mean educational level than the

voters who gave Lyndon Johnson his majority in 196^.^

At

the same time, it is an electorate somewhat less likely to
go to the polls.

The rate of voter turnout, which had been

rising in this country during the past half century, has now
leveled off and appears to be beginning something of a decline.

^Since 196^, when it reached a high of 51?^» Democratic
identification in this country has dropped to 35^ according to
survey results released in April of 197^ by the Center for
Political Studies at the University of Michigan. In the 1972
presidential election many groups which have traditionally and
nominally been considered as Democratic voters (Catholics,
Jewish people, blue-collar workers) gave the Republican candidate a higher percentage of the vote than at any time in recent
memory (53^, 29;^, k8fo for Catholics, Jews, and blue-collar
workers respectively).
^In 196^ the electorate's mean educational level was
years in 1972 it was 11.6 years. Though the 1972 electorate contains a higher proportion of young peopletraditionally better educated than their elders— the 196^ to
1972 increase is still noteworthy.
I

5The rate of voter turnout in the past eight presidential elections is as follows. 19;+^ (53^^). 19^8 (5 1/0
i960 (6^0, 196^ (63/), 1968 ( 63/O
1952 (62%), 1956 (60/0
William Flanigan, The
19^^-1964,
Sources
1972 (56/0.
Allyn
Political Rphav ior of the American Electorate (Boston* manac,
Al
World
and Bacon, 1968),p. l6> 19 68 and 1972, The4^„7 3
Association.
Enterprise
Newspaper
the
annual publication of
»

I

,

,

^
1,

There are in short, a number of important ways
in which the American voters of contemporary times differ

from their counterparts of a decade ago.

One of the most

notable and potentially far-reaching of the changes which
have occurred since 1964 is the rise in the percentage of

Americans who refer to themselves as "Independents." As
shown in Table

i

- 1,

the percentage of Independents-

after holding fairly steady for a quarter of a centuryhas risen from

22f.

in 196if to

in 197^.

Among young

voters (those aged 18 to 29) the incidence of Independence
is now nearly fifty percent.

As the Table shows the increase among Independents

but the
has come at the expense of both major parties,
the
figures for the years 196^1-1974 would indicate that
in recent
Democrats have been hurt more than Republicans

times.

underscored by
The importance of these figures is

Independent vote for
the knowledge that, since 1940. the
of the Democrats
President has split four times in favor

Republicans.
and five times in favor of the

And. in those

for the
6Thoueh no age breakdown is available
Studies
Political
for
February. ?97fsS?vey of the Center
(which showed the overall rate of ^^^^Pf
an overall ^^^^P^f^^^^/®''^^
1972 SRC survey (which showed
of persons under
percentage
the
of -^m indicated that
Independents was 49.8^.
thirty whS called themselves
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nine presidential elections, the Independents have been on
(Only in i960, when the

the winning side eight times.?

Independent vote split fifty-four to forty-six percent for

then-Vice-President Nixon, have a majority of Independents
voted for the losing candidate.)
These data are obviously of great interest, both
to the academic student of electoral behavior, and to the

"practicing" political actor.

To the political scientist,

schooled in the discipline's generally accepted contention
that party identification is the single most important

determinant of electoral choice, they represent the

possibility that a new model of electoral behavior— one
based on something more than simple party identification-

may be needed, if the votes of these partyless Independents
are to be properly understood.

To the political actor, or

some of
politician, these figures dictate a re-thinking of
politics. Such
the traditional wisdom of American partisan

made by then-President
a re-thinking is evident in a comment

Richard Nixon in 1971
described in
7As is the case in every election
based on the respondents
this study, the voting records are election just past.
Recollections of their votes in the
side with a winner, it
Given people's general propensity to the winners are inflated.
mav be that some of the figures for of this sort has to
This is a phenomenon that research
one can ?nly hope that
accept as almSst irremedial. and
as to undermine the validity
its instance is not so major
of the study's general conclusions.

o

We will never have a time again, in my
in this country where you are going to
polarization of only Democrats versus
Republicans
.1 think you are going to
the Independents controlling basically
balance of power.

opinion,
have a
have
the

If the "practicing" politicians are taking notice
of the newly-numerous Independents, political scientists

seem to know relatively little about them.

Are Independents,

as they are sometimes pictured, discerning and dispassionate

political actors who weigh issues and candidates carefully
and cast their votes thinking only, as Bryce would phrase
it,

of the "general interest?"

Or are they political misfits

whose propensity to switch allegiances (and thus decide
elections) raises some troublesome questions about the nature
of our electoral process?

Do they represent a segment of

the electorate seriously alienated from what they see as the

baseness of "mainstream" party politics?

Or are they simply

people whose desire to vote for "the person" leads them to
avoid the major party labels?

Can we say that they represent

the ideological center of the American political spectrum—

between the Democrats on the left and the Republicans on the
right?

maybe
Or, perhaps, do they themselves represent one (or

both) of the ideological extremes?

To these and other important

^President Richard M. Nixon, ABC Television Interview,
Lance Tarrance,
March 22, 1971; cited in Walter DeVries and V. itics (Grand
American Pol
T he Ticket-Splitter A New Force in
1^/2).
Erdmons,
B.
Rapids, Michigan William
I

I

»

i

8

questions concerning Independent voters,
political
science has very few satisfactory answers.
And where
answers exist at all they are often conflicting
and

confused*
The purpose of this study is to examine Independent

voters in depth, and to attempt to answer questions
like
the ones above about a group that has in ten short years,

become the largest "party" in American politics.
paper,

I

In the

will rely heavily on the extensive survey data

which have been gathered over the years by the Survey
Research Center at the University of Michigan for the

Inter-University Consortium for Political Research.

The

study is intended to answer questions on three broad fronts
1)

Who are the Independents, and how do they compare with

party members in tenns of demographic characteristics,
political attitudes, and political interest and involvement?
2)

Why do persons choose to identify themselves as Independ-

ents, and why has their number risen so greatly in recent

years?

3)

What impact are the Independents having now

on the two major parties, and what will be the impact on
the political system if their numbers continue to increase
at the expense of the two-party system?

In the study,

Independent voters

I

have chosen to focus on "self -identified"

— voters

who, when asked their political

e

I

9

affiliation, respond, "Independent."

Self-identified

Independents should not be confused with the ticketsplitters, or floating voters about whom much has been

written in recent years. 9

Though a large percentage of

self-identified Independents split their tickets (and many
ticket-splitters are Independents )10
not identical.

-the

two categories are

Split-ticket voting is no doubt an important

and rather novel phenomenon in American politics, but it is

different from the phenomenon of self-identified Independence,
and

I

suggest that the explanations behind the two are not

necessarily the same.

While some of the explanations behind

self-identified Independence (the presence of sociological
cross-pressures, for example) can also be suggested as

explanations for split-ticket voting, some others (such
as alienation from the party

or*

political system) probably

Self -identification as an Independent reflects,

cannot.

at the very least, de facto disassociation (whether
9See, for example, Angus Campbell and Warren Miller,
"The Motivational Basis of Straight and Split-Ticket Voting,"
American Political Science Review 51 June 1957. and H. Daudt,
Floating Voters and the Floating Vote (Leideni H.E. Slenfert
Kroese, N.V., 1961) and DeVries and Tarrance, The Ticket
Splitter A New Force in American Politics 1972.
,

»

»

,

l^As Chapters II and IV relate. Independents were more
likely than either Democrats or Republicans to be ticketsplitting voters in the six election years examined. In 1972
for example, over two-thirds of all Independents interviewed
claimed to have split their ballots, compared to less than
half of either group of partisans.

10

conscious or not) from the traditional American two-party
system. 11

This is not to say that the majority of

Independents do not still cast their votes and focus
their political interest within the framework of the

two-party system; they do.

But the data indicate that

at least in this regard, an increasingly large number of

Americans are becoming estranged from one of the "grand
Sinnbols" of our democracy.

V/hatever the motivation

behind such an estrangement (an estrangement which is not
manifest, per se , by split-ticket voting) it is worthy
of investigation.

An additional reason for the selection of the selfidentified Independent is that Independence represents a

movement by the electorate away from party identification.
A continued increase in the number of these voters could

conceivably result in further declines in the ranks of the
parties and what Walter Dean Burnham sees as the consequent

deterioration of those parties as viable political agencies.
A part of this study's concluding chapter examines the

llchapter IV of this study discusses the attitudes
of Independents toward political parties and associated
concepts in an effort to determine if these attitudes play
an important role in motivating either partisanship or
Independence. The reference here to disassociation merely
reflects the fact that, whatever their motivation,
political Independents are effectively less a part of the
two-party system than are party identifiers.

11

potential impact which continued
movement in the directi,.on
of a -partyless- politics may
have on the American political
^2
system.
In dealing with self-identified
Independents, a
number of problems and procedural difficulties
are inevitable.
First, of course, is the problem of isolating
the Independents
Since the research in this study has been
conducted

primarily with Survey Research Center data, the
Center's
questionnaires have pre-determined the method of selecting
Independent voters.

Generally, this arrangement has been

very satisfactory, but a few small difficulties have
arisen.
Though all the SRC's questionnaires ask what the voters
"consider- themselves politically (thus providing a sound
index of voter self-identification) the phrasing of the

question sometimes varies slightly from year to year.
Matters are complicated, too. when the questionnaires
ask those respondents calling themselves Independents

whether they "lean** toward one major party or the other.
In overcoming these problems.

simple rules.

I

have tried to follow two

First, in each case where a group of

Independent voters are introduced into the study, the basis

—

^^The term 'partyless' politics and the notion that
a continued weakening of the parties could lead in its
direction comes from Walter Dean Burnham, "The End of
American Party Politics" in Burnham. ed. Politics America
The Cutting Edge of Change (Mew Yorki D. Van Wostrandj 1973).
p. 13^.

—

t

12

for defining them as Independents has been made
explicit.
In some cases, the questions themselves are reproduced
in the text of the study.

Second, in cases where survey-

questions inquire about the partisan direction in which

Independents may •'lean,"

I

have included all Independent

respondents— regardless of their marginal partisan
sentiments

— in

the Independent category. 13

The study itself consists of five chapters.

The

opening chapter reviews the literature which currently
exists on the subject of Independents, and discusses the

ways in which the present study can partially fill some of
the gaps now existing in that body of literature.

Both

books and articles which have been written about
Independents, as well as the more general voting studies
(which normally deal with Independents in the short space
of a sub-chapter or a few paragraphs) are discussed.
The second chapter, beginning the core of the

study, examines the demographic characteristics, political

attitudes, and voting patterns of Independent voters in
13in some instances the different 'types* of
Independent voters are compared and contrasted with each
other. Also some cases exist where it is useful to compare one type of Independent with a certain type of partisan.
By and large, however, when the term Independent is used,
it is intended to include (unless otherwise specified)
all Independents, even those who profess to "lean" toward
one or the other of the two major parties*
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the presidential electorates from I952 through
1972.

The

Survey Research Center data give us the opportunity
to observe and compare this information about Independents

with similar information about their partisan contemporaries
in each of those election years.

The data help us examine

whether (and how) Independents differ from partisans with
respect to income and education levels, age, religion,
type of occupation, social class, and other demographic

traits.

They also tell us how the Independents have voted

in past elections and how their votes compared with those
of the party identifiers.

Finally, they enable us to get a

fairly thorough picture of the Independents* attitudes on a

number of important political issues.

Of special concern

in this chapter are the changes which the Independents have

undergone during this period

— particularly

those changes

which affect the Independents* position relative to partisans.
One problem inherent in analysis of this sort

(especially when discussing 'trends' among Independents,
or comparing the Independents in one election year with

those in another) is trying to decide whether a change among

Independents reflects an actual change occurring among a

fairly constant population group, or whether it reflects
the influx of new voters (possessing the 'new' characteristic

reflected in the alleged change) into the category.

For

example, it would be difficult at first glance to
analyze
a sharp increase in pro-civil rights attitudes among

Independents from one election year to the next.

Would

such a change reflect a liberalizing trend among

Independents, or might it suggest that the Independents
of the first electorate are now calling themselves

Republicans (or Democrats) and that the Democrats (or

— many of whom may
attitudes — are now calling

Republicans) of the first electorate
have had pro-civil rights

themselves Independents?
Since the Independents are such a large and

heterogeneous group in society, it is obvious that both
these explanations are operative in some proportion in
all election years.

The problem, of course, is in trying

to decide which, if any, situation is dominant.

Though,

as noted, neither explanation can claim to definitively

describe all the Independents and the changes they
undergo, it is possible to test (at least indirectly) the

constancy of the group's membership over time.

The best

way to do this using the survey data is to compare the

voting records of Independents with their recollections
of votes in past elections.

If,

for example, the

Independents of I968 claim to have voted Democratic in
196^ in roughly the same proportion as Independents actually
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voted Democratic in 196^. it would lend some
credence to
the notion that the group has some semblance
of consistency
and does not fluctuate wildly— with large numbers
of
•dropouts' and 'dropins

from year to year.

Such a

conclusion would also have import for the discussion
(to be undertaken in Chapter IV) of the extent to
which

short-term historical forces influence the size and
character of the Independent category.

On the other hand,

evidence that the Independents of I968 recalled a

Democratic vote in 196^ vastly different from the 196^
vote of Independents actually observed might lead us to

argue that the category's membership did vary greatly from

election to election.

Table

i - 2

represents the Democratic

vote for President of Independents in 196^, 1968, and 1972,

along with their recollections of their votes in the
previous elections.

The problem of selective over-recall

(remembering voting for a winner when some other vote, or
no vote at all, may have been the case) is partially

controlled in the comparison when we remember that even
the "current** vote is, in fact, a recalled vote since it is

recorded in a post-election interview.
As the Table shows, the only instance of a great

disparity between actual and recalled votes (and, by
implication, between the compositions of the Independent
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categories in different electorates) exists
between the i960
Democratic vote of Independents and the i960
vote recalled
by Independents in the 1964 sample. While it
is certainly
possible that many of the 1964 Independents were
people
who had been Democrats four years earlier, that
is quite
unlikely, since 1964 marked the 'high water* of

Democratic identification {51%)— a. fact difficult to
square with any thesis arguing that the 1964 Independents

were Democrats of i960 who defected.

Far more likely is

the possibility that, with the pro-Kennedy sentiment so

prevalent in 1964, many Independents recalled a i960

Kennedy vote which in fact they did not cast.
not alone in this memory lapse, since

63.9;^^

They were

of all the

voting respondents in the 1964 sample recalled a i960

Kennedy vote, when Kennedy's actual I96O percentage was
roughly ^9%,
These figures suggest, if only tentatively, that
the membership in the Independent category does not

fluctuate wildly from year to year.

While Table

i

- 2

certainly does not offer conclusive proof to that effect
it does suggest that there is indeed a certain membership

consistency to the Independent category from election year
to election year.

While many people undoubtedly do drop

in and out of the category from year to year thus,

•
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ipso facto, changing its character (as •dropouts'
and
•dropins' undoubtedly change the characters of the
two

major parties over time) we can still describe the
category's changes and trends in a meaningful way as
having been influenced by circumstances and the passage
of time, as well as by possible changes in membership.
If we keep in mind the potential variability of the

Independent category and remember to regard it as
something other than a closed group, statements about
its changes in character can be made with some assurance
of accuracy.

Though Chapter II deals with the Independents in
all presidential electorates from 1952 to the present, a

major emphasis has been placed on the years 1964, I968,
and 1972.

During these years the greatest growth in the

number of Independents has occurred.

These three elections

have also occurred in what some political scientists are

calling a period of "realignment."^^

These two conditions

not only make the 1964-1972 period a very interesting one
for our purposes but they also add challenges to the

research by presenting the opportunity to explore the
^^The question of realignment^ and its possible
effects on the current rate of Independence, is discussed
in Chapter IV.
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"short-terra** forces associated with realignment which

may have affected the size and character of the Independent
vote during the past decade.
In the third chapter, one of the questions

perennially asked about Independent voters is addressed!
are Independents, on the whole, more knowledgeable about
and involved in politics than party members, or are they

less so?

(or, perhaps,

is there no essential difference

between Independents and partisans in this regard?)

Since

Independents seem to be rapidly on the increase in this

country and are playing a more central role in election
outcomes, this question takes on added importance.
The dominant opinion of the discipline's voting

scholars is expressed in the language of The American

Voter

I

Independents tend as a group to be somewhat less
involved in politics. They have somewhat poorer
knowledge of the issues, their image of the
candidates is fainter, their interest in the
campaign is less, their concern over the outcome
is relatively slight, and their choice between
competing candidates, although it is indeed
made later in the campaign, seems much less to
spring from discoverable evaluations of the
elements of national politics. 15
^^Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller
and Donald Stokes, The American Voter (New York* John
Wiley and Sons, i960), p. 83.
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This dominant academic doctrine is at odds
with the layman's
conventional wisdom which has traditionally regarded
the

Independent as an ideal democratic citizen, making
political
choices on the basis of merit rather than party
label,
on

rationality rather than blind loyalty.

Chapter III

attempts to provide some answers to this important question.
The fourth chapter looks at some of the reasons

why people choose to call themselves Independents, and
why their numbers have risen so rapidly in recent times,
to these questions, a number of possible answers suggest

themselves.

It is possible that Independent voters are

somewhat more alienated from "the System" (be it the party
system, or more generally the political system) than are
the party identifiers.

Perhaps one can explain political

Independence by the presence of one or a number of
sociological or ideological cross-pressures.

It may be

that the Independent is reluctant to claim a party label

because of a preference for voting for "the person," or
because of a distaste for adhering to what is perceived as
a "party line."

Perhaps the Independents are voters in

transition from one party to the other— finally having

mustered the courage to abandon the party of their
forebears but as yet unable to ally themselves with the

party of their forebears' traditional opponents.

I

It is
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possible, too, that many Independents are
simply young
voters who desire to test the political waters
slowly,

without firmly committing themselves to a political
party
or a set of policies.
Other possible explanations might
include temporal historical circumstances, such as the

presence of an unusually unpopular candidate at the head
of one party's ticket, or conditions which call into

question the honesty and integrity of party officials
and, by implication, the viability of the party system.

In this chapter, the survey data available from
the SRC studies are supplemented by a number of open-

ended personal interviews with Independents in several

sections of the country.

These interviews have been

designed to ascertain the Independents' perceptions of
their political world and to discover the reasons they
have chosen not to align themselves with either major
party.

While not random in character, and thus not

introducable as empirical evidence, they are useful in

supplementing and illustrating in personal terms the
findings of the survey data.
In the final chapter the recent increase in the

number of Independents is assessed both with regard to
its current impact on the two major parties and its

potential longer-range implications for the American
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political system.

In this chapter inverviews with
party

elites have been employed to determine
the way the situation is currently being viewed by the
two major parties,
and the strategies they are developing
to cope with it.

Concerning the longer-range implications, a brief
assessment is made of what the situation's
logical

extension— further decline in party identif icatioh and
movement toward a -partyless" politics— might mean to
the country's political system.

On a theoretical level,

the ramifications of a "partyless" politics are discussed

within the framework of the literature which already exists
on the functions and roles of parties in politics.
The final chapter also discusses where the level
of political Independence is likely to go in future years.

Speculating on how much more the rate of Independence will
rise in the future (if at all), or how much we can expect
it to fall (again, if at all) the chapter explores the

effects which the Independents are likely to have on the

electoral politics of the future and the role which the

Independent voters may play in the continuing evolution
of the American political system.

CHAPTER

I

PERTINENT LITERATURE
In addition to dealing with works and studies which

focus specifically on Independent voters, this chapter

discusses a number of the more general works on voting

behavior which have been produced over the years. Research,
especially in a field as clearly delimited as voting
behavior, is usually an ongoing process

— where

the con-

clusions and results of one study are often the foundation
of the next.

It thus makes sense to begin by discussing

some general voting works

— specifically,

those associated

with Paul Lazarsfeld and Bernard Berelson and with the

research team of the Survey Research Center at the University
of Michigan.

Though some of these studies deal with

Independents only in passing (if at all) they are important
because they have been instrumental in laying some of the
'•ground rules" of the field, and influencing the direction

of subsequent research efforts.

Once the general works have been discussed, some
of the more specific studies which treat Independents in

depth are considered.

Generally speaking, they are presented
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i

in the order of their publication
dates. 1

The discussion

of each piece is built around five
questions (questions
which the present study seeks to answer)

How does the author define and isolate the

1)

Independent voter, and what implications does
this chosen definition hold for the balance
of
the author's research?

What does the research tell us about the

2)

demographic characteristics, voting patterns,
and political attitudes of Independents?

^There are three important works which will not
be discussed in the text of this review (because they
deal with categories of voters somewhat removed from the
self-identified Independents) but merit at least passing
reference.
Two of these, H. Daudt's Floating: Voters and
the Floating Vote (I96I) and V.O. Key's The Responsible
Electorate Rationality in Presidential Voting, I936-I96O
(Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1966) deal with
voters who switch party allegiance from one election to
the next.
The works are somewhat similar in that they
attempt to refute the rather low opinion of switching
voters held and presented by the authors of The American
Voter . A third work, Walter DeVries and V. Lance
Tarrance's The Ticket-Splitter New Force in American
Politics (1972) is currently much discussed and might
easily have been included in this review. However,
DeVries and Tarrance define their category so widely
"the ticket-splitter is likely to be basically a
Republican or Democrat, but one who occasionally splits
off to vote for a candidate of another party" (p. 37)
that it bears only superficial resemblance to the subjects
of this study.
»

I

»
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3)

Do the authors attempt to examine
the reasons
which may motivate political

Independence—

and, if so, what are their conclusions?
^)

What is the general level of political
interest
and political involvement that is attributed
to

Independents?
5)

Do the authors attempt to assess the political

impact of the Independents, from either a short
or long-range point of view, and what conclusion

do they reach?

Not every work, of course, addresses each of these questions.

But by taking each piece of research in its turn, we can

begin to form some impression of what political science
knows about the Independent voter.

General Works

i

The Lazarsf eld-Berelson Studies

The People's Choice , ^ by Paul Lazarsf eld, Bernard

Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet was published in 19^4 and became
an early landmark in social science's attempt to examine

systematically the nature of electoral choice in our society.
It was also the first major study to utilize the "quantitative

^Paul Lazarsf eld, Bernard Berelson, Hazel Gaudet,
The People's Choice (New Yorki Columbia University Press,
19^^).

.
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approach" to the study of politics,
suggested by the
pioneering work of Stuart Rice in 1928.3
The book reports
the findings of a panel study
conducted with a representative group of voters of Erie County,
Ohio, in the
I9/10

presidential election.

Strangely enough, the study was

not originally designed to add to our
knowledge of voting.
£er_se. In his 1959 essay describing some

of the ••landmark-

studies of voting behavior, Peter Rossi
reports that
The People's Choice was conceived, not
because of the

authors' special concern with political events
of

19i^0.

but because of their desire to gain a better
understanding
of the "psychology of choice."^ Lazarsfeld. the
study's

senior author, likened the voting decision to a "consumer's
choice" and sought to understand, in psychological terms,
the components of that decision.

However, to what was

probably the surprise of the authors, their panel study
appeared to indicate that the roots of electoral choice

lay in sociological, rather than psychological explanation.

(r^Iew

York

^Stuart Rice, Quantitative Methods in Politics
Knopf, 1928)
I

^Peter Rossi, "Four Landmarks in Voting Research."
in Eugene Burdick and Arthur Brodbeck (eds.) American Voting
Behavior (Glencoe. Ill.i The Free Press, 1959 )» p. 15 . Rossi
mentions that Lazarsfeld came to the study of voting behavior
only when he failed to obtain the financial support necessary
for a study of consumer preferences.
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Using the analogy of the consumer once more, the
researchers
discovered that the voters possessed strong 'brand
loyalties 'i
-most of them had long-standing attachments to one or
the

other political party. "5
Out of this early research came a widely accepted

picture of the American voter bound, as it were, in something of a sociological straight jacket

.

The act of voting,

as The People's Choice describes it, is a social act, with

social motivations and explanations.

Persons from like

social and economic backgrounds, "...tend to see the world

through the same colored glasses,"^ and thus are prone to
vote in similar ways.

In Lazarsfeld's unequivocal terms,

"Social characteristics determine political preference."'?'
In such short space, it would be inappropriate to

offer specific criticisms of The People's Choice

picture of the American voter it produced.

,

and the

Suffice it to

say that the study was the first of its kind, and, while

suffering the crudeness and occasional over-zealousness
that pioneering efforts often do, it was nonetheless the

model from v/hich many subsequent voting studies took their cue.
^ Ibid

. ,

p.

17.

^Lazarsfeld, et al .
p.

18^1'.

7ibid.

,

p.

27.

,

The People's Choice (19^^).

The People's Choice does not deal specifically
with

Independent voters.

In 19^^, when the book was published,

only one voter in five called himself an Independent,
and

perhaps the authors were not interested in this group

enough to warrant detailed mention of them in the text
of the study.

In fact, the authors' measure of voter

self-identification (what they called their "Index of
Political Predisposition''^) does not have a place for

Independent preference

— one

is either "slightly,"

"moderately," or "strongly" a Republican or a Democrat.
Ten years later, when Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and

William McPhee published Voting .^ their controversial
study of the 19^8 electorate in Elmira, New York, little
had changed in their apparent estimate of the importance
of Independents.

In Voting

,

the authors introduce the

concept of "linear direction" in their description of

partisan political attitudes.

By setting up their direc-

tional models along dichotomous lines ("pro and con,"
"left and right," "Democratic and Republican"^^)

,

they

^Ibid., p. 26.

^Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William
McPhee, Voting A Study of Opinion Formation in a
Presidential Campaign (Chicago University of Chicago
Press, 195^)'
i

lOlbid., p. 1^.
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effectively removed the possibility that
Independents
could play any meaningful role in their
analysis.
Like its predecessor, Voting leans heavily
toward
a sociological explanation of the voting
act.
Interaction
with members of one's own social and economic
group colors
the voter's perception of the issues and
candidates,

solidifies party loyalties, and plays a major role in
the

electoral choice.

In the authors' words,

"...the political

parties maintain fairly constant rates of support which

differ markedly from one stratum to the next.

In order

to account for this, one has to assume that political

discussion goes on mainly within certain groups and is
much less likely to cross social barriers of all kinds.
While their dichotomous method of defining partisan

attachment effectively defines the concept of Independence
out of the study, the authors of Voting do include in their

analysis two categories of voters who resemble in some ways
the Independents which the present study seeks to examine.

These voters are, for Berelson and his colleagues,

"changing voters" and "neutrals."

Speaking first of the "changing voters" (a category
of voters who were later the subject of a debate between
V.O. Key and H. Daudt on the one hand, and the Survey

^^Ibid., p. 299.

i
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Research Center team on the otherl2),
Voting takes an
inclusive view and places in this
category both those
voters who change their minds during
the campaign
("switchers" as the SRC would define them)
and those

changing their loyalties between campaigns
("switchersor "floating voters" as Key and Daudt
would define them).
Concerning this changing vote, a succinct
explanation is
offered
...changes of vote are characterized not only
by inconsistencies in the past but by inconsistencies in their present position on
subsidiary political matters. It is the
people with "cross-pressured" opinions on
the issues or candidates or parties that
is, opinions or views simultaneously supporting different sides who are most likely to
be unstable in their voting position. .13

—

—

.

While these "changing voters" are by no means identical
to the self-identified Independents which the present

study will examine, neither are the categories mutually
exclusive.

The presence of the "cross-pressures" which

Berelson and his associates describe will later be
^^See Key, The Responsible Electorate (I966),
p.

7.

^^Berelson, et_al., Voting

(195''^),

p.

19-
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examined as one of the possible
explanations of selfidentified Independence.
The -neutral voters- mentioned in
Voting are

somewhat closer to the subjects of the present
study.
Unfortunately, "neutrality- was defined in Voting

,

not as describing political self-identification,
but
as describing the voters* attitudes towards the
parties,

candidates, and issues of the 19^8 campaign.

Nonetheless,

some of the discoveries about these neutral voters are

worthy of mention.

In general, these findings are

consistent with those of later studies (to be discussed
below) which looked at Independents in more detail and

pictured them as being somewhat less interested and
involved in politics than party members.

Berelson*s

team concluded that, "the more strongly the voter
favors or opposes parties and candidates, the more

interested he is in the election.

v/hile

conceding

that the "...interested neutral is precisely the image

^^For a discussion of "cross-pressures" in general,
and specific consideration of those mentioned in the Elmira
study as well as a review of the methodological difficulties associated with cross-pressure models, see
Patrick M. Horan, "Social Positions and Political CrossPressures A Re-Examination," American Sociological
Review 36 (August 1971), pp. 650-66O.

—

«

,

15Berelson, et al .. Voting

.

(195^)s>P» 2^.
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of the 'ideal' political man who
exists in some hopeful
theories and most civics text books....they conclude
that such voters are few and far
between.
"The classic
•independent voter* of high interest
but low partisanship is a deviant case. "16

General Works,

The Survey Research Center Studi es

With the publication of The Voter Decides ^^
195^, the academic study of voting behavior turned
on

important corner on the way toward its present
level of
development.

In a major departure from past works, the

authors of The Voter Decides employed a national cross-

sectional sample of respondents, rather than the single

IMA'» PP« 26-2?. It is difficult to include
Votmp; in a discussion of social science literature
without at least passing reference to that study's final
chapter, "Democratic Practice and Democratic Theory." In
it Berelson, the chapter's author, applauds what he calls
the "functional apathy" of the American electorate, in
what amounts to an empirical justification of the theory
of democratic elitism.
Excellent criticisms of this
theory of democratic elitism and Berelson 's refinements
of it, are available in Peter Bachrach, The Theory of
Democratic Elitism; A Critique (Boston Little, Brown,
1968)} Jack L. kValker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory
of Democracy," American Political Science Keview 60 (I966),
pp. 285-95; and James Wright, "Political Alienation in the
United States, I956-70," unpublished dissertation,
University of Wisconsin, 1973, Chapter 5, pp. ^92-500.
i

,

^^Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and V/arren E.
Miller, The Voter Decides (Evanston, 111.! Row, Peterson,
and Co., 195^).
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area studies used by Berelson and
Lazarsfeld.

All

subsequent Survey Research Center-sponsored
research
on presidential elections has employed
the national
sample format.
The Voter Decides is not a work whose
place in

history is assured by the startling or
profound nature
of its findings.

Rather it is best remembered for its

introduction of the use of the national sample, and
its
movement away from the sociological, or group-centered
explanation of the voting act toward a more perceptual,
or psychological explanation which emphasized the

potential for direct contact between candidates, issues,
and voters.

In its discussion of the 19k8 and I952

election campaigns, The Voter Decides breaks fresh ground
on the subjects of political participation, attitudes
on political issues, and party identification

— subjects

whose full implications were to be explored in depth by
The American Voter six years later.

In describing the electorates of the 1948 and
1952 campaigns, Campbell and his associates were the

first to deal specifically with what

I

have earlier

called 'self-identified Independents.'

As is their

1 fi

(i960).

Angus Campbell, et al .. The American Voter

usual practice, the SRC researchers
isolated the
Independents by asking their respondents
what they
usually -think of themselves politically.

In I952,

according to the study, about one voter
in five was
an Independent. The conclusions of their
research on
Independents are sketchy at best, but they offer
us
at least a point of departure from which
to view the more
detailed analysis which The American Vote r was later
to

produce.
For the most part, the Independents of I952
seemed to be concentrated heavily in the Northeast, with

relatively few in the Midwest or South. 19

As might be

expected, these voters seemed less receptive to the idea
of straight-ticket voting than did their partisan counter-

parts. ^0

On the subject of the Independents* degree of

political participation, the research of The Voter Decides
yields a mixed picture

1

the Independents of I952 seemed

to participate somewhat more frequently than Democrats,

and somewhat less frequently than Republicans.^^

Nearly

twice as many Independents as partisans (of either stripe)
^^Carapbell, et al., The Voter Decides (195^), p. 93.
^

^Ibid .. p. 95.

^^Ibid., p. 101.
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described their voting history as having
been spent
supporting the candidates of -different
parties. -22
Though the authors of The Voter Decides

mentioned no conclusions about Independent
voters in
the text of their study (the above
observations
are

culled from a number of charts and graphs),
their use
of self-perception as the key to political
identification

represents an important turning point and lays the

groundwork for the more systematic examination of
Independents in The American Voter .
The American Voter

,

published in i960, is, at

least at this writing, the most extensive study ever

undertaken of American voting behavior.

Relying on data

from national samples of the 19^8, 1952, and I956

presidential electorates, ^3 the study's authors— Angus
Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald
Stokes

— built

a complex and detailed picture of the

2^Ibid., p. 105.
23
^

The American Voter for all its useful insights,
was, as just described, written with data collected in the
1952 and 1956 presidential election campaigns, along with
a smattering of data collected in 19^8.
It is interesting
that social science still regards the v/ork as Scripture
when some of the ingredients in its model of voting behavior
seem less important today than they were at the time of
the study's samples.
Dwight Eisenhower was by no means a
typical presidential candidate and it would seem reasonable
to suggest that some of the forces operative in an election
which involved his candidacy may have in fact been rather
,

unusual temporal phenomena.
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American electorate which, while not
without its critics,
remains authoritative to this day.
In perhaps its most
important contribution, The American Vnt.Pr^
greatly refines
and expands the treatment given party
identification by
the earlier voting studies.

It also pays more detailed

concern to the voters* perceptions of the
candidates and
issues. And it begins to deal, if only in
preliminary
fashion, with the enormously complex phenomenon
of

political ideology.
One other area in which The American Voter
goes

beyond the work of its predecessors is in its treatment
of Independent voters.

Isolating Independents by self-identification,
the first conclusion drawn by The American Voter is that

the voting history of Independents is far less consistent

than that of party identifiers.

For example, when

respondents were asked in 1956 whether they had always
voted for the same or different parties in presidential
elections,

of Independents recalled a history of

having voted for different parties, compared with
of the "weak" party identifiers and

18^5^

40;^

of the "strong"

party identifiers .^^
^^Campbell, et al .. The American Voter (i960), p. 70.
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Perhaps the most interesting of The
American

Voter's findings about Independents concern
their general
levels of interest, knowledge, and participation
in
politics.

As mentioned in our introduction, the
authors

do not equivocate on this question. 25

Describing the

electorate of I956, the authors show the Independents
to
have been considerably less interested in the partisan

political events of that year, and point out—-in convincing
support of their thesis— that

^-9/0

of Independents claimed

not to care very much (or not care at all) about the
outcome of the presidential election.

In contradiction

of the picture then popularly held of Independents, the

study concluded that, in reality, those voters are "...far
from being more attentive, interested, and informed.

..

"26

As The American Voter describes them. Independents are

anything but 'ideal citizens.*
In offering their explanations of self-identified

Independence, Campbell and his colleagues refuse to be
satisfied with the notion that it represents nothing more

than passive non-alignment

1

do not suppose that every person who describes
himself as an Independent is indicating simply
his lack of positive attraction to one of the parties.
Some of these people undoubtedly actually are
repelled by the parties or by partisonship itself

V/e

23 ibid

..

p.

83.

^^Ibid.
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and value their position as Independents.
Certainly independence of party is an idea
some currency in our society, and it seems of
likely that a Dortion n-P ±hr,<sa ^A,y^r^
4.1

In a later passage, the notion that Independence
has

"currency in our society" is expanded

1

The ideal of the Independent citizen, attentive
to politics, concerned with the course of
government, who weighs the rival appeals of a campaign
and reaches a judgment that is unswayed by partisan
prejudice has had... a vigorous history in the
tradition of political reform... and has such a hold
on civic education today... 28
The American Voter was the first major study to

deal with Independent voters in other than a passing
fashion.

Like its findings in other areas, The American

Voter 's conclusions about Independents are not beyond
criticism.

In later chapters, this study will examine

some of those conclusions in depth and make some judgments
as to how well they are standing the test of time.

Independent Voters

1

Research and Commentary

The earliest political science research which deals

specifically and exclusively with Independent voters is
Samuel Eldersveld's I952 article, "The Independent Votei
27ibid., p. 69.

2^Ibid., po 83.
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Measurement. Characteristics,
and Implications for Party
Strategy.. .29 As might be
expected, given the early
date
of Eldersveld's work, little
was known about the
nature
of the Independent vote.
This he readily admits,

Independents may be many or few;
increasing or not, areal patterAs they may be
may or mav not
exist; Independents may be of
many undetermined
intelligent or'^ficklet and
^hfplf^^t^
the
effects of independent voting on
the
system may be benificent or dangerous.
i""?-^
^^ov^ledge about independlnt
votin^?^
well-documented,

:r'infniLus:3§^^'^

To help clear up some of these
ambiguities, Eldersveld

marshals data from three separate studies31
in an effort to
classify various types of Independent voters
and learn a
little about their social and political
characteristics.
His first task is to isolate political
"independence."

In doing so, he rejects exclusive adherence
to either an

aggregative method of defining Independents as those
responsible for inter-election party shifts, or a
totally
subjective method, such as self-identification.

In fact

29samuel Eldersveld, .'The Independent Vote* Measurement, Characteristics, and Implications for Party Strategy "
American Political Science Review ^6, (1952), pp. 732-754.
.

30lbid., p. 735.

^^Eldersveld includes data from the SRC 19-^8 election
study, an aggregative study of the 1950 Michigan gubernatorial election, and a survey of a sample of the voters
of Washtenaw County, Michigan, conducted in 19^9 with the
assistance of Survey Research Center personnel.

he states unequivocally that
"...self perception may be

completely erroneous."

(i.e.. the voter who perceivei

himself to be independent may in fact, by
virtue of hii.8
demonstrated voting behavior, be a confirmed
Democrat
or Republican) 32 He settles on a method
which ascertains,
through responses to survey questions, the
respondents*
voting histories, and defines as Independents
people
who have a history of splitting their ballots or
supporting different parties in different years.

Using this behavioral index as his guide, Eldersveld
examines several characteristics of the Independent vote.

When he looks at the Independents* political participation,
he concludes that,

"on voting turnout. Independents do

not have the high record generally believed; certainly it
is not superior to all types of partisans . "33

His research

showed Independents to have fairly high levels of income
and education, and suggested that "...a larger percentage
of men (than women) were bona-fide Independents.

The older

voters did not reveal as much split-voting and independence.,
a smaller percentage of union members were Independents than

non-members. 3^

In suggesting implications for parties*

electoral strategy, Eldersveld advised, on the basis of
his research, that "...the party which has most appeal to

^^Ibid.. p. 737.

33ibid.. p, 7^6»

3^ibid., p. 751

certain social and demographic
groups-the educated,
prosperous, middle-aged-will
presumably have more
success in attracting Independents
.
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Another 1952 study of Independents
by Alan Meyer
was included in William McPhee
and William Glaser's 1962
Public Opinion and Gonp-ressional K1 Pnt.i .... 36
.

Meyer's definition of Independence,
like the one used in
this study, is perceptual in nature,
but includes a

different group of voters than those to be
investigated
here.

In his work, Meyer included both people
calling

themselves Independents and people who claimed
to have
switched party allegiance in the recent past. But
he

limited his bona-fide "Independent" category to only
those voters with high levels of interest and
participation
in politics.

Similar voters with low interest he labeled

-apathetic."

By so defining his categories, Meyer removed

any chance that his analysis could address itself to the
important question of the Independent's level of
-^^JJlld.,

p.

751.

3^Alan Meyer, "The Independent Voter," in William

N. McPhee and William A. Glaser (eds.) Public Opinion and

Con/^ressional Elections (Glencoe, Illinois The Free Press.
1962), pp. 65-77.
As it appeared in the McPhee and Glaser
reader, Meyer's article was revised by the editors on the
basis of new information which had come to their attention
since the article's original preparation in 1952.
1

if2

participation and involvement.

And, by including persons

who have recently shifted
party allegiance, he obscures
the question of whether
self-identified Independents are
voters in "transition" from one
party to another.
From the perspective of my own
areas of interest
in the subject, the most interesting
aspect of Meyer's
analysis is that Independent voters
(as he defines them)
tend to exist in environments of
what he calls "mixed
stimulation. "37 in Meyer's words, his
data suggest
"...that exposure to conflicting pressures
in one's
social milieu, pressures for political
interest but not
in one party alone, is associated with
maximum independent
voting. "38

In 1959

Robert Agger wrote a short study of the

»

Independent voters in the 1952 presidential electorate .39
Agger's paper sought to determine whether self-identified
Independents differed markedly from partisans in three
general respects

t

demographic characteristics, overt

37ibid,, p. 7^.

IMl' P» 75' Meyer's conclusions in this regard
are rather similar to those offered by Berelson and his
associates in Voting (195^), pp. 18-20.
»

.

^^Robert Agger, "Independents and Party Identifiers!
Characteristics and Behavior in 1952," in Burdick and
Brodbeck, American Voting: Behavior (195^), pp. 308-329.

^3

participation, (i.e., actual physical participation in

voting and other political processes) and what he termed
"psychological participation."

Utilizing both Gallup

and SRC data in his analysis, he concluded that the

Independents in 1952 bore a striking resemblance in these
three areas to the Republicans of that year, but that

Independents seemed to be,

"

.

.

.more *cross-pressured

'

than

either Democrats or Republicans "^0
.

On the question of overt participation. Independents

were located in between the rather inactive Democrats and
the highly involved Republicans, though their performance

in 1952 was somewhat closer to that of the Democrats.
V/hen

looking at "psychological participation" (the extent

to which the respondents had interests in and opinions

about political issues) he found that Independents

actually seemed more concerned with issues than either
group of partisans, even when education was controlled.
Since Agger was writing in the light of The Voter Decides
and other early works which had painted a rather dim view
of Independents, these findings were probably somewhat

surprising to him.

They led him to suggest (in a way which

Walter Dean Burnham would develop later) that there may
^^Ibid., p. 316.

indeed be two groups of Independents in
the electorateone

'high* and the other 'low* on the
scale of 'ideal

citizen* traits.
In 1968, William Flanigan published a small

research compendium, The Political Behavior of the

American Electorate.

The book has been updated a number

of times since, and while Flanigan makes no claim that

all the research he is reporting is original, he does

provide us with a useful reference for examining current

voting behavior research.

Since most of the data he uses

are SRC-originated, Flanigan is dealing primarily with

self-identified Independent voters.

And, while much of

what he reports is supportive of the SRC's basic findings
he offers dissenting views in a number of important areas.

Cognizant of the dim view taken of Independents in The

American Voter and other studies, Flanigan contends that,
"the case against the Independents has been overstated. "^2

While he concedes that Independents are often less
interested in political campaigns and outcomes than are
partisans, he contends that it is possible "...that these
^^V/illiam Flanigan, The Political Behavior of the
American Electorate (Bostont Allyn and Bacon, I968).

^2ibid., p. 41.

^5

measures of 'high interest'
in the campaign and 'great
concern' with the outcome of the
election are tapping
the enthusiasm of the partisans
for their party's

Presidential candidate rather than a
more general
interest in politics. "^3
concluding his section on
Independents. Flanigan describes them
in a far more
positive light than most previous studies.

m

The most nearly correct view of
the Independent.
believe, is that Independents are not
much
interested in politics and government and
I

certainly not much concerned with partisan

politics— they are not emotionally involved

m

party clashes. On the other hand,
appear to have the information and the Independents
perspective
on political affairs necessary for an evaluation
of issues and candidates as competent as
could
be expected of partisans.
Independents are no
wiser or more virtuous than partisans; nor are
they less so.'^^
An interesting aspect of Flanigan's work is that

while using the same data employed by the SRC teams, he
comes to different and somewhat more optimistic

conclusions.

If nothing else, this shows once again

that the "facts- do not "speak for themselves," and
that different researchers— starting with different

assumptions and with different goals in mind
^3rbid., p. 42.

^^Ibid.. p. 43.

— can

view
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the same data and interpret
them in somewhat different
ways • ^5
^

In his 1971 study of 'critical

•

elections and

what he sees as the decline of
American parties, Walter
Dean Burnhara speaks of a rapid rise
in the number of
Independents, the beginning of which, "can
be pinpointed
with some assurance as falling between
1966.-'^6
1964
and

Burnham points to Gallup data which show the
rate of
Independence at JOfo in I969 and claims that,
"for what
is probably the first time since reliable
survey data
became available nearly a generation ago. the
proportion
of strong party identifiers in the total
electorate
is

less than the proportion of independent identifiers "4?
.

^^This does not impugn the "integrity" of the
research in question, but simply makes explicit an
inescapable fact, the analysis (for that matter, the
collection) of data is not a neutral, impersonal enterprise, but one which incorporates and is to a certain
extend bound by the normative predispositions of the
researchers. The present study is not excepted from
this characterization.
^^V/alter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and
the Mainsprings of American Politics (New Yorki W.W. Norton.
1970 ), p. 121.

The reference to 'strong party
^''^IhiA*
P* 121.
identifiers' in Burnham's statement is to those persons
who claim a 'strong' identification with the party of
their choice.
t
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In addition, Burnham speculates that the nature
of Independence itself "...may have undergone a
profound

political change since the 1950 's."

Basically, Burnham

is confronting data from the 1964 SRC survey which
do

not wholly support (at some points even contradict)
The American Voter 's generally low opinion of

Independents. ^8

light of this, Burnham suggests

that "...there is some kind of bimodality in operation
in their demographic profile," and that, "...Independents

tend to split between those with high to very high

scores of political efficacy and those with low to very

low scores. "^9

Observing that many of the new, post-1966
Independents have come from the Democratic ranks, Burnham
cites Gallup data on the new group and argues that,
"...the recent decline in Democratic identification and
Ibid
Burnham's data reveal the
p. 122.
Independents to be rather distinctly "middle class"
in 1964.
He states
"The significant point is that none
of the groups among which Independents have the largest
share... is the kind of group associated with low political
participation or efficacy. If it is indeed true that the
profile of the 1964 Independent can be read in terms
analagous to those used by the authors of The American
Voter , it would have to follow that there is a rather
steep upward gradient in the proportion of individual
voters who are political 'know-nothings* as one ascends
in each social category toward the top of the social
scale.
But this, if true, would be a significant
political anomaly."
. ,

i

^Ibid.,

p.

127.

i
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increase in independent
adults is concentrated
toward
the top Of the social
structure. .. "50 Burnha^n
uses
these findings to support
a thought-provoking
conclusion!
It may be entirely likely
that there are at

structure of electoral politics
at the present
and symbols"'
wnicn do not have rauch meaning
wh?c\'drnot^havr''r'
in terms of
their political values or
cognitions :5l

Burnham's work reminds us that
Independents are not a
monolithic or unchanging group, and
that certain of their
numbers may conform to a number of
different descriptions.
His thesis is an interesting one,
and it
is all

the more pertinent because of its
recent vintage and its

discussion of the increase of Independents
which has
occurred during the past decade. Burnham
believes the
increase is partially attributable to the
disintegration
of the American parties
The evidence lends some credence to the view
that American electoral politics is undergoing
a long-term transition into routines designed
only to fill offices and symbolically reaffirm
"the American Way." There also seem to be

50lbid., p. 128.

51ibid., 127.
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tendencies for our political parties gradually
to evaporate as broad and active intermediaries
between the people and their rulers, even as

they may well maintain enough organizational
strength to screen out the unacceptable or
the radical at the nominating stage.
It
is certain that the significance of party as
link between government and the governed has
now come once again into serious question. 52

E« M. Schreiber has puzzled over the recent

increase of Independents and come up with an explanation
quite different from Burnham's.

Schreiber rejects the

notion that the parties face imminent collapse and
argues that "...party identification still remains the
single best predictor of votes both at the presidential
level and at the lower levels of government. "53

Schreiber 's

1971 essay is an attempt to assess and understand, in

electoral terms, the import of the rise in Independence
that occurred between 196k and 1970.

Focusing on the components of that increase,

Schreiber concludes it has occurred almost exclusively
among whites, has been especially marked in the South,
and outside the South, has been most notable among

young voters.

He attempts to make his data politically

52v/alter Dean Burnham, "The End of American
Party Politics," in Burnham (ed.) Politics/America
Cutting Edge of Change (1973). p. 132.
t

.

Schreiber, "'V/here the Ducks Are
Southern Strategy Versus Fourth Party" Public Opinion
Quarterly , 35» Summer 1971»P» I66.
53e,

'

1

The

i

50

useful when he advises that, on the basis of
the political
attitudes he has observed in the new Independents,
con-

servative electoral strategies would be most effective
in trying to gain their allegiance.

His data dispute

the notion that the new Independents constitute a

potential power base for a new radical-left party
There may or may not be an attempt to raise a
new left-oriented party to contest the I972
presidential election, but if such an attempt
is made, the data presented here suggested that
white Independents will prove less than a readymade constituency, outside as well as inside
the South. 5^

Schreiber argues that a "Southern Strategy**

by Republicans would be an effective course in 1972
(as it apparently was) and sees only disaster should

the left attempt the formation of a new party.

Pointing

out that such a party would come not from Independents but

from Democrats, he concludes that **...on the basis of the

data examined here, it appears that the fourth party

strategy in 1972 would create conditions that would almost
guarantee a Republican plurality and thereby make a
•Republican majority' unnecessary.

•'55

Another scholar concerned with the recent rise in
Independent voters is James Sundquist.

Sundquist begins

his discussion of Independents by attempting to describe

5^Ibid., p. 167.

^^Ibid.
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the ten million voters he claims have deserted
the major

parties during the past six to eight years.

From a

demographic viewpoint, Sundquist says that "...the
increase
(among Independents) was entirely attributable to whites.

••56

Many of those whites were Southern Democrats and, among
that group,

•'the

growth of independent political attitudes

...is entirely among those opposed to government action to

enforce school integration....

Southern integrationists

show no increase in independent voting.^57

in addition to

these defecting Southerners, Sundquist shows that the

Democrats also lost a large number of Northern Catholics

during this period.
The new Independents, of course, have not come

exclusively from the Democratic ranks.

According to

Sundquist, the 1960*s also brought a new loss of

^fo

in

the portion of the electorate considering themselves

Republicans.

These Republican losses occurred primarily

among middle-class, college-educated suburbanites.

Additionally, both parties suffered from an inability to

attract the allegiance of many young voters

—a

fact whose

significance is underscored when we consider the large
^^Jame s Sundquist, •'V/hither the American Party
System?" Political Science Quarterly 88, December
,

1973. p. 571.

57 ibid

..

p. 571.

numbers of young voters who have been
coming into the
electorate in recent years.

Searching for a way to explain these defections,
Sundquist suggests that the answer may lie
in the nature
of the politics of the past ten years.

He argues that

the 1960's were a period whose politics revolved
around

three central issues— the Vietnam War, the race issue,
and the 'social issue' (an agglomeration of concerns,

usually said to encompass crime, drugs, rebellious youth,
and 'permisiveness '58)

.

According to Sundquist, these

were not 'normal' political issues which could easily be

absorbed into the traditional post-New Deal partisan
structure.

He uses these

'abnormal' issues as a partial

explanation for the decline of the parties and the rise
of Independence

I

By cutting across the existing line of party cleavage,
these issues blurred the distinction between the
major parties and created polar forces that found no
satisfying expression through those parties. 59

When we identify the voters most directly affected by these
issues (Southern whites on the race issue, and young voters

—

—

^^The 'social issue' and all its implications
are discussed thoroughly by Richard Scammon and Ben
Wattenberg, The Real Majority (New Yorki Coward-McCann,
Chapter I.
1970)
,

•59sundquist, "Whither the American Party System?"
(1973), p. 578.
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on Vietnam, for example) we
identify many of the voters
Who, in Sundquisfs words,
«...are rejeoting the major
parties and calling themselves
independents . "60
Still another explanation
for the recent increase
is suggested by Rita Hauser.61
„auser argues that the
newly-numerous Independents are really
Republicans and
Democrats who were disenchanted
and driven from their
parties by those parties' selections
of "extremist"
presidential candidates in 196k and
1972 respectively.
-Both candidates." (Goldwater and
McGovern) writes Hauser.
-were moralistic, ideological,
and far removed from the
center point... and the center, where
the country really
sits, turned away. "62
curious irony, the defection
of alienated Democrats and Republicans
into the Independent
column has ensured the continuation of
the situation they
abhor.
The new Independents* departure has
permitted
the

parties to be captured by "...the fringe
element who view
politics as passion rather than persuasion, as
blind loyalty
rather than broad tolerance and who, by default
of the

independents' participation in party affairs,
nominates
^°rbid., p. 578.

^^Rita Hauser, "The Center Can Hold," guest
columnist
the New York Times December 11.

m

62ibid.

.

1973. p. ^5c.

5^
the candidates from within
its narrow nest. -63

Thus a

vicious circle is joined in
which large numbers of
voters
are driven from the parties
by undesirable candidates,
and
their departure ensures that
such undesirable candidates
will continue to be nominated
in the future.
The validity of Hauser's
theory is subject to

question-especially since the parties
seem to have more
flexibility than she ascribes to them,
and can seemingly
bounce back from even the gravest
of defeats. Nonetheless,
her essay is interesting in that
it suggests (as
does

Sundquisfs work, to some extent) that
'short term' forces
may be playing an important role in
the contemporary
upsurge of Independence. Chapters IV

and V of this study

examine some of those short term forces
and assess their
impact on political identification.

By way of summation, it may be said that
the

picture of Independents painted by social science
is
complex and, at times, even somewhat contradictory.
There is much disagreement, for example, on the
question
of the Independents' overall political awareness
and

astuteness.

Some researchers believe that Independents

are generally less involved and less aware of political

things than are partisans, (Campbell, et al .. i960) while
^3ibid.
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others argue a more favorable impression
of Independents
(Agger, 1959; Flanigan, 1968) or suggest a
'bimodality'
among the Independents, with some of their number
highly

interested and involved and others less so (Burnham,
I970).
In general the literature describes the Independents
as a group located above the median in terras of
income,

occupation, and education (Eldersveld, 1952, Agger,
195^),

but Walter Dean Burnham (1970) argues that the Independents
are split in terms of their demographic and socioeconomic

traits

— some

located near the 'top' of the socioeconomic

scale, with others near the 'bottom.'

A host of variables are cited as possible explanations of political Independence.

Sociological and

ideological cross-pressures are often suggested by the
researchers, (Berelson, et__al.

,

1954; Meyer, 1962;

Agger, 1959) as are the overall decline in the strength
of political parties (Burnham, 1970), the 'partyless

issues' of the 1960's (Sundquist, 1973), and the

alienation of many voters resulting from the parties'
falling into the hands of 'extremist' factions (Hauser,
1973)

•

As for the possible consequences of the currently

large number of Independents, Burnham (1970) argues that

their presence can only hasten the continuing decomposition
of the political parties

— with

rather ominous policy
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consequences-6^ and Hauser (1973) concludes that
their
desertion of the parties can only perpetuate the
condition
(i.e., control of the party by extremist
factions) they
seem to abhor.
V/e

have learned during the past twenty years of

research that political Independents are not a monolithic
group, and that the phenomenon of political Independence
is not a simple one to describe.

The general thrust of

recent literature has pointed out, for example, that a

tendency toward bimodality (both in socioeconomic terms,
and on 'ideal citizen' traits) exists in the Independent

category.

Also, research has indicated that temporal

political circumstances appear to affect the rate of
Independence.

By and large, however, many of the

ambiguities which Eldersveld described in 1952 still
surround our knowledge of the Independent voter.

important questions remain unanswered.
unasked.

Many

Some remain

This study hopes to reduce both of those

categories
^^Some of these possible consequences, ominous and
otherwise, are discussed in Chapter V.

CHAPTER

II

THE INDEPENDENT VOTERS,
I952-I972
In this chapter Independent
voters are examined
as they have appeared in
the national electorate
in the
six presidential elections
from I952 to 1972. The data
used came from the national
samples of voters conducted
by the Survey Research Center
and examine the Independents
voting habits, political attitudes
and beliefs, and their
demographic and socioeconomic
characteristics. In each
case, and for each year, an
effort has been made to
compare the Independents to their
Democratic and

Republican contemporaries.
Since no presidential campaigns or
elections occur
in historical vacuums, included in
the chapter are brief
discussions of the historical and political
climate in

which each of the six elections took place.
1952

Eisenhower V. Stevenson
At the time that Harry S. Truman decided not to
seek re-election in 1952, his personal popularity was at
a very low ebb.

Though history would lead many of them

57

58

to change their judgments, many Americans in I952 believed

Truman had bungled his conduct of the Korean

V/ar,

been

responsible for the rampant inflation of the time, and
in many respects, lacked the "stature- to be an effective

President.

With military affairs and the dignity of the

Presidency thus on the voters' minds, the climate was
ripe for the election of one of our country's greatest

military heroes, General Dwight D. Eisenhower.

The

enormously popular "Ike" Eisenhower, and his running
mate, Richard Nixon of California, coasted to a landslide

victory in November over their Democratic opponents,
Governor Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois and Senator

John Sparkman of Alabama.
Perhaps more surprising than the outcome of the

election itself was the nomination of Eisenhower to head
the Republican ticket.

Though relatively little was

known about the General's political beliefs early in
1952, he was generally held to be a 'moderate' on

domestic issues and a mild 'internationalist' in world
affairs.

His nomination marked a departure from

Republican philosophy of the past which had traditionally
advocated a virtual isolationism in foreign policy and
sought primarily, as its domestic policy, to roll back
and overturn many of the New Deal reforms.

Though

59

Thomas E. Dewey, the party's nominee
in 19^^^ and 19k8,
was himself a moderate Republican,
it was not until

Eisenhower's showdown victory over Taft
in I952 that
the Republican image of domestic
ultra-conservatism
and international isolationism was
effectively muted in
the public mind. Eisenhower's nomination
signaled the

resignation of the GOP to the fact that mainstream
America was likely never to return to the
politics of
the nineteen- twenties.
This resignation was precipitated,
if not by changes in Republican philosophy, by
calculated

political pragmatism.

"The sequence of elections before

1952," writes V.O. Key, "had, by their cumulative
impact,

made it plain that the Republican party could not
win the

Presidency if it seemed clearly to threaten the gains of
the principal beneficiaries of the New Deal."l

Realizing

this, the delegates to the Republican National Convention

left Senator Robert A. Taft and what had come to be known
as his "standpat Republicanism" standing in the wings.

Instead, they selected Eisenhower on the first ballot
a decision that was destined to return them to the White

House for the first time in twenty years.
^V.O. Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups
(New York Thomas Y. Growell, Fifth Edition, I969),
p. 193.
I

.
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For their part, the
Democrats went to a third
ballot before nominating
Adlai Stevenson.
Stevenson came
into the convention as
something of an underdog,
since
Senator Estes Kefauver of
Tennessee had been the most
successful vote-getter in
the Democratic primaries.
Kefauver had alienated many
Southern white Democrats
by his strong civil rights
position and angered the
party -bosses" in many Northern
cities by his past
efforts to link parts of their
organizations
to the

fringes of organized crime.

Without these "bosses" and

the vote from the South.
Kefauver's cause was lost, and
the convention moved to Stevenson.

Despite (or because of) his
polished oratory
and quick wit. Stevenson proved
a relatively ineffective
campaigner. No competition for
Eisenhower's infectious
grin and firendly style. Stevenson
was unable
to excite

an electorate who viewed the
General with fond memories
of the past and great hopes for his
returning 'dignity'
to the office of the Presidency.
Stevenson and Sparkman
were beaten soundly in November, receiving
only
89

electoral votes and ^4.5^ of the popular total.

Though the 1952 election had all the earmarks
of
a 'personality contest'

(that abberation of democracy so

widely decried by civics books— and candidates who are
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losing.), there were
several issues which
generated voter
interest.
The Korean War, the "loss"
of China, and
America's seemingly weakened
position in world affairs,
an played on the voters' minds.
Most of these issues'
were "naturals" for
Eisenhower's Republican candidacy,
and he successfully argued
that his long experience
in
world affairs would be a
tremendous asset in the
Presidency.

While Stevenson argued that a
Republican victory
would mean an end to the social
progress of the past
twenty years, the GOP could point
to the so-called
"Truman scandals" (an amalgam of
alleged bribings,
fixings, and unwarranted pardonings)
as evidence of the
Democratic mismanagement which deserved
voter repudiation.
And, with Eisenhower-a fairly
'progressive'

Republican-

at the head of the GOP ticket.
Democratic charges of

Republican arch-conservatism were somewhat
muted in
their effect on the voters.
Whether the international and domestic
difficulties
of the Truman administration made a Republican
victory

inevitable in 1952 is difficult to say.

What is certain

is that the nomination of Dwight D. Eisenhower,
and the

change in Republican direction which it marked, made the

GOP a far more attractive party in 1952 than it had been
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at any time since the twenties.

And. by according him a

landslide victory in the November
elections, the voters
proved that they did, indeed,
"like Ike."
The 1952 national electorate
was composed of

Democrats, 25.6/. Republicans and 21.
2f. Independentsfigures which were obtained by
observing respondents'
answers to the question, "Generally
speaking, do you
think of yourself as a Republican,
a Democrat, an
Independent, or what?"
The Independents in 1952 contributed in
no small

way to Eisenhower's landslide victory. 2

Two thirds of the

Independents voted for the General, as did
96.1^ of the
Republicans and one fourth of the Democrats. There

'

was

also something of a volatile quality to the
Independent
vote of that year, since in 1952,

4if.8/.

of the Independents

claimed a history of having voted for different parties

^Another possibility, of course, is that the
Eisenhower candidacy was responsible for driving many 19^8
Democrats, now fond of the General, into the Independent
camp.
There is, as mentioned in the introduction, no
precise way of determining which explanation is dominant,
but Table i - 2 would seem to indicate that individual
candidacies are not responsible, by themselves, for
percipitous changes in the composition of the Independent
category. Also, it should be remembered (as shown in Table
i - 1) that the rate of Independence stayed fairly constant
from 19^8 to 1952. Democratic identification, in fact,
increased slightly during the period--a fact which casts
doubt on any thesis that the Eisenhower candidacy, per se
was responsible for major changes in party identification.
,
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in past presidential elections.

When we delete from

their numbers the 23.6/. of the Independents
who had not
previously voted (because of age and assorted
reasons)
we see 58. 7f. of all 'eligible' Independents
to have been
"floating voters" at one time or another. Such a
'floating' tendency was exhibited by only one-quarter
of the partisan voters.

Further evidence of the

Independent's "independence" in voting patterns comes

when we see that almost one fourth of them claimed to
have split their tickets "about evenly" in 1952, compared
to only 13.2;^ of the Republicans and 11.4^ of the Democrats.

As mentioned above, one of the most important
issues of the 1952 campaign was American involvement in
Korea.

A measure of its salience can be gleaned when we

compare the voters' attitudes toward Korea with voter

attitudes on the more contemporary problem of American

involvement in Viet Nam. 3

It will surprise few that,

when asked in I968 if they felt that American involvement
in Viet Nam had been a mistake, ^l,6fo of the electorate

said that it had been.

In 1952, 38.9;« of the American

voters believed that our involvement in Korea had been
^In depth analysis of American public opinion on
the wars in Korea and Viet Nam is available in John Mueller's
War, Presidents, and Public Opinion (New Yorki John Wiley
and Sons, 1973) » especially Chapter 3«

6^

a mistake.

Though this figure is not as high
as the
number of Americans who dissented
over Viet

Nam. it is

a substantial figure, and gives
a good indication of the
extent to which the Korean question
was a controversial

one in 1952.

When we examine opinion on Korea
along

partisan lines, we see that 370/^ of
the Independents
felt that America involvement there
was a mistake, as

did 35.7/^ of the Democrats and
5^.3fo of the then "dovish"

Republicans.

Significantly, however, even though the

Republicans were least supportive of initial
involvement
(no doubt because it was undertaken at the
order of a

Democratic President), they appeared as supportive
as
the Democrats and Independents of pursuing
an 'escalation*

policy designed to result in a military victory.

Over

kO/o

of the Republicans sought such a military victory,
as did

39.0^ of the Independents and 35.1?^ of the Democrats.

Among the domestic issues of concern in 1952 were
the question of the federal government's role in the
affairs

of the citizenty, federal involvement in civil rights

matters, and the controversial Taft-Hartley Act.

Concerning

the role of the government, respondents were asked if they

believed that, "...the national government should do more
in trying to deal with such problems as unemployment,

housing, and so on."

The 1952 Independents were as
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enthusiastic as Democrats in their support of government
involvement, with 20. 9^^ of their number arguing for a

larger governmental role.

Holding that same position

were 17.9^ of the Democrats and

13.2'/$

of the Republicans.^

When the focus was narrowed, however, to elicit opinions
on whether or not the government should "...take an

interest in whether negroes have trouble getting jobs...,**
the Independents hedged somewhat, and like the

Republicans were less supportive of that type of

activity than Democrats.
On the subject of the Taft-Hartley Act, the

Independents joined both Republicans and Democrats in a

general endorsement of the Act's propriety.

They were,

however, less supportive of the Act than Republicans,

only 2.7/^ of whom favored its repeal compared to

9.7;^

of the Independents and 15*5/° of the Democrats.

In looking at the demographic and socioeconomic
I

characteristics of the electorate in 1952, some interesting
patterns emerge.

The Independents of that year were

concentrated most heavily in the Northeast and Midwest,
with relatively few of them (proportionately speaking)
^The observed difference in this case between
Independents and Democrats is not statistically significant.
21.
of the Independents stated the
such an interest, compared
take
should
government
federal
19
of the Republicans.
and
Democrats
to 29.8;^ of the
5\Vhen asked,
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residing in the South.

Over one fourth of the North-

easterners called themselves Independents then as did

21.8^ of the people in the Midwest.

In the South,

barely one person in ten was an Independent (nearly
lQ)''/o

of the Southerners were still Democrats in 1952)

and in the West the percentage of Independents was
18.2^,

The Independents tended to be city dwellers

more than did the party members with over a third of
their numbers residing in central cities, compared to

about one-fourth of both Democrats and Republicans
There were fewer blacks among the Independent ranks
than among the Democrats, but more than among the

Republicans.
The Independents of the 1952 electorate tended
to be slightly more numerous among the younger age

groups in society than among the older groups.
Figure II -

1

graphically presents the percentage of

Independents among the various age groups in the 1952
electorate.

V^hile the incidence of Independence

generally

seems somewhat higher among the younger age groups, there
is no precipitous drop once the 21-2^ and 25-28 age groups

have been passed, and the decline in Independence with age

city dwellers
^J)7 ,9% of the Independents were central
compared to 2k,7fo of the Democrats and 29^3% of the
Republicans
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is barely perceptible among
voters over thirty,

m

I952.

there seemed no wide gap between
'old' and 'young' voters
in terms of their preference for
political Independence.
On the socioeconomic indices,
Independents

generally occupied a middle position—
somewhere 'below*
the Republicans and 'above* the
Democrats. Where variations from this trend occurred they were
instances
of

the Independents pushing 'upward' on the
socioeconomic

scale, in one or two cases approaching the levels
held

by the Republicans.
One such index was income, where

13.^

of the

Independents reported a family income in excess of
$7500 per year, compared with 12, 5fo of the Republicans
and only 4.3^ of the Democrats.?

At the other end of the

income scale, only 29.1^ of the Independents earned less
than $3000 per

year— a figure about

the same as the

31.0^ of the Republicans who earned that amount (35.^
of the Democrats in 1952 earned less than $3000 a year).
The relatively high income of the Independents (in 1952,

there was no significant difference between the income

levels of Independents and Republicans) was very probably
a reflection of their occupational status since, in that

?The observed difference between Independents
and Republicans in this case is not statistically
significant.
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year,

they clustered disproportionately
toward the 'high
status' side of the occupational
scale.
The percentage of
their numbers (l6.6f.) who were
either professional people
or upper level managerial
personnel was as high as that of
the Republicans and higher than that
of the Democrats.
The Independents were about as likely
as partisans
to be members of union families in
1952.9 and. when asked
if they perceived themselves as being a
member of a social

class, Independents located themselves between
the

Republicans and Democrats— less "working class" than
the Democrats, but not as "middle class" as
the Republicans. 10

The educational levels of the Independents in
1952 appear

somewhat more impressive than this "average" perception
would indicate, since their mean level of educational

attainment in that year was 10.1 years, a figure about
equal to the 10.3 years of the Republicans, but above
the 9*0 years for the Democrats.il

^10.^^ of the 8^1 Democrats in the sample and
of the ^86 Republicans occupied such positions.

17.0^;^

^7^»Q/o of the Independents were members of nonunion families, compared to 69,lfo of the Democrats and
77 .0:^ of Republicans.

^^On this question, 3^ of the Independents called
themselves 'middle class' as did 26.3;^ of the Democrats
and 55*2;^ of the Republicans.
llThe Independent-Republican difference in this case
is not statistically significant.
That between Independents
and Democrats is significant at the .01 level.
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It appears, on balance, as if Independents
were

indeed the 'middle* voter in 1952.

Their support of

Eisenhower was greater than the Democrats, but less
than
the Republicans.
Their political attitudes seemed to
cluster near the center of the Democratic-Republican
split.

And their demographic and socioeconomic profiles

showed them to be slightly less 'well-to-do' than the

Republicans, but generally better off than the Democrats.

Perhaps the most interesting observation is that

especially on several socioeconomic indices

— the

Independents of 1952 seemed to be "crowding" the

Republican end of the continuum.

That, coupled with

their fairly heavy (app. 65%) support of Eisenhower,
gives their appearance a faintly Republican caste in
that year, and should be remembered as we examine their

characteristics in subsequent elections.
1956

Eisenhower V. Stevenson
In many ways (including the most obvious) the 195^

presidential election was a virtual 're-play' of the 1952
contest.

Perhaps more than anything, the election was an

affirmation that the nation's voters still "liked Ike."
There is no doubt more to that now-famous phrase than a
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Simple campaign slogan.

Eisenhower's personality,
and
the voters, favorable
perception of his congenial
-father
image, were unquestionably
major factors in his
re-election.
Samuel Elliot Morison has
written that "his genial

character and transparent honesty
inspired loyalty to
himself and confidence in his
administration. "12 This
loyalty and confidence were
expressed by the voters in
the landslide victory which
they awarded him
in I956.

Among the relevant issues in
the I956 campaign
were the state of President
Eisenhower's
health, the

newly emergent civil rights issue
precipitated by the
Supreme Court's decision in Brown
V. Bo.rd of Edun.ti.n
^^ ^^^^^^
195^. and the afterwash of McCarthyism
and its attendant focus on the
perils of the so-called
"communist menace."
The relative success of the Eisenhower
admin-

istration in ending the Korean conflict,
extending
unemployment benefits, launching a massive
Interstate
Highway program, and convincing the populace
that its
•dynamic conservatism* was the perfect vehicle
in the

war of "liberty against socialism," all enabled
the

Republican party, with the revered Ike at the head of
12

Samuel E. Morison, The Oxford History of the
American People (New Yorki Oxford University Press,
1953;, p. 1079.
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the ticket,

to capture k57 electoral
votes and 57% of

the popular total.

All was not bright for the
GOP,

however, since the I956 election
returned to Congress
the Democratic majority in
both houses which had been
elected in the off-year contest
of I954.
This
Democratic majority, in the face of
Eisenhower's
landslide, resulted in 'divided government
'-at that
time a most unusual occurrence-and
suggested that the
electorate of 1956 was not conforming
to patterns of
the past.
In 1956, 23,1^% of the electorate thought
of

themselves as Independents, while ^3-5/^ were
Democrats
and 29.1^ were Republicans. More specifically,
when
asked, -do you usually think of yourself as
a Republican,
a Democrat, an Independent, or what?" the
voters responded

as demonstrated in Table II - 1.

The categories "weak"

and "strong" positions were determined by asking
partisan

respondents the strength of their affiliation, and the
categories of 'leaning* Independents were determined

by asking the Independent respondents if they considered
themselves "closer" to one party or the other.
In the 1956 election, the Republicans (both
'strong* and

'weak' Republicans, are now here included

as they will be in the future, unless otherwise stated)
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supported President Eisenhower
solidly, as might be
expected. Of those voting,
96.3/. went for Eisenhower,
compared with 25.5/. of the
Democrats (both strong and
weak) and 73-6/. of the
Independents (included here
are
all three categories of
Independents, as they will be
in the future unless
otherwise specified.)
in short.'

Eisenhower was able, in I956. to
command the almost
unanimous support of Republicans,
win a large majority
of Independents, and earn
the votes of many Democrats.
If we turn these figures
around a bit. we see that

Eisenhower got 29.5% of his votes
in I956 from
Independent voters (while Stevenson
got only I5.7/,
of his total from the Independents.)
It is clear that
the Independents of 1956 were
very important
in

Eisenhower's victory, but some other
elements of that
Independent vote are not so obvious and
merit further
examination.
To begin, it may be the Independent
voter of I956

who was responsible for the ••surge"13
election and the
"divided government" it produced, since
31,9> of the
13The term "surge" election-connoting an election
which a party's victory in a presidential election
goes unaccompanied by a victory in the House of
Representatives—was coined by Charles Sellers, "The Equilibrisra
Cycle
Two-Party Politics," Public Opinion Quarterly
^
Vol. 29 (Spring 1965), pp. 16-3^^:

m

m

.
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independents in that year
claimed to have "splif.
their
tickets on the presidential
and congressional races,
as
opposed to 16.5/. Of the
Republicans and 12.9% of
the
Democrats. While ticket-splitting
.ight ,uite logically
occur more frequently among
Independents, this disparity
is still rather startling
and suggests that the"
Independents
of twenty years ago may have
been the pioneers of
the

"ticket-splitting'' phenomenon which
is so widespread
1^
today,

In addition to being
"ticket-splitters," the
Independents of 1956 also seemed
more likely to be
"floating voters" than did partisans
of either stripe.
When asked if their votes in
previous presidential
elections had been cast for only one
or for different
parties, over half the Independents
claimed a history
of having voted for different parties,
while such a

mixed past was observed among about one-fourth
of the
party identifiers. These figures seem to confirm
the

common sense assumption that Independents have
a more
flexible vote than do partisans— both with respect
to

different contests in the same election year, and between
the elections of different years.
•^^For a discussion of the 'ticket-splitter* see
DeVries and Tarrance, The Ticket-Splitter New Force in
American Politics (197277
i

~

I
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Among the questions asked in
the I956 survey
designed to measure the respondents'
political attitudes
were those dealing with civil
rights, "big"

government,
and how to deal with internal
and external 'threats'
from communism.
The Independents of I956 took
a generally con-

servative position on the question
of the government's
involvement with the economy and welfare

of the citizens-

about as 'conservative' as Republicans
(who generally
favored the government's non-interference)
and considerably
less 'liberal' than the Democrats (who
tended to favor
government involvement) . 15 in contrast, on
questions
dealing with civil rights issues, the
1956 Independents
were the group most favorable to the cause
of school
de-segregation, outstripping both Republicans and

Democrats in support of government intervention to
ensure
the integration of public education,

(though their

expressed support of federal efforts to aid in securing
jobs and housing for negroes was no higher than that
of
the party identifiers of either party).

^^For example, 50^ of the Independents agreed
that the government should aid in seeing to it that
"...everyone has a job and a good standard of living,..,"
as did 70^ of the Democrats and ^6.2;^ of the Republicans
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Another issue area of high
salience in I956
was that area of concerns
that can generally be
labeled
the -communist problem."
their attitudes on this
"problem." the Independents
seemed to be somewhat more

m

••open-minded" than either Democrats
or Republicans.

For
example, when asked if the
government ought to "fire
any government worker who is
accused of being a communist."

63.1^ of the Independents disagreed, as
compared to 53.2^
of the Republicans and
SI *H of the Democrats. On the

question of foreign aid. however, the
differences were
insubstantial, with 32.8,^ of the Independents
agreeing
that foreign aid was right, "...even
if they
(the

recipients) are not as much against communism
as we
are,..." Similar agreement was forthcoming
from 30.5^
and 27.6?5 of the Republicans and Democrats,
respectively.
These few items do not purport to describe the

"ideology" of the 1956 Independents.

For one thing, the

range of opinions touched by these questions is limited
and results are far too sketchy.

It is possible to say.

however, there appear to be few large gaps between the

attitudes of Independents and those of the partisans in
1956. at least on the issues examined.

In fact, except

on measures of approval of government's involvement in
the economic lives of the people, there appears very
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little difference between the
attitudinal patterns of
the Democrats and Republicans.
Later in the chapter
our examination of the
electorates
of I968 and I972

will show that the broad-based
'consensus' here
described appeared to erode somewhat
when pressured by
issues relating to war, poverty,
and ra-^e relations.
This erosion causes one to wonder
if th.> consensus so
often described to exist during the
1950's (from which
many notions about the consensual nature
of
'normal

polities' in America are drawn) was by
itself something
of an abberation, produced more by
'short term' forces
than by any overriding consensus with
or in the political
system itself.!^
In 1956, most Independents in the United States

were concentrated in the Northeast and Midwestern
areas
of the country.

Table II -

2

shows the 1956 pattern of

party identification by region in the four geographical
1^1 t is interesting that the consensual nature
of the 1950 's politics was used by some analysts as a
model for what they perceived to bo the 'end of
ideology' as a potent force in political struggles.
The fact that this consensus may have been due more to
a number of short-term forces rather than the 'end of
ideology' v/as apparently overlooked by these observers.
An excellent collection of essays devoted to the 'end
of ideology' thesis (both pro and con) is available in
Chain Waxman, ed.
The End of Ideolo>":v Debate (New Yorki
Simon and Schuster, I968)
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areas of the country .

In the table * the area Northeast

includes New England and the Middle
Atlantic states;
the South includes the traditional
•border' states as
well as the 'deep* South; and the
West includes the
Mountain and Coastal states.
TABLE II -

2

PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY REGION OF RESIDENCE IN
I956
Northeast

Midwest

kjuuoii

wesu

Republican

^1.0

33.7

18.0

22.8

Democrat

30.

36.9

58.9

^2.7

Independent

26.6

27.8

18.0

22.8

2.1

1.6

5.1

11.7

Other

100.0
(N=402)

100.0
(N=536)

100.0
(N=555)

100.0
(N=2i|'l)

As is shown in the table, the highest incidence
of Independence occurred in the Northeast and Midwest

whereas the South had the smallest percentage of
Independents.

The Independents hailed disproportion-

ately from cities

— both

small and large— and relatively

few of their numbers were from rural areas.

Also as

tended to be the case in 1952, there was a higher

proportion of Independents among the young in 1956 than
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among their elders.

Figure II

- 2

illustrates the

party identification patterns
of voters by age
group.
While this figure yields no
'straight line*
relationship, it certainly presents
us with a few
general trends worthy of discussion.
The incidence of
Republican identification is more
frequent among older
voters, and that of Independence
is most common among
the young.
There are a number of fluctuations
in the

pattern of Democratic identification,
but it seems to
be less affected (in any consistent
pattern) by
age

than either of the other two categories.

As we look

at the graphical representations of
Republican and

Independent identification, the figures suggest
that
many of the young Independents who, with
age, choose

to identify with a party most often
choose the

Republicans.

It might be theorized that, since

Republicanism seems to appeal more to older voters,
the Independents who, by definition, choose
a party

later in life (if at all) are more likely to end up

eventually in the Republican camp.
tfien

If this is true,

it is possible the contemporary (19?^) boom of

xndependent voters— especially young ones— could
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someday work to the eventual
advantage of the
GOP. 17

In addition to being
"younger" than their partisan
counterparts, the I956 Independents
were also more likely
to be found among whites
than non-whites. 2l^.l^% of
whites were Independent as
were 13^^ of the non-whites.
In the socioeconomic categories,
the Independents
seemed to be slightly better off
(relative to partisans)
than they were in 1952. Somewhat
surprisingly,
the

Independent voters had the highest mean
educational
level in the electorate, with 10.
3

years of school.

Comparable figures for the Republicans
and Democrats
were 9-7 and 9.0 years respectively. 18
There were
relatively fewer college graduates among
the

Independents than among Republicans, but there
were
fewer Independents (22.1^^ with only a grade
school

education than either Democrats {28.5%) or Republicans
^"^While Screiber's analysis,

{31.k'/o).

"Where the Ducks

Are,"
U97l; argues that the Independent boom will most likely
benefit
(^ory^^

the GOl
the question of aging and conservatizinr
(or Republicanizing, as the case may be) is not
a simple
one, and is the subject of some controversy.
For a
discussion of the question. See Nerval Glenn, and Ted Hefner,
Further Evidence on Aging and Party Identification," Public
~
Opinion Q uarterly. 36, (Spring 1972), pp. 31-^7.
,

'

Both the difference between Independents and
Republicans, and between Republicans and Democrats are
significant at the .05 level.
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On both their perception
of their own social
Class and the social
class of their family,
the

Independents were once again
back in the middleless .middle Class, than
the Republicans but
more so
than the Democrats. 19
Independents were about as
likely to be union members
as were Democrats, but
more
likely than Republicans
(69.9/. of the Independents
were
from non-union families as
were 68.2^^ of the Democrats
and 80. 2^^ of the Republicans).
The Independents in I956 occupied
the "high

status" occupations about as
frequently as did the
partisans. Slightly over seventeen
percent of the

Independents were either professionals
or selfemployed businessmen, as were sixteen
percent of the
Republicans and twelve percent of the
Democrats. At
the other end of the occupational
"scale" there were
proportionately fewer Independents in the unskilled
labor categories than either Democrats or
(somewhat
more surprisingly) Republicans.
As we might expect, given these occupational

l^On the question of their social class,
33.7/0
of the Independents claimed a 'middle class'
perception,
as did 28, 0/0 of the Democrats and 50.^/^ of the
Republicans.
When asked about their family backgrounds, 23.9^ of the
Independents claimed 'middle class' origins, as did 25^3fo
of the Democrats and 42,3^ of the Republicans.

8/+

tendencies the Independents were quite well off

financially in 1956.

The Independent's mean income

level (per family) in 1956 was $5220 per year, virtually
the same as the $5200 mean for Republicans and somewhat

higher than the $^750 earned by Democrats. 20
In sum, it can be said that on many important

socioeconomic indices, the Independents of 1956
appeared somewhat closer to the Republicans than they
did to the Democrats.

important areas

In fact, in three of the most

— education,

occupation, and income—

they actually appeared at least as far from the

Democrats as did the Republicans.

It could well be

argued that, at least in 1956, the Independents might
have really been
1952

— as

— 'Republicans

they were to a lesser degree in

in disguise.'

Their overwhelming

support for Eisenhower could be given as evidence in

support of such an argument.

But certain other factors

notably their 'middle' position on several political opinion
questions and the demonstrated volatility of their vote

suggest that such a classification would be, at best, premature
^^V/hen non-whites (the vast majority of whom were
Democrats in 1956) are removed from the sample, the interparty income disparity decreases somewhat, with the mean
income of Democrats rising to approximately $^850/yr.;
the incomes of Independents and Republicans remain
virtually unchanged.
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I960

Kennedy V. Nixon
The presidential election of
i960 was certainly
one of the closest and most
exciting contests in our
recent history. In its outcome it
was a "reins tating«
election, whereby control of the
White House was
returned to the normally-more-powerful
Democrats after
an eight-year period of Republican
"deviation. "21 Probably
more than anything else, the
Democratic victory can be
traced to the large Democratic
registration majority,
to the voters' favorable reaction to
John Kennedy's

political style and to their desire, after
eight years
of what they perceived as Republican
'inactivity*
(however pleasant that inactivity may have
been) to
-get this country moving again." Crucial
factors in
Kennedy's election (though their precise impact
on the

voters will probably never be known) were the
famed

television debates.

Though selective perception

undoubtedly led strong partisans on both sides to
contend, honestly, that 'their man' had 'won' the
debates,
21

The terms "reinstating" and "deviating" elections
are discussed and defined by Gerald Pomper, "Classification
of Presidential Elections." Journal of Polit ics 29
"
(1967), pp. 535-66.

—

there is a general consensus
that Kennedy, by virtue
of
his attractive appearance
and style, bested Nixon,
at

least in the first of these
appearances and, in so doing.
«on the support of a large
number of previously undecided
voters.
The most talked about issues
in the i960

campaign were probably the state
of the economy.
Senator Kennedy's religion, (and
perceived inexperience)
and a slightly different version
of the perennial cold
war problem of the 'communist
menace,*

Kennedy's campaign was built around
two major
issues, one domestic and one foreign.

The Massachusetts

Senator took great pains pointing to
the shortcomings
of the American economy in i960, and
argued that,
despite our overall high standard of living,
a sub-

stantial number of Americans were not receiving
their
•fair share.'

In a land of affluence, Kennedy found it

inconceivable and unacceptable that, as he claimed,
thirty million Americans went to bed hungry every
night.
He supported raising the minimum wage to
$1.25 per hour
(in contrast to the $1.10 per hour supported by Vice-

President Nixon) and argued— though not too loudly at the
time

— for

adoption of a plan to provide medical care

for the aged.
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In a curious reversal
of the patterns of
previous
elections, Senator Kennedy
was able to lay the
problem
Of the threat of communist
aggression squarely in the
laps Of his Republican
opponents, starting most of
his major campaign addresses
with the contention that
the world "cannot exist,
half slave and half free,"
Kennedy assailed the Republicans
for permitting the
existence of what he called a
"missile gap"-.a disparity which he claimed existed
between the amount and
potency of Soviet and American
arms. As Kennedy

recited his list of deficiencies
in the American
arsenal, and contrasted these to
the massive amount
of weaponry he alleged the Soviets
were producing, he
succeeded in convincing the voters
that the Republicans-

traditionally the party able to use the
'communist
issue' to its own advantage— had.
in this important
area, been lax in protecting the country
against
possible Soviet aggression.
While pursuing his hawkish course in arguing
that America was ill-prepared for a possible
nuclear

confrontation with the Soviet Union (which, in i960,
was still enough of a threat to warrant the printing
air raid instructions on the book covers of school
children, and the widespread construction of fallout

of
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shelters). Kennedy was able to attract
the peaceoriented voters by his firm pledge of
American noninterference with the Communist Chinese shelling
of
the islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Arguing
in a

televised debate that American commitments
obligated
us to aid only in the defense of Taiwan itself
and the

Pescadores Islands, Kennedy was able to cast Nixon in
the role of being willing, once again, to send 'our

boys* to fight on 'foreign soil,*

For his part, Vice-President Nixon gauged his

campaign around what he saw as the successful record of
the Eisenhower administration and his long experience

in high governmental office.

Though his claim that

Kennedy lacked experience was somewhat misleading (Nixon
and Kennedy had been freshman Congressmen together

fourteen years earlier), Nixon was able to convince

many voters that his personal experience in dealing

with world leaders (most notably, his *Kitchen Debate*
with Soviet Premier Khruschev) equipped him best to deal
with America *s problems abroad in the decade of the
sixties.

"Experience Counts** read the Nixon-Lodge

bumper stickers and campaign buttons, and the Republicans
were undoubtedly successful in persuading many voters
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that Kennedy's tender age
and lack of executive
experience left him unprepared
for the Presidency.

An issue of high salience in
i960 was Senator
Kennedys Roman Catholicism. Though
Vice-President
Nixon maintained throughout the
campaign
that the

•religious issue' had no place in
American politics,
many voters were concerned-inspired
no doubt by myths
about the nature of Catholicism and
Catholics' relation
to the Papacy— that election of a
Catholic might

adversely affect the relationships between
church and
state in this country.

Agreeing (however unconsciously)

with political theorists such as Hobbes,
Rousseau, and
Machiavelli that Catholics, with their 'divided

loyalty,'

are poor political "risks," many voters were
undoubtedly

driven to avoid voting for Kennedy because of his
Catholicism.

On the other hand, it is almost a cer-

tainty that a large number of Catholic voters who might
otherwise have voted for Nixon or stayed at home, went
to the polls and pulled the Democratic lever in 1960.^2

22The impact of the religious issue on the i960
campaign is discussed by Philip Converse, "Religion and
Politics: The I96O Election," Chapter 6 of A. Campbell,
P. Converse, V/. Miller, and D. Stokes, Elections and the
Political Order (New York, John V/iley & Sons, I966),
Converse believes, and claims his data
pp. 96-12^.
support the belief, that "...religion played a powerful
role in shaping voting behavior in the i960 election. This
force generated differences quite beyond the customary,
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Whether his religion helped
or hurt Kennedy in
the long run is open to
question. It probably

did
change some votes on both sides,
but it is not possible,
on the basis of data available,
to speculate on the
precise magnitude and direction of
its influence,
any case, it certainly did not
blow the election wide
open in either direction, since
the i960 election was
the closest in our history.
Out of over sixty-eight

m

million votes cast. Senator Kennedy was
elected President
by a popular plurality of only 112.000.23
y/ith Lyndon
Johnson, then the Senate Majority leader
from
Texas, on

his ticket, Kennedy was able to capture
many of the

Southern states and gained an Electoral College
majority
of 303 votes to Nixon's 219.

The presence of Henry Cabot

long-standing ones between the major religious groups
in the United States."

^

23
-'While

many have marveled over the closeness
of this election, it is possible to view the outcome as
"^^^^ "^^^ 112,000 vote plurality for Kennedy.
If 6/11 of Kennedy's total in Alabama is deleted (since
6 of the 11 Democratic electors from Alabama voted for
Sen. Harry Byrd in the Electoral College) as having been
cast for Democratic electors not pledged to him, the
final total shows Nixon winning a plurality of
approximately 65,000 out of 68 million votes cast.
The questionable vote totals reported in the states
of Illinois and Texas cast further shadow on the precise
total outcome.

Lodge on the GOP slate,
while adding to that
tiCefs
image of experience and
professionalism, probably did
not help the Republicans
as much as Johnson
helped the
Democrats. Lodge, li.e
Kennedy, was from
Massachusetts,
and the regional impact
which parties like their
vice-presidential candidates to
carry was probably
not very strong in his case.
One other factor which
contributed to the

Republican defeat in i960 was
the reluctance of
President Eisenhower to get
involved in the campaign.
Though Eisenhower could undoubtedly
have been elected
for a third term had not the
twenty-second ammendment
been in effect, his popularity
did not seem to rub
off on Richard Nixon, nor does
it appear in retrospect,
did he take any pains to ensure
that it did. While
the extent of Eisenhower's
estrangement from Nixon
(if any) is something we can only
guess, we can also

guess that his wholehearted, enthusiastic
endorsement
of his Vice-President in I960. and
his active campaigning in his behalf, might possibly have
been enough to
tip the delicate balance of that election.
In i960, the percentage of Independents
in the

electorate held steady from 1956 at 22, k%.

The

Democrats and Republicans showed little change as well.
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capturing the loyalty of
kk.yf. and 28.8/. of the
electorate,
respectively,
the election itself, the
majority of
Independents in the sample
continued to display

m

the

Republican tendencies they
exhibited in 1952 and I956 and
voted for Richard Nixon-the
only time in recent memory
when they have given majority
support to the losing
candidate. Only 1,5.7% of the
Independents cast their
votes for Senator Kennedy, compared
to 80.
8/.

Democrats and only

6.8;^ of the

Republicans.

of the

Despite their

support of Nixon, however, comparative
analysis of the I956
and I960 elections demonstrates
the Independents* important
role in Kennedy's election. As we
look at the three groups
(Democrats. Republicans, and Independents)
relative support
for the Republican candidates of I956
and i960, we
can see

that, once again, the Independent
vote was the most 'volatile.*

with nearly twenty percent fewer Independents
supporting
Nixon than had backed Eisenhower in 1956.^^
At the
same

2^

The problem arises again, here, of
how much consistency the Independent category determining
had between
1930 and I960.
In terms of raw percentages it remained
virtually unchanged {2k/o in 1956. 2y/o in i960). When the
retrospective 1956 votes of I96O Independents are recalled,
there is some disparity with the actual I956 Independent
vote.
18. 8/^ of the i960 Independents recalled a I956
Stevenson vote, when 26.^'% of the 1956 Independents actually
voted for Stevenson. This disparity, however, can probably
be attributed to selective recall rather than to a dramatic
shift in the composition of the Independent category, since
the recalled 1956 vote for Stevenson of the entire electorate was only 36.5%— 6.5^ less than the
he actually
received.
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t.-. only S.X percent
o.

t.e Eisenhower
Be^oorats appeared

to defect (or return)
to Kennedy, while
Republican support
Of Nixon was virtually
as solid as it had

been for

Eisenhower.
Since Kennedys religion
is considered by so^e
to
have been a salient
issue in i960. Figure 11 3 displays
a representation of
his support fro», both
Catholic and
Protestant voters, of all
partisan persuasions, in
that
election.
This figure confronts
us with a picture that
makes difficult to defend
any argument claiming that
the
candidates, religions were
not an important factor
in the

I960 campaign. 25

As mentioned above, whether
his religion
•hurt- or 'helped' Senator
Kennedy is an open question.
But Figure II - 3 strongly
suggests that religion was
indeed a variable of some
importance in voter choice in
i960.

<^i"«^«"«s are statistically
3iOTificfn??o^^^^r?K
significant
for all three groups of voters
in this case
°^ comparison, it is interestiS
to note ;h»iVv>^
that there were no statistically
significant
differences between the Democratic
vote^ of Democrats and
°'
(Cathonc
P^otesian?) i°n
Protestant)
in l^tu'^'^f
1964.
Among Independents, Catholics were
:?te Democratic than were Protes?antI
P^?^
TafS
Independents voted for Johnson, as
dfd
^5%h^*P°^f
Protestant Independents). For the three
ttt
groups,
the mean difference (Catholic over
Protestant)
in support for Kennedy was 33.V/; in
i960, in 196^ the
mean difference in support for Johnson was
lO.lji.
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The Roman Catholicism of
John Kennedy was
certainly not the only (or even
the most important)
issue in the i960 campaign.
Also on the voters' minds
were the problems associated
with civil rights, how
much the government should be
involved in helping people
solve their problems, and
Senator Kennedy's often-heard
contention that in international
circles, "...the

prestige of this country has reached
an all-time low."
If Kennedy was perceived as a
'liberal'
on

civil rights in I960, it probably did
not hurt him as
much as similar perceptions were to hurt
other

Democratic candidates in the late sixties
and seventies.
The voters of that year were evenly
split on whether the
government ought to step in to ensure that schools
were
de-segregated with due haste. Most strongly in
support
of government action were the Independents,
over forty-

five percent of whom favored an active federal
involvement,
The Democrats and Republicans were somewhat less
enthusi-

astic, and equal percentages (about forty percent)
of

both groups indicated support for government intervention.
It is interesting to note, however, that when race is

controlled and only white respondents are questioned,
the Democrats show up as the group least supportive of

goveiTunental civil rights intervention in i960.

Among

.

the White respondents k7
.2% of the Democrats argued
in
I960 that the federal
government should "stay out
of
the question of whether
white and colored children
go
to the same school."
Expressing

similar feelings were

^O.Sfo of the Republicans and
35.3% of the Independents.

When only non-Southern whites
are considered, however,
the inter-party distinctions
tend to disappear somewhat
with approximately 35% of both
Democrats and Republicans
opining that the federal government
should
"stay out"

of the question, compared to
29% of the Independents.

When asked to express their support
for another
type of government activity,
however-namely. government
action to ensure every person a good
job- the Independents
retreated a bit from their activist stance
on civil

rights, and took a position in between the
Democrats
and Republicans.

56.7% of the Independents expressed

approval of government action in this area, compared
to 65.8^ of the Democrats and only 48.8^ of
the

Republicans.

Even when social class is controlled,

middle class Independents were more likely than middle
class Republicans to favor government action, and

working class Independents were less likely than
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working class Democrats to
support such a policy.26
Also at issue in i960 were
the questions of
America's international power
and prestige,

and the
fear of international holocaust,
added to by Senator
Kennedy's frequent allusions to
the "missile gap" which,
he claimed, existed between
the U.S. and the Soviet
Union. Agreement with Senator
Kennedy's claims on the
decline in U.S. prestige seemed to
be distributed along
partisan lines, with 39.0f. of the
Democrats in agreement
with the idea that the U.S. had
become "weaker" within
the past several years.
Only 17.3^. of the Republicans
were willing to agree to such a
contention. Significantly, the Independents seemed almost
as convinced
as the Democrats that the Massachusetts
Senator's claims

were on the mark, and 37.3?^ of them saw
America as
"weaker" in i960 than it had been in the past.
On the other hand, about the same number of

Independents as Republicans admitted to being "pretty

worried" about the possibility of America's becoming
involved in another

war— a worry which might

have made

the voters responsive to Kennedy's allegations of a
26
"The

percentages of working class Republicans,
Democrats, and Independents supporting government involvement in this area were 58.0^, 71. ly^, and 53.6/0 respectively.
Among the middle class the percentages were 38.6^
(Republicans), 52.
(Democrats) and 51.6^ (Independents).
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"missile gap."

The group most concerned
about the

possibility Of a war was the
Democrats, but even in
their ranks, over three times
as many voters claimed
to be only "slightly
worried" or "not at all worried,"
as Claimed to be seriously
concerned about the

probll.

Much like their counterparts
in earlier electorates, the Independents of i960
were somewhat

younger,
and more often of the white race
than were party
identifiers as a whole (though, of
all the three groups,
the Republicans had the smallest
percentage of non-white

members-approximately

5?^).

The i960 Independents

were

more likely to have been brought up
in a central city
than either Republicans or Democrats.
They were less
likely than either group of partisans to
have hailed
from a farm or small town.
The educational level of Independents in
I96O

was virtually on a par with that of Republicans,
and

substantially higher than that of the Democrats.
Independents had a mean level of educational attainment
of 10.2 years, compared to the 10.0 years for
Republicans

and 9.0 years for Democrats. 27

Even when race is controlled,

Republicans and Independents had educational levels higher
^'^The Independent-Republican difference in this
case is not statistically significant. The IndependentDemocrat difference is significant at the .01 level.
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than the Democrats in i960.

Por example, of the
white

respondents, ^8.5f. of the
Democrats had a high schoolor-better education, compared
to 5^M^ of the
Independents
and 60.7% of the Republicans,
that year, eight percent
of the Independents were
college graduates, as were

m

approximately ten percent of the
Republicans and six
percent of the Democrats. 28
Though the computation of mean
income levels was
not possible with the data
available, it is possible to
assess the Independent's financial
position in
i960

by observing their distribution
over the survey's income
scale.
There seemed, according
to the data,

to be

relatively few "poor" Independents in
that year, with
only 22.7^ of their number earning
less than $^000.

In a similar income category were
3^.8^ of the Democrats
and 33.2?$ of the Republicans. At the
other end of the
scale, an equal proportion of Independents
and Republicans
were financially -well-to-do, " and 16.
0/. of the Independents
claimed incomes above $10,000, compared with
15.9% of the

Republicans and

10.3;^.

of the Democrats.

This relatively

high income level for Independents can partially
be

explained by the fact that they occupied, in i960— as
they
28 None

of these observed differences is statis-

tically significant.

had in the past-Jobs
and professions fairly
high on
the status and
presumed-income scale, seemingly
as

high as those occupied by
Republicans. 17. V. of all
Independents were professional
people or managers, as
were 16.6% of the Republicans
and 11. of. of the

Democrats.
The high level of income
and occupational
status of the Independents in
i960 apparently were not

accompanied by inflated perceptions
of their own social
class.
Though they seemed to equal the
Republicans in
income and occupation status,
Independents were
decidedly less likely than Republicans
to think of
themselves as 'middle class.' Only
32.2/. of the Independents
so described themselves, compared
to ^6.6/. of the

Republicans and 26.8^ of the Democrats.
controlled, no major changes occur.

When race is

Among white respon-

dents the percentages of those in the
middle class are
3k.2%, k7.9fo, and 28.1/. of the Independents,
Republicans,
and Democrats respectively.
These figures may reflect
the rather low volatility of the social class
variable,

since, when asked what they would consider the
social

class of their family background, about the same

percentage of Independents and Democrats— a percentage
higher than that of the Republicans— claimed a working
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Class background.

Over three fourths of all
Independents
recalled a working class heritage,
along with a similar
percentage of Democrats and 6l%
of the Republicans.
The demographic, socioeconomic,
and

'ideological*

picture of the i960 Independents
yields no clear patterns.
Perhaps these will become clearer
as they are compared
with the images of Independents in
other years. But a
measure of the mixed nature of the
Independent vote in
I960 is that it, like the country as
a whole, split
virtually down the middle in trying to decide
who would
become the country's 35th President. Four
years later,
the Independents were to be much more
united in their

choice for President and, perhaps, more easily

describable in terms of their political attitudes
and

demographic characteristics.
1964

Johnson V. Goldwater
In 1964, the voters gave Lyndon B. Johnson the

greatest numerical landslide in American electoral
history.
1964,

President Johnson asked for, and received, in

the popular mandate to carry out the work begun in

the Kennedy administration and to embark on programs of

his own, designed to bring to America the "Great Society."

Running a.ainst a
candidate whose
conservative politics
aa^penea the ardor o.
even so.e RepuUicans.
Johnson
captured 486 Electoral
College votes compared
to the
52 won by Senator Barry Ooldwater
and amassed a
popular
plurality of sixteen
million votes.
The 1964 campaign
offered the voters, i„
senator
Goldwater-s words, "a choice,
not an echo." The
voters
made that choice, and
it was a choice that
cost the

Bepublicans dearly i„ races
for both the Presidency
and seats in the Congress.
In a real sense. Goldwater
was the first Republican
presidential candidate since
the thirties who constituted
a serious threat to
the
general direction American
government had taken since
the New Deal. Unlike
Eisenhower and Nixon, who
appeared
to the voters as candidates
interested only in slowing
down the pace which government
had been taking since the
1930's. Goldwater represented
the possibility of a
fundamental change in direction
and a rollback of many
Of the New Deal innovations.
In 1964. the American
voters were not ready to sanction
such a reversal.
One of the more talked about
issues of the 1964
campaign was Goldwater 's perceived
"ideology." While

"extremism in defense of liberty" may not
have been a
vice in 1964. to be identified as an
extremist— of any

.tripe-has traditionally
been a capital cri^e
for
American presidential
candidates.
shown29 that the

One study has

.ideological content- of
the 196^
election was abnor^nally
high. (i.e.. the
question of
political ideology
„as of high salience
in the
campaign) and that voters
perceived Goldwater to be
the -ideologicalcandidate. Goldwater-s
characterization as the -ideologicalcandidate in the election
cost him votes, since the
majority of voters who perceived him in such a light
voted for President Johnson.
Among the more -normalpolitical issues of
importance in that election
were civil rights, the
social activism of the federal
government, and
continued American involvement
in Viet Nam.
If
Senator Goldwater had any base of
support among black
voters, it vanished with his vote
against

£e^

the 196^^

Civil Rights Act on the grounds
that its public
accommodations provision was unconstitutional.

By

this controversial political act.
the Arizona Senator
set himself up as an opponent to
the general thrust of
civil rights sentiment that had been
building in the
°'
^"<^ '^'E- Anderson, "Ideolorv
and 4.U
the ^^i???
Public's Conception of the 1964 Election,"
in
^""^ Gatlen. eds.. Political Parties
n^'-i"®?"^"'
and Political
Behavi ^, 2nd edition,' (BostonT Axiyn
Allyn ana
and
Bacon, 1971). pp. 400-419.

country for nearly a
decade.
a e.

thp same
.
At the
time, however.
he endeared himself
to a great many
rrnr...
white voters in the
aeep south.
(Hxcep. ror the five
votes he receive.
fro. his native state
of Arizona, all
of Goldwater's

electoral votes ca„e rro.
the aeep South-an.
he won
nearly 87 percent of
the popular vote
in the state of
"ississippi.) The extent
to which Hepuhlioan
sentiment
has endured in the
South since 1964, and
the effects of
that sentiment on
political realignment and
Independent
voters, are discussed
at so^e length in Chapter
IV.

Also at issue in 196^
were the general thrust
Of federal government
activism and the Viet Nam
war.
Lyndon Johnson appealed to
the voters as a candidate
who saw serious inequalities
in the economic conditions
of American life, and who
felt the federal government
Should bear a hand in the
redress of those

inequalities.

Barry Goldwater argued for
more restraint on the part
of
government, believing that our
problems could best be
worked out by the individuals
experiencing them, or by
governments and institutions "closer"
to the people
than

the one in Washington, D.C.
On the question of American
involvement in
Viet Nam, the roles were reversed,
with Johnson arguing
(however ineffectively, since he was
apparently unable
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convince even M.se..)
.o. restrain..
„HiXe OoX.wa.er
orea escalatea
.^erican invoXve.ent
(in te^s o.
^
not in ™en) an.
oonsiaere. Me^oiiaUon.
Of Vxetna^ese jungles
by use of nuclear
weapons.
Throughout the campaign.
Johnson and his running»ate. Hubert Horatio
Humphrey, hammered
hard at the
theme that Goldwater
was something of a
political
reactionary intent on
returning America to the
political
past by government
retrenchment and escalating

j"

the

Viet Nam conflict by
the use of nuclear
weapons,
Cleverly designed television
commercials, the Democrats
successfully portrayed
Goldwater as a man with
an
-itchy" finger on the
nuclear trigger.
For their part, Goldwater
and his running-mate.
William Miller, attempted
to convince Americans
that
the -Great- Society
envisioned by the Democrats
was
simply one more step on the
way to the managed society
Of "1984." What the country
needed, the Republicans
argued, was a return to
government "by the people," and
less interference in local
affairs by the bureaucrats in
Washington. In foreign affairs,
Goldwater -s campaign
suggested that a firm American
presence was necessary
to stem the increase of Communism
around the globe.
Goldwater was somewhat unclear as to
the form this

m
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involvement in
international or^aniz^t^
organizations, while
toying with the
idea of "wars
wars of liberation"
lih»
hto free
countries under the
yoke of

co«unis..30)

posture was decidedly
.ore .ilitaristio
than .ohnson-s.
There are probably
a number of reasons
why
Ooldwater was beaten
so decisively in
196..
™ay
have been that Johnson
was unbeatable in
that year '
carrying, as he was,
the .antle of the
slain John
Kennedy. Possibly the
deep split in the
Republican
party-a party which saw
George Ro^ey. Nelson
Rockefeller '
ana Willia. Scranton
all fall by the
wayside in attempts
to "save- it fro.
disaster-was the ultimate
cause of
Goldwater.s failure. But
in looking at that
election
there is one factor which
I feel weighed
heaviest, and
It is illustrated well
by something that
happened in
Atlantic City, New Jersey,
at the time of the
Democratic
National Convention there.
Knowing that a large number
of prominent Democrats
would be frequenting the
Atlantic
City Boardwalk near the
Convention Hall, and wanting
to
arouse their ire, th e Republicans
placed a huge billboard

»
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across tro. the hall
which feature, a very
complimentary
photograph Of senator
Goldwater, and the
phrase,
"in

your heart, you know he's
right." The billboard
caused
some stir in Atlantic
City until some enterprising
Democrats purchased a billboard
of their own. and had

it constructed immediately
beneath the one erected by
the Republicans.
The Democratic billboard
simply said,'
-Yes.... extreme right!"
Perhaps those words, and the

voters perception of their
essential accuracy, were
most responsible for sending
Barry Goldwater into
temporary retirement in 1964.
Like most Americans. Independents
voted for
Lyndon Johnson in record numbers
in 1964.31 Table II 3
presents the vote breakdown, by
party self-identification,
in the Johnson landslide.
As the Table indicates,
Johnson won the majority
(of votes cast) of all groups
except the Republicans and
the Independents-leaning Republican.
The completely

unaligned Independents (who often provide
a barometer
31a look at the Table reveals a rather
hip.h
rate of non-votmg among Independents in
196^, partic'}\^''ly.^''''^S^]}^^Vendents who leaned toward the Democrats
U/.^/O and Independents with absolutely no partisan
preference (^9.5/0. Chapter III assesses the
participation and political involvement of Independents
in an
effort to determine the character of what I have
termed their 'political responsibility.'
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TABLE II - 3
VOTE, BY PARTY SELF-IDENTIFICATION.
IN 196^^

Did Not
Vote
Total

T
Johnson

Goldwater

Strong
Democrats

72.9^

3.6

23.5

100.0
(N=^17)

Weak
Democrats

55.8^

12.2

32.0

100.0
(N=385)

6.3

37.^

.

Independents
(closer to D's)

100.0
(N=l/|4)

Independents
(no preference)

38. Qfo

11.6

^9.5

100.0
(N=121)

Independents
(closer to R*s)

19.3^

58.0

22.7

100.0
(N=88)

Weak
Republicans

33. 3?^

43.8

21.9

100.0
(N=210)

Strong
Republicans

8.2fo

76.0

15.8

100.0
(N=171)

of which direction the 'swing vote* is moving) went

for LBJ over three to one, though only half their

number voted.

Johnson's victory was ensured by his

huge majorities among Democrats and Independents and
the inroads he made among the GOP

— especially

among

"weak** Republicans, where he won k^fo of the vote cast.

That the Independents, who as a group had supported

Eisenhower in 1952 and I956 and Nixon in i960, would
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-sert

t.e COP i„

^^^^^^^^^
exa™.nation o. t.ei.
preferences .or ..e
KepuUiean
no^xnation in that ,ear.
or aU the In.epenaents.
only 13^ preferred
Ooldwater for the
nomination.
wMie 30.3. Of them
preferred one of the
.ore ..oderateHepubUoan contenders-Scranton.
Roc.efeXier. or Lodge.
Though the Democratic
majority which Johnson
brought with him into
^Congress
^-uiisress might
ai^hi- indicate
.
that
the incidence of
"tic.et-spUtting" was less
prevalent
than it had been in
the past year, on
the contrary
the voters in 196^
seemed to be splitting
their
ballots more frequently
than ever. Only
13.3,5 of
the Independents in
196^ stated they had
voted a
-straight" party ticket,
compared
i

to 32-5/. of the

Democrats and 31.5. of the
Republicans.
The Independents contributed

in no small way
to President Johnson's
victory in 196/..
that year

m

they comprised 22.5. of
the electorate (while
Republicans
and Democrats represented
2^.2% and 5I.5. respectively)
and their support gave
Johnson I9.V. of his total
votes
received. Behind this electoral
contribution was a
fairly clear picture of
Independents in apparent
agreement with the President in
most important issue
areas
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AS mentioned above,
the .est widely
discussed
issues in the 196. campaign
were civil rights,
the role
of government, and the
Viet Nam War. On the
area of
civil rights respondents
were asked a number of
questions designed to measure
their attitudes on
the progress of the
civil rights movement
and how
much the federal government
should be involved in
the implementation of the
movement's goals. Table
II - ^ reports the responses
of Republicans. Democrats,
and Independents to five
civil rights-related questions
in 196't.

C.

Integration

D.

School de-segregation
Pair employment
practices

£.

5Sfo

53fo

59/^

32

38

^0

33

31

36

37

39

36

N=38l)

Note

I

^3
(N=802)

i^=353)

On question A., respondents listed
agreed
with the statement! "Negroes have a right
to live wherever they can aford to, just
like white people."

Ill

V'xvxx xj.gnxs

leaders are trvinn-

speed?"
On question

C, respondents listed
"^^^^Sregation" when Lked,
"ShaHh
What about you? Are you
in favor of
^^^^^'^ segregation or
tllf^'^^'''''''l
something
between?"

m

On question D., respondents
listed
^^^^ ^sl^ed. "Do you
^"^^
eovernment in Washington
^hon^H see to it that
should
white and negro
children go to the same schools?"

On Question E., respondents
listed
agreed that "the government in
Washington should see to it that
negroes get fair treatment in jobs."

As the table indicates, the
Independents emerge
as the most pro-civil rights (on
the basis of responses
to these questions) of the three
groups.
Though the
.

difference between the Independents and the
'runner-up'
group is so small in each case as to be
statistically
insignificant, their consistently higher showing
seems
to suggest that they were indeed in
196^ the group most

sympathetic to the civil rights movement's goals.
In fact, though it appears on first glance as if the
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Democrats are crowding
the Independents
for the pro
civil rights position
on a number of
questions, when
we control for race
and question only white
respondents,
the Independent-Democrat
differences widen. Observing
only white respondents,
the percentage expressing
satisfaction with the pace of
civil rights progress is
36/.
among Independents and
^0% among Democrats, on the
subject Of government intervention
into equal employment opportunity the percentage
of white Independents
favoring involvement was
compared to 3k% of the
white Democrats.
If the Independents were the
group most
•liberal' on the civil rights
question in 196/f. they
returned to a position between
the parties when asked
their opinions on some of the
'bread and butter*
economic issues of the day.
Proportionately fewer
Independents than Democrats favored the
government's
seeing to it that "...every person has
a job and a

good standard of living. "32

federal aid to education

^^^^ ^^^^^
controlled. Independents
-^f?^®"
(both middle
and working class) were in between the
parties and felt less strongly than the Democrats,
though more strongly than Republicans (of both
classes)
tnat^ the federal government should aid people
in
obtaining "...a job and a good standard of living.'
(y.
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was supported by a smaller
share of Independents than
Democrats (though both groups
voiced substantially

stronger support for the idea
than did the Republicans) .33
On the subject of 'Medicare,'
a very
topical issue in

196/f.

/17.3/.

of the Independents agreed
that the federal

government should "...help people
get doctors and
hospital care at low cost." compared

to 60.5f. of the

Democrats and 29.2^ of the Republicans.
While these "role of government"
questions
neatly place the Independents between
the Democrats
and Republicans on the political
'spectrum,' the results
in other issue areas are quite mixed.
Independents
and Democrats were virtually
indistinguishable in

their early support of the Viet Nam War,
while both
groups were somewhat less 'hawkish' on
the subject than

were Republicans (approximately one-fourth
of the Democrats
and Independents favored a "stronger stand"
in that area,

compared to over one third of the Republicans).

In the

general area of international relations. Independents
were more in favor of trying to work out our differences

with the communists at the conference table than were
33
-^^31.8:^
of the

Independents agreed that the
federal government should aid public schools, as did
37 •6?^ of the Democrats and 16.5% of the Republicans.

epuMioans. ana about
the sa^e as
De^oc.ats.3'.

2j:'T

" """^

on

-

-

etart eaon aa. with
a pra.er. (a.ain.
a ve., saUent
"

--e

the

poXUios o.

.-up .east

supportive o. school
p.a.e.s. though aXl
groups haa a majority
or thei. number
who beXievea
that sohoox p.a.e.s
were appropriate.
percentage
Of inaepenaents
opposed to school
prayer was twenty-

one percent-substantially
higher than that of
the
Republicans (n.o%). and
Democrats (11^.2%).

AS in the earlier
electorates, the highest
percentages of Independents
in 196^ were located
in
the Midwest and
Northeast. Table II 5 is a repre
sentation which can be
read two ways, and
shows

the

distribution Of voters, by
party identification and
region, in I964.

This table provides us
with the

infonnation necessary to
view both the partisan
makeup of each region and
the regional distributions
of
party strength. As mentioned
above, the Northeast
(with 30.9^) and the Midwest
(with 27.8/.) are the most
heavily Independent areas.
They are also the areas
Where most of the In dependents
are located-together

belief as^did^7A^.?^^72^^^S''^^''"^^ expressed such a
Democrats and 65. 1/. of the
^
Republicans!
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totalling 6^.8^ of the
j.ne total
tv,^«
total Independent
strength.
Fitting in with the
patterns we observed in
earlier electorates, the
Independents of 196^^ were
more likely to be young
(3/^.6^. of the voters
under
were
29
Independents), and more likely
to be white
than party members as a
whole, though there were
more
non-White Independents
(7^) than non-white Republicans

Independents were less likely
to be union
members than Democrats, but
more likely than Republicans,
and they occupied a position
between the parties on the
question of their perception of
social class. 35 Even
when race was controlled, white
Independents {l^2fo)
were more 'middle class* than
white Democrats (36^)
but less 'middle class' than white
Republicans

(55/.).

In the important area of education,
Independents also
occupied the middle position with a mean
educational

level 9,55 years, compared to 8.7 and
9.9 for the

Democrats and Republicans respectively. 36

trying

to isolate voters at both ends of the
educational

'scale'

'^^^ Independents perceived
themselves
class,' as 52.9/0 of the Republicans and
?./^^f
of J^'-^t^^
the Democrats.
33*1%

00

•

The observed difference between the Independents
and Republicans
this case is not statistically
significant.

m

we

-

t.a.

no.

0. ..e Xnaepenaen.
we.e ooUe^e
"-LJ-ege

graduates, while 17

'
graaes of
grades
0/ school
H
or less

^'^^^
a

u

^ ^^gher percentage of

Re.nhT
Republicans finished
college
"J-J-ege
+

v.-

.

tionately more
Democrats (30
.
eip-hf
eight grades.

fi^
(16.8>S) while
propor-

-^^W

.
"-^^^

"^^^

complete

The income level
evei of
rr,ri^
Of Independent
voters in 1964
appearea. .00.
.est so^ew.ere
between t.ose o. .
respective party
^e^.ers. maepenaents
were less
l^^ely than Democrats
(.ut .ore so than
RepuUicans)
to have earnea
between two ana rive
thousana aollars
that year, ana less
li.ely than Republicans
(though
so
than Democrats) to
have haa an inco.e
in
excess or $15,000.
.he aata on the

U

-

occupational
categories of the various
voters are .ixea ana
yieia
no conclusive results,
but it is interesting
to note
that, as in the past.
Indepenaents tend to be
engagea
in professional
occupations in proportions
similar to
their Republican
contemporaries.

If there is an overall
pattern which emerges
from observing the
Independents in 1964 it is
one
Which once again places
them near the political
ana
socioeconomic "midaie." Even
more than in the preceaing
elections, it seems when
aescribing the Independents
of
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196^ we have referred to
them
onem as " ...more
m.v,
so than...
but less so tnan....
than.
t^:*
t.^.
If
political
scientists contend
that independent voters
represent the social and
political middle ground
of the American
electorate
the sample of 196^
provides some sound data
in support
Of that contention.
The extent to which
that middle
position was affected by the
turbulent politics of
late sixties can be observed
as we examine the

Independents in the I968 electorate.
1968

Nixon V. Hnmphr>o y y, yj^^^r.^

Richard Scammon and Ben
Wattenberg have described
the 1968 election as one
in which the "social issue"
(law
and order, political protest,
societal permissiveness,
etc.) replaced the -bread and
butter' economic issues as
the most important concern of
the voting public. 37 a
shift in traditional issue focus was
not, however, the
only unusual aspect to the politics
of I968.
The

37

Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberr, The
(I970).
The '3RC data do not quitf bi^
out ocammon and V/attenberg's hypotheses.
bread and butter' issues and concern over Actually, the
the Viet Nam
War were most often referred to by voters
when asked
"^^^ country's most pressing
problem
t^^'^Jl^?
TvJ^ioS''^
in 1968.
Nonetheless,
the 'social issue' was much
discussed
1968 and it is fair to say itH^d a higher
^"^
^
"^^^"^ ^^^^ "^^^^
d^l964
1
u
Keal

.

IVIa.ioritY

m
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Challenge to the incumbent
President by fellow-De.oorat
Eugene McCarthy, and that
incu.hent President's
subsequent decision not to see.
re-election were also highly
unexpected and they, coupled
with the tragic assassination of Robert Kennedy,
the holocaust at the
Democratic
Convention, and the most
successful third party
candidacy
in forty years made I968
a -year to rememberin

American politics.
Vice-President Hubert Humphrey,
who emerged from
the much-discussed Democratic
Convention as his party's
nominee, chose as his running
mate Senator Edmund S.
Muskie of Maine.

Richard Nixon, who had become
the

Republican nominee after defeating
challenges from
Governors Nelson Rockefeller of New
York and Ronald
Reagan of California, chose Governor
Spiro "Ted" Agnew
of Maryland to run with him, and
the American Independent
Party nominated its founder. George
C. Wallace
of

Alabama, and General Curtis LeMay as its
standard
bearers
In the campaign itself, Nixon-Agnew took
an

early lead over Humphrey and his much-divided
Democrats,
but as the voting approached, Humphrey made
great progress
and closed the gap almost completely. By
election
day,

it must have been apparent to Richard Nixon that
he was
to be involved in his second razor-thin presidential
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election in less than a
decade.
Nixon came out on top with

This ti.e. however,

302 electoral votes to
I91

for Humphrey and

(all from the 'deepSouth) for

Wallace.

Nixon's popular margin over
Humphrey was
approximately one-half million
votes, out of more than
70 million cast.
The 1968 campaign is a
difficult one to
analyze for two reasons. First,
though

most of Wallace's

popular votes and all of his
electoral votes came from
the nominally Democratic
South, his support was largely
conservative (especially on civil
rights matters) and
his presence in the campaign
probably hurt Nixon more
that it did Humphrey. Had Wallace
not been a factor.
Nixon's margin of victory in I968
would have been
substantially larger. A look back at
the 196if returns
reminds us that the Republicans made
significant

inroads

in the South in that year, and while
Nixon was certainly

not perceived to be as conservative on
civil rights as
Goldwater (a perception which would probably
have made

him attractive to white Southern voters),
Hubert

Humphrey was, by reputation at least, more of a
'liberal*
on civil rights than Lyndon Johnson, himself
a Southerner,

had appeared in 196^.
this to be the case.

Analysis of the 1972 returns shows
Of the I972 voters who recalled

a 1968 vote for
Wallace,

79;^ .oted for Nixon
in 1972
When the Kixon ana
Wallace votes in .968
are co^Mnel
the seven states of
the deep South, the
results

-

re™iy

are

similar to the totals

polled
Nixon
alone in 1972 when
Wallace was out of the
race. 38
The second factor
which complicates
ar^alysis
Of the Nixon-Hu„,phrey
contest is that one of
its »ost
important issues, the Viet
Na. War, was never
really
addressed in a systematic
way by either of the
candidates. Since neither a
representative of the "peace"
movement nor an avowed -hawkhad a place on either
party's ticket, the concerns
of many Americans for a
speedy termination of the
Viet Nam War (one way or
another) were never voiced by
the candidates during
the campai gn.
Holding constant to his belief
that

Nixon-Wallace I968
totals with
wlth''?>,2°Mp'''"^^2".°f
the Nixon totals in 1972 is
striking.
(Nixon pluf Wallace)
iw.LbbioSippi

N. Carolina
3. Carolina

Arkansas
Louisiana

77«l/o

(Ni^xon)

78

9,

'.

70.9^5

70.72
69.8^.

72^

Source! World Almanac, 1973,

l^jA
^^^^
69.%

68!72"^''

A.O

n

ll'l
+0*7
+0-7
-I'.j
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foreign policy should be entitled
to bi-partisan support.
Richard Nixon refused to be specific
in his statements
on Viet Nam, stating only that he
had a 'secret
plan*

to end the war. which he promised
to implement when and
if elected.
Humphrey, on the other hand, was in a

difficult position.

While the Democrats were per-

ceived by many to be slightly more Movish'
on the
war than Republicans, (22.^,^ of the voters in
I968

felt the Democrats were likely to take a "stronger
stand" on the war,

^'3.5fo

and— significantly— 3^.1^

felt the Republicans were,
saw no difference in the

parties* positions on the war),

Humphrey was bound—

if by nothing more than convention and respect— to
avoid

criticizing President Johnson's war policy.

Such

criticism would probably have fallen on deaf ears anyway,
since the voters largely believed that Humphrey had

been a part of Johnson's war-planning brain trust, 39 and
members of the "peace" movement
Chicago fresh in their minds

— v/ith

— simply

the memory of

could not reconcile

themselves to supporting any one who had played so promi-

nent a role in the Johnson administration.
^^The very limited role played by Humphrey in
decisions leading to Viet Nam escalation is chronicled
by David Halbertsam, The Best and the Brightest (New York*
Random House, 1972).

If "divide and
conauer"
^nquer is a sound
tactic in
+V,
V
the
battles of politics,
both sides in
1968
been badly shaken
by the extent t
"''^^
apparent in
nthexr
their ranks.
Republicans found that
™any
conservatives, especially
in the
^v,
deserting
'
the OOP
th
.
GOP ,0
.
vote for Wallace,
.e^ocrats observed
their
left flan, alienated
fro™ the Hu«phrey-MusUe
ticket
and deciding, for
the ™ost part, to
"sit it out" (at
least in tern,s of
active campaign activity)
in 1968.
Gxven these «ide rifts
in both ca^ps. it
is not

"

JS

surprising that the
outcome of the election
was very
much in doubt until
well into the morning
hours of
the day after the
election.
J.

The "social issue"
alluded to by Scammon
and
IVattenberg was. as
mentioned above, a vague
amalgam
Of concerns on the
questions of law and order,
student
protests, and the all-around
-permissiveness- which
many voters felt characterized
American society i„
the late sixties.
Throughout the campaign, the

Republicans made an issue of the
apparently high crime
rate, and made much political
hay be characterizing
Johnson-s Attorney General Ramsey
Clark (as well as
the Supreme Court) as being
"soft" on criminals.
The
massive anti-war demonstrations,
as well as numerous
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•civil rights, riots
in the

Wao.

neighborhoods of „any

A-nerican cities (both
covered widely and
vividly by the
»edia) seemed to persuade
voters that lawlessness
and

•violence, were rampant
in the land, and the
incumbent

Democratic administration
was made to bear the
brunt of
political blame.
Led by Humphrey, the
Democrats countered
Republican claims by pointing
to the enormous progress
made during the Johnson
years in the areas of housing,
civil rights, and the "war
on poverty."
the final
analysis, though, these claims
were not enough to stem
the Republican tide riding
on a general disaffection

m

with the Viet Nam War and
adverse popular reaction to
the perceived side effects
of many of Johnson.s social
programs. '^0
four years. Americans had been
exposed
to the problems and pitfalls
of a Democratic administration trying to build, in a
limited time
span, its

version of the .Grea t Society.'

m

I968 the voters were

research, "An Analysis of the Results
of the 1972 Presidential Election,"
indication of the extent to which the(1974) givel us some
„<•

"Great

•

SocieL's"

y^^^' 59.8/. of the responprogress was being made "too
2^® respondents who felt that way. 72.2%
i^lh
voted either for Nixon or Wallace. Of the
voters who
91 -if. voted for Humphrey,
K,!;\^r^frn./'*^5
electorate felt that progress was
-^^
-too Slow
?^
ripn?r?2?+ "^^^
f^^J''/^"
•

''^'^^'^^
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asked to appraise the
.Great Society.
it wanting.

and they found

In 1968, we begin to see
the first stages of
the increase in
Independents which is so
prevalent
today.
By that year. Independents
had caught up with
Republicans in number, and
comprised 26.5^ of the
electorate, compared to
2^.1f. of the voters who called

themselves Republicans.

Democrats were still in a

commanding position with the
loyalty of l,5.y/o of the
voters.
In their I968 vote, most
Independents returned
to the Republican "fold"
which they had left in 196^,
and Richard Nixon received nearly
60% of the Independent
votes cast.
Table II-6 presents the vote for
President
by party identification in the
1968 election.
TABLE II

- 6
.

PRESIDENTIAL VOTE BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION
IN I968
VOTE

REPUBLICAN

Nixon
Humphrey
Wallace

88.1^^

Total

Note

I

DEMOCRAT

INDEPENDENT

19.5^^
69.3/^

25,2%

11.2^

17.3/-

100.0^

100.0?^

(N=r375)

100. 0^;^

(N=705)

(N=M2)

In this table, the 'Independent' category
includes all voters who initially
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preference tor

onZ/artylllnt

other.

Besides demonstrating
the Independentswholehearted support for
Nixon, the figures in
the Table
also Show that George
Wallace seeded to appeal
Much
more to Independents than
to either Republicans
or
Democrats in 1968. it is
of course possible that
a
number of voters 'dropped
in- to the Independent

'

category in I968 specifically
to vote for Wallacea possibility enhanced
by the fact that his
party
organization was known as the
American Independent
Party. There is no precise
way to determine exactly
how widespread this phenomenon
was, but
Table

i

2

contains figures which shed
some light on the question.
The recalled 196^^ Democratic
vote of 1968 Independents
was 61.655, a figure slightly
lower than the 66.2?5 of

Independents who actually voted Democratic
in 196k.
Though this difference is not a
substantial one, it is
made more noteworthy when we recall
that voters have a
tendency to "over-recall" votes for
winners (66fo of all
1968 voters recalled a 196'^ Johnson vote,
when

actually cast one).

605?

had

Since the I968 recall of Independents

was lower than their actual 196k Democratic
vote, it would
indicate that there was some shift in the
membership
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composition of the Independent
category between 1964
and 1968, although the
s»all difference suggests
that
the change was probably
not precipitous, since
many
Wallace voters were no doubt
attracted by the Alaba^^a
Governor's stance on civil
rights, we will examine
Shortly whether the Independents'
attitudes (consistently most -liberal' in
previous elections) had
become as conservative in I968
as their support of
Wallace would indicate. But.
I would suggest that
another factor-really quite
unconnected to civil rights
attitudes-might have been
responsible for Wallace's
higher support among Independents
than partisans

in 1968.

If we accept political science's
general contention that
party identification plays a major
role in the voting
decision, it is entirely possible
that Wallace's decision
to run outside the two party
framework cost him the votes
of many members of both major parties.
This is not to
day that party members were disenchanted
with a third

party candidacy per se

.

but that many voters who might

otherwise have supported VJallace were unable
to break
the ties of their traditional party allegiance,
and

consequently voted for Humphrey or Nixon.

It is likely

that some voters who may have agreed with Wallace's
issue positions may have been held back from voting for
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him because of their
party allegiance. No
such constraint existed to prevent
Independents from voting
their .•Mind." and Wallace
consequently did much better
among the Independent voters.
One implication of this
hypotheses is that Wallace's
"real" strength in 1968
lay closer to the I7/. of
the vote he received
from
Independents than the 7.8^ he
received of the combined
partisan vote, though, as noted
above, it is possible
that some conservative voters
may have been attracted
into the Independent category
in 1968 by the Wallace
candidacy.
This contention can be partially
and tentatively supported by recalling
the 1972 primaries in which
Wallace, running as a Democrat,
surprised most observers
by his startlingly strong showings
in Ohio, Michigan, and
Indiana.

Lest this description lead us to the
false
notion that Independents were unanimous
in

their con-

servative bent in I968, we should also
note that, when
asked who had been their preference
for the Democratic
presidential nomination prior to the decision
of the
convention, over fifty percent of the
Independents
claimed to have preferred one of the 'liberal'

Democratic contenders (Eugene McCarthy, Robert and
Edward Kennedy, and George McGovern).

Their preference
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^or these 'liberal.
Democrats was as M.h
as that
expressed by .embers
of either political
party.^

Though the above-mentioned
'social issue- was
much discussed in the
media
-Ld in 196b.
1968 th.
the survey questions
available which measured
politica] attitudes
poxixicai
^
that year
aid not address
themselves to that area,
but concentrated
on the more traditional
issues of civil rights
an. the
role Of government.
Also examined were the
voters'
opinions of the propriety
of American involvement
i„
Viet Nam and the course
the country ought best
pursue
in extricating itself
from the dilemma.

m

As they had been in earlier
surveys, voters were
asked if they felt progress
in the civil rights
area
was being made "too fast.
"too slow. "
••

or "about

right."

Table 11 - 7 shows how the
different identifiers
responded to that question.
These figures indicate that
the Independents of 1968 were
at least as convinced
as Republicans, and more so
than Democrats, that civil
rights progress was being made too
fast. When we control
for race, little is changed as
regards the Independents
(69.9/.) and Rep ublicans (65.
Of.) who felt progress was too
.

53'2i^ of the Independents expressed a Dreferpnro

McCarthy, Robert or Edward Kennedy^ or
cZ.lt'^M'r
George McGovern, as did 51.9fo of the
Democrats and '^(•^/<'
ky.Sfo
of the Republicans.

^•ast.

but it is interesting
^nat tho
the 'progressive'
^ that
appearance of Democrats
on this
thi. issue
disappears
v^hen only white
respondents are included,
included since 67vS
.
of
+K
u.
the white Democrats
argued that
arp-ued
th«t progress
was too fast.
.

•

TABLE II

REPUBLICAN

-

7

DEMOCRAT

INDEPENDENT

"too fast"

56.0^
"about right"

25.1%

31.

2l.k/o

"too slow"
S,9fo

other answer
5.1/.

Total

100.0;:$

(N=375)

100.0^
(N=705)

100,0:^

(N=M2)

The pattern established
by Independents in 196^
of
being Slightly, but
consistently ™ore progressive
on
civil rights issues was
not evidenced in I968.
(m
fact, where observable
differences exist between

Independents and partisans on
this issue in I968. the
Independents appear more conservative,
though none of
the differences are
statistically significant). Whether
the change was due to a
conservatizing trend among them.
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WaXXaoeites is

aimcuXt

-St

to aeter^Xne
preoiseXy.

rUe

Xikexy answer is that
both these phenomena
were
responsihXe.
any case, since the
WaXXace vote in
1968 consisted heaviiv
h^^ ^-p
^•^y (8S
(05.4,0
of persons feeXing
that
oxviX rights progress
was "too fast." it
is fair to
-ay that the Independents
of 1968 contributed
more to
his strength than
they probably would
have in 196^. or
at least more than
the 1964 group of
Independents
would have contributed
at that time.

m

On those issues which
dealt with the question
Of government activism.
Independents were much
closer
in their attitudes to
Republicans than to Democrats.
Nearly half of all
Independents felt the federal
government was becoming "too
powerful" (as did more than
half of the Republicans,
but only 28% of the Democrats)
and 24.5 percent of the
Independents felt that the

government should involve itself
in aiding citizens in
obtaining a job and a "good
standard of living."
Giving a similar response were
22.1^ of the Republicans,
and 40.3:^ of the Democrats.
One issue area in which Independents
seemed to

differ almost equally from both
groups of partisans was
the question of American
involvement in the Viet Nam War.
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™03t pertinent inaices.
maependents we.e consistently
-re -hawkish" than either
Kepuhlicans or Democrats.
More Independents
(33^) than Republicans
{27.7^)
and about the sa.e
as Democrats
(30.6^,, felt Africa
"dxd the right thing"
in getting involved
i„ viet Nan..
They (40.5^) were also
.ore supportive of taking
-...a stronger stand, even
if it means invading
North
Viet Nam- than were the
Republicans (32.3?0 or
Democrats (30.9^). And.
while there is no statistically significant difference
between the X6.5% of
Independents favoring the
immediate Viet Nam puliout
in 1968 and 19.2^ of
Republicans and 21. 3/, of

Democrats favoring such a
move, the pattern observed
is consistent with the
-hawkish" image the Independents
painted for themselves by
their answers to the earlier
questions.
As in past years, the
Independents of 1968
resembled Republicans more closely
than Democrats on
a number of demographic and
socioeconomic variables.
One area, though, in which the
Independents differed
markedly from both groups of partisans
was in their
relative youthfulness
As in earlier years. Independence
was a characteristic of younger
voters, and party
.

allegiance, especially to the GOP, seemed
to increase
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among the middle-aged and
older voters. Figure
II
^
presents the age distribution
of Republicans. Democrats,
and independents, as well
as that of "party
identifiers"
(the total Of Democrats
and Republicans)
i„ 1968.

The

figure shows us that after
an initial burst among
the
voters in the youngest
categories. Independence
seems
to fall to around 22/.
of the electorate and
remain
thereabouts through the rest
of the age groups.
Similarly, after a slow start,
party identification
rises to 705; among those
voters over thirty and remains
fairly constant thereafter.
From these observations
we might suggest that the
perceptible increase in
percentage of Independents between
196/^ and 1968 may
have been due more to the
greater likelihood of the
young voters in 1968 to be Independent
than an overall

upsurge affecting voters of all ages.
back at Figure II - 1 shows us that

A quick look

the incidence of

Independence among voters over thirty
in 1956 was not
substantially less than that of the
over-thirty voters
in 1968.

The significant difference seems
to have been

among the very young voters-of whom Z7%
were Independents
in 1956 compared to hS.r/., in I968.
Though analysis
of

the reasons for the currently high percentage
of

Independents is reserved until later in the study.
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these data suggest that young
voters (so many of whom
have recently entered the
electorate due to the

18-year old vote and the post-war
'baby boom*) may
provide us with a part of the answer.
The socioeconomic profiles of
Independent

voters in I968 were, once again,
relatively high.
Over one third of their number had
attended or were
attending college in that year, similar
to the
the Republicans and higher than the

Wo

of

of the Democrats.

Also, proportionately fewer Independents
had failed to
complete a grade school education than members
of either
party. When race is controlled, Independents
still

appear the most educated group.

72.7^ of the white

Independents were high school graduates in I968,
compared
to 68. 2?^ of the white Republicans and
51. 9;;^ of the white

Democrats.

Independents had the highest apparent mean

educational level, with 12.0 years, followed by the

Republicans with 11,5 and the Democrats with 9.8.^2
This high level of educational attainment was reflected
in the occupational patterns of the Independents, where

nearly one quarter of them were employed as professionals
or managerial personnel, compared to 17^ of the partisans.
^'^Both the difference between Independents and
Republicans and the difference between Independents and
Democrats are significant at the .05 level.
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Simultaneously, .ewer
Inaependents than party
.e.bers
were service workers
or unskilled laborers.
More
Independents than partisans
considered themselves
middle Class (48.8^ to
4l.5f,), but about equal
proportions Of both groups
Claimed to be members of
a
union household. ^3
A look at the overall
income figures for I968
demonstrates that,
^ -p
widu, a-c
at least
lPnQ+ if
«i
class perception is
tied to family income, the
higher proportion of
Independents who considered
themselves middle class
in that year were not
inaccurate. Figure II 5

displays the income distribution
of Independents and
partisans in I968. The figure
shows that proportionately more partisans than
Independents listed themselves in the lower income
categories. Slightly higher
percentages of Independents than
partisans placed themselves in the middle range brackets
($^000-$15,000)
and more (11.9^ to 6,y/o) claimed
incomes of between
fifteen and twenty- five thousand dollars.
While most
of these observed differences are
quite small, the

^^^^

^® might expect, the Republicans were
likely to be union members in
^o%^^'^ll^^'^
196a.
V/hen combined with Democrats, however,
the partisan voters as a whole were from union families 2l^.Q%
of
tne time.
Independents were from union families 25.5^
of the time.
^""^^'^ ^^^^'^
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pattern's consistency is
obvious and indicates
to us
that the Independents
were better off
financially in
1968 than were the party
identifiers.
If the Independents of

196/f represented the
middle Of the socioeconomic
spectrum, by 1968 they had
moved decidedly upward
and begun to crowd the
Republicans for the top
position. The question of
how long they were likely
to stay there, and what
effects their new social
and economic pre-eminence
would have on their political
outlook and behavior is
best answered by an analysis
of the Independents in
the 1972 election.

1972

Nixon V. Mcr.nvPTn.
The 1972 presidential campaign
is so fresh in

our memories (and kept so by daily
media coverage of
•Watergate') that a detailed re-hash
of its issues in
these pages would serve no useful
purpose.
The main
reasons for McGovern's calamitous
defeat have been
chronicled fully elsewhere.
Nonetheless, a Republican

landslide— in a time of huge Democratic majorities
in
^^See Theodore H. White, The Making of the
President, 1972 (New York* A theneum Publishers,
I973).
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registration an.
identification-merits examination,
especially when we oonsiaer
that Nixon's overwhelming
victory was accompanied
by only minimal GOP
gains in
the House and the
net loss of two Senate
seats.

If

"ost Americans are
Democrats (or Democratic
sympath"ers) and continue to vote
Democratic in congressional
elections, how can President
Nixon's 1972 landslide
be explained
In the 1972 survey, voters
calling themselves
Independents constituted over
one-third of the

electorate-quite a remarkable
jump from the

22.5jS

they represented only
eight years earlier. And.
as
they had in I968. they
gave Mr. Nixon heavy electoral
support. Figure II - 6 reflects
the upward surge in
Independent support of Republican
presidential candidates between 1964 and
1972.
The figures show that
the upsurge of Independent
support for Repuglicans
was accompanied by similar
upsurges among other groups
Of voters.
While the Independent vote
appears the most
volatile, th e 3>i7i by which it
varied from 196'+ to
1972

Dieaffection with McGovern himself was of
the respondents
""^'"'^
s?ated't?atVr
McGovern T^T^'
did not have "...the kind of a
^Pr^on.i^+
president ought to have." 28.?% expressed
5" ^
i^^ct'S'wu
such an opinion
about Nixon.

1^0
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196^

Percentage of voters
supporting Republican
candidate

1968

REPUBLICANS
DEMOCRATS
INDEPENDENTS
ALL VOTERS

1972

was almost matched
by
^•
xne 2q^
y the
^97^ .r.^variation
in the
Democratic vote during
durinn- that
+
period. Even

the always-

whUe

they appear to
con.ir. that the
Independents
constitute something
or a -swing
vote-.-reveal that
the Shifts Of
independents between
elections are as
™oh associated with shifts
in the vote of the
general
populace as they are
causal variables in
determining
the outcomes of
elections. Were this
not the case
and were support of
the partisans for
their candidates
constant in every
ry election,
elec+inr,
tv,
the year-to-year
variance
«ould appear as it does
in Figure II ,,,3,„,^
a hypothetical
situation in which the
partisans are
always loyal and
Independents the only "swing"
voters.
The contrast between
Figures II - 6 and II 7 „akes
it clear that, while
Independents obviously do
constitute something of a
"swing" vote, they are
by no
means alone in the way
they are effected by
'shortterm' political forces.
In addition to their
demonstrated propensity to
vote Republican more
frequently in 1972 than in the
recent
past there is other evidence
to suggest that Independents
today are more inclined toward
the GOP than they once were.
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FIGURE II
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in 196^, over forty
percent of all Independents
claimed
to consider themselves
"closer" to the Democratic
party.
Approximately one fourth
claimed Republican leanings,
and
34^ were totally uncommitted.
By 1972. however, only
31.95^ Of the independents
felt closer to the
Democrats.
While 30.2^ were closer
to the GOP and
37-9^. were without any preference.

If the independents made
a substantial contribution to Nixon's overwhelming
presidential victory,
they also may have played
a role in the Democrats
fairly strong showing in
the congressional races,
since
they were the group in the
electorate most likely
to

have

sput

their tickets in
1972.
v,Mle Xess than
half Of either group
of partisans claimed
to have
voted for candidates
from different
parties, over
two-thirds Of all
Independents did so. When
these
-ticket-splitters" are examined
in regional patterns,
the results are
so.ewhat surprising.
Given the South's
massive defection to Nixon
in 1972, one ™ight
anticipate that the highest
incidence of split-tioket
voting
would have occurred in
that area. Actually,
.ost of
the 1972 • ticket-splitters,
(proportionately speaking)
were in the West and
Midwest, where over 6o;i
of the
voters split their ballots.
Though Southerners split
more frequently than did
voters in the Northeast,
there were still many "solid
Democrats" in the South,
and that area was the home
of nearly forty percent
of
all voters who voted the
straight Democratic ticket
in 1972.
It would seem, in retrospect,
that while
the South went strongly for
Nixon in I972, there is
still a strong "bed rock" of
solid Democratic support
in that part of the country.

It has been said that the
1972 election offered
voters as clear-out an ideological
choice as they had
had in nearly half a century-clearer
even than the
"choice" offered them in 1964.

If that is true, then

much Of the outcome
should be explainable
i„ terms
Of the voters, political
attitudes and

stands on the

issues.

Since the Independents
gave Mr. Wixon such
solid electoral support.
„e might expect to
find them
solidly behind the President
on the more important
political issues. Besides
the traditional issues
dealing with the role of
government, the voters in
1972 were asked to choose between
candidates and
philosophies with differing
views on tax reform, the
Viet Nam War, America's role
in world affairs, the
place Of protest movements
in American politics, the
dimensions of the movement for
women's equality, civil
rights (with its newest
problem-busing children
to

achieve racial balance), and,
somewhat unfairly, (and
to the chagrin ,of the
McGovern forces), a group of
issues called the three
"A's--"acid. amnesty, and
abortion.

When the voters were asked
if the government
in Washington was, in their
opinion, becoming too
powerful, three out of every five
respondents said
that it was.
The interesting thing is that,
when we
break this figure down by party
identification, we
observe that the Independents were
the group

most

convinced that government had become too
powerful

(65^ Of their number agreed),
and that there
appeared
to be no substantial

difference between the
way
Democrats and Republicans
viewed the situation
(58.5^
and 57.1^ of those
groups, respectively,
felt government was too powerful).
The similarity between
the
Republican and Democratic
figures is rather startling
especially when we consider
the wide disparities

between those groupspositions on this question
in
1964 and 1968. By way of
partial explanation, it is
possible that any question
dealing with whether or
not government is becoming
"too powerful" is likely
to elicit positive
responses from two groups of
voters.
The first group (many of
whom would, philosophically
at least, be Republicans)
responds to the question on
the basis of principle
rather than partisanship,
and

by answering affirmatively,
makes clear that "the
government" (in a rather abstract
sense) is too much
involved in the daily lives of
the people.

The second

group answers positively for
partisan reasons, and
their responses indicate the
belief that "this government" (read, administration) is
becoming too powerful.
In 196t and 1968, the first
and second groups were
combined under the Republican banner,
while in 1972
the objectors to strong government
were split—those

Objecting. phiZosophioally

in the Republican
oa.p. and

those objecting for
partisan reasons among
the

De.ocrats-thus balancing off
the picture ™ore
than
in previous years.

(Another possibility, of
course.
IS that government
reallv was getting
P-Pt+ir.o- +
too powerful

in
1972. and this fact was realized
in near equal measure
by Republicans and
Democrats, or perhaps that
Democratslong supporters of a
-big. federal

government-were

themselves becoming more
conservative on this question
in 1972).

When the voters were asked
if they felt government Should assist people
in obtaining and maintaining
a good standard of living,
the distribution seemed
a
bit more familiar, with
29. 1/, of the Independents
in
agreement, compared to kO%
of the Democrats and 20j5
of
the Republicans.
Even when class was controlled,
working class Independents
were less enthusiastic
than working class Democrats,
but more than working
class Republicans in their
support of government
involvement.
Independents again came up in the
middle
when asked if they felt government
should "do everything
possible" to control inflation.
They were slightly
less

enthusiastic than

Democrats in their support of

government anti-inflation measures,
but more so than

voters were .ue.tionea
on ,neir
recepu.eness to a
gover^ent-sponsorea health
insurance

Mil.

12

°'

^"^^P-^'ents strongly
supported such a plaj
=o»parea to
0. the Hepu.llcans
ana
o. tL
Democrats,^?
on the question of
tax reform,
Inaepenaents
rese.hlea Kepublicans
™ore than Democrats
in their
perception 0. a neea
.or .unaa.e„tal
re-structurin, 0.
the system, ana
less than .orty
percent 0. their nu..er
expressea the belief
iier that i->,„
v
the rich
shouia pay substantially more than they
ao
uu now.
ji
tm,
This .comparea with
slightly more than forty
t)ercf»i+ of
^-e +v,
r,
percent
the Republicans
ana nearly half the
Democrats.
•

With George McGovern,
iaentified from the
beginning as a -peace"
canaiaate. in the race.
America's
future course in that
war was an issue of
high salience.
It IS probably Significant
that, while most
Americans by
1972 had given up th e iaea
of a military victory
in

^6

government^aA?i-infl*a?ion'^2«o^^"*" strongly favorea
Republicans ana 2572^ 0? thfn^^f'
^^'^'^ °^ the

1^8

Viet Nam, only twenty
percent favored "immediate
withdrawal".-the position
exclusively associated with
George McGovern. The
remaining eighty percent of
the
voters took positions ranging
from pursuing a full
military victory to total
withdrawal of forces
once
the necessary arrangements
had been made for the

return of our prisoners of war.

Herein lay McGovern's

problem.

It seems reasonable to
suggest that the
four-fifths of the voters who
favored courses other
than immediate withdrawal could
all have found a
comfortable "home" under the
umbrella of Nixon's
Viet Nam policy: he was withdrawing
troops; he was
ensuring that the POWs would be
returned as part of
any cease-fire agreement; and
he was, as Cambodia and
the Haiphong mining displayed,
unafraid to use the
"get tough" policy which appealed
to some voters.
In
short. Nixon's policy on the war
had an eclectic
character to it which made many voters
feel comfortable
supporting it. On the other hand,
McGovern's position
was more clearly and narrowly defined,
and probably

appealed only to those who, like himself,
favored

immediate (or nearly immediate) withdrawal
of forces.
As we just mentioned, this group amounted
to less than
a quarter of the electorate.

Another of McGovern 's

problems-one particularly
damaging since he built
so much Of his candidacy
around the Viet Nam War
issue-was that many voters
perceived that his election
would not bring peace
to Viet Nam.
I„ fact, only 38.3;^
Of the voters agreed
that his election would
result in
peace, compared to the
ky.Of. who felt Nixon -s
election
would. McGovern-s apparent
inability to convince a
majority of the voters that
his election would result
in a solution to the
problem which his campaign
argued
was the most important
must have been instrumental
in
his defeat.

McGovern and Nixon also were
identified with
different stances on the more
general question of
American involvement in world
affairs.
The voters
were asked if they felt we
would be "...better

off if
we just stayed home and did
not concern ourselves
with the problems in other parts
of the world." There
was enormous sentiment against
America's taking such
a stance, and over three
fourths of the voters in all

categories rejected this "isolationist"
position. 75.6/$
of the Independents supported an
active American role in
world affairs, as did 77.1:^ of the
Democrats and 80.9^
of the traditionally isolationist
Republicans. These
findings suggest two things.

The first is that
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isolationism— a position linked «+
^ ^
j-inKed, at least
tangentially,
to the policies of
George McGovern-was
highly

unacceptable to all groups
of voters in I972.
The
second is that, as mentioned
earlier, partisan considorations often influence
what we might otherwise
assume
to be positions of
principle,
since, in I972. it was

President Nixon (accompanied
by Henry Kissinger) who
was directing our overseas
involvements. Republicanswho might have objected
to similar actions by
a
Democratic President-were
forced, however, reluctantly,
to "go along" in support
of those involvements
if their

support of Nixon was to be
consistent.

Another issue of some import in
I972 was the
"politics of protest." During
the late 1960»s the

political protest march or
demonstration (generally
directed against American war
policies) had become a
common feature on the American
scene. Many voters
perceived McGovern's candidacy to
be associated with
the American anti-war movement
and the political
protests that movement generated.

Unfortunately for

McGovern, the large majority of Americans
seemed to
consider such demonstrations improper
or somehow "out
of place." When asked, for example,
whether they

approved of "...sit-ins. mass meetings,
demonstrations,

and things like that,"
only 7.6^ of the voters
gave
their unqualified approval.
,hen the voters made
connections between Senator
MoGovern and the American
protest movement, those
connections hurt the McGovern
campaign, since 75.6% of
the people expressing
disapproval with protests of
this sort voted for

President Nixon in 1972.
One other comparatively
"new" issue in the
1972 campaign was the area of women's
equality and.
on this issue, most Americans
seemed to be in sympathy

with MoGovern's positions,

without implying that

Richard Nixon is a male chauvinist,
it is fair to say
that MoGovern's campaign was
more active in its support
of women's causes than was
the President's. And the
voters in 1972 were of the opinion
that the time for
women's equality had arrived. There
were no

significant relationships between
attitudes on the
women's issue and party identification
or political
independence. A majority of the voters
in
all

categories expressed support for increased
women's
equality.

32.7J5 of the Independents expressed the

belief (the 'strongest' possible answer to the
survey
question) that "women should have an equal role with
men
in running business, industry, and government"
as did
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30.5% of the Democrats and 29.0^
of the Republicans.
Simultaneously, only IS.H of
the Independents would
agree that a "woman's place
is in the home," 20.2/.
of the Democrats and IQ.lvf.
of the Republicans.
In the area of civil rights
the Independents
continued to display the
conservative orientation they
had shown in I968 though
they were at least matched
in
their conservatism by Republican
identifiers.
This is

apparent when we observe their
attitudes on the question
of 'busing.
Opposition to busing was overwhelming
among all three groups of voters
in 1972, with 80. 6f.,
•

Qe.l^fo,

and 73.

of the Independents, Republicans,
and

Democrats, respectively, agreeing
that children should
be kept in neighborhood schools,
rather than be bused
to achieve racial balance.
The busing issue, despite
McGovern's claim to the contrary, was of
high salience
in 1972 (98.8^ of the respondents
claimed to be concerned enough about the federal government's
role in

integrating schools to have formed an opinion
favoring
one side of the other) and the opposition
of many

Americans to busing helped President Nixon whose
position on the subject was, and is, well known.

A

measure of that help is seen in the fact that 71. 9^4;
of the anti-busing respondents who voted reported a
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Nixon vote in 1972 compared
to 17.7^ of the
pro-busing
forces.
Conversely. Senator MoGovern
won the vote of
only 28.155 of those opposed
to busing and
82.7f„ of
those who supported it.
Sadly for MoGovern, however,
only 233 of the sample's
respondents had pro-busing
attitudes, 2133 of the respondents
were opposed to
busing.
In addition to the more traditional
issues,
the 1972 campaign raised (in
the voters* minds if not
the politicians* speeches) what
is termed, for lack of
a better phrase,

the •'social change issue."

Whatever

else it accomplished, McGovern's
1972 campaign revealed
that there are a great many Americans
interested in
some fairly fundamental changes in
the styles and

values of life in this country.

And, while Nixon's

landslide victory may indicate that there are
even
more Americans who admire the "old values,"
1972
may be remembered as the year in which some of

those

"old values" were first seriously challenged.

Whether

because of his own positions, or because of the
positions and life styles of some of his most vocal
(and visible) supporters, McGovern became, in 1972,

the candidate allegedly sympathetic to an amalgam of

issues generally characterized as, "acid, amnesty, and

abortion.- and these issues
probably cost George
MoGovern votes in 1972.
While McGovern was by
no
means an ardent supporter
of abortion-on-de.and
(he
felt the question was
best left to the states
and had
no place in national
politics) he was generally
regarded as more pro-abortion
than President Nixon.
This was not a position
likely to endear him to
the
electorate. 59.1^ of whom felt
abortion should not
be allowed at all. or
only if "...the life and
health
of the woman is in danger."
At the same time. Zk.yA
Of the electorate favored
'abortion-on-demand., feeling
that it "...should never be
forbidden, since one should
not require a woman to have
a child she doesn-t want."
On the subject of amnesty
for draft resisters. McGovernposition (Which, though somewhat
unclear, was certainly
inclined more toward amnesty than
the President's) ran
contrary to that of the majority of
Americans.
71.7/.

of whom felt the government should
not "...declare an
amnesty after the war." Also in
1972. the respondents
were asked if they felt the use of
marijuana should be
legalized (or at least "decriminalized,"
as McGovern
had argued) or whether penalties for
its use should

actually be increased.

Over sixty percent of the voters

favored stiffer penalties— a position which,
while not
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specificaUy associated with
President Nixon, certainly
was antithetical to that
taken by Senator McGovern.
On
the marijuana issue, the
Independents were the groups

most 'sympathetic., with
over one fourth of them
in
favor of some relaxation
of the anti-marijuana
laws.
Approximately eighteen and fifteen
percent of the
Democrats and Republicans
respectively,

favored such

a relaxation.

Perhaps most important here
is the
fact that only eighteen
percent of the Democrats

agreed

with the position that was taken,
at least implicitly,
by their own presidential
nominee. It is doubtful that
many Democrats (or any voters)
deserted McGovern solely
because of his position on
marijuana, but the above
figures are symptomatic of the
extent to which the
McGovern candidacy was not in harmony
with the expressed
opinions of a great many Democratic
voters.
And. it

is interesting to note that, among
those respondents

favoring stricter mauijuana laws, McGovern
won only

30,1?S

of the vote, while his percentage
among persons favoring

de-criminalization was 53. 8;^.

As in the past, the percentage of non-white

Independents (7.?^) was greater than that of fiepublica
(3.8%) but smaller than that of the Democrats (18.6;2).
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Tlie

Independent identificati n„
i-iiioation was most
popular am^v,„
younger voters-in
=
fact
''^^ "^^''y enfranchised
ei^hte.
.
eighteen-to-twenty
ase group,
"ge
J'
cro.m +v,
the incidence of
independence was
50.3^. When we consider
the T^dependents
.
under twenty-five
(and th,
"'"'^ '"'^ °^ ^^-^ -ters
Of that age,)
o we see that
the Southern
states are home
t
the largest group.
3I.5. of the young
Independents,
-e M,,„,,,.
^^^^^
^^^^
^^^^^^
35.x. and i6.3, of this
group, respectively,
.he high
«c.dence of Independence
among the young voters
in
the south is ,uite
interesting, especially
i„ n,,,
ot the generally
low number of
Independents which that
region has had in thp
=+
t
the r,o
past,
a later chapter,
this
Phenomenon will he examined
as we try to explain
the
large increase in the
number of Independents
which has
occurred in recent years.
,

^

•

.t

•

"

m

Figure II - 8 shows party
identification, by
age. for voters in the
1972 electorate.
One interesting aspect of this
representation is the fairly
constant level of Independence
among voters aged
la to 29.
In past years, the
percentage of Independents
has dropped sharply once
the "youngest group" has
been
passed. While this may
suggest that political

Independence had more durability
in 1972 than it had
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xn the past, another
plausible explanation is
that the
1972 electorate really contains
two "youngest groups",
if those groups are
effectively defined as
voters
coming into the electorate
for the first
time.

The

elections of 1952 through
1968. which we have examined
all showed a high rate
of Independence among
"firsttime" voters.
The 1972 data show the
sa»e thing but
the impact is doubled
since, in addition to those
voters aged 21 to 21, who
were voting for the first
time, there were a large
number of eighteen- to-twentyone-year-old voters also coming
into the electorate.
This does not, however,
explain the persistently high
rate of Independence among
voters in the 2it to 29 age

group--second time" voters who normally
show a sharp
drop in their self-identification
as Independents.
If subsequent election studies
show the -straight lineof Independence (which approaches
fifty percent for
1972 voters under thirty) stretching
ever
to the right,

the current "boom" in the
number of Independents may

eventually result in as many as half
the voters being
without a partisan identification.
The Northeast seemed to have the
highest rate

of Independence (though the difference
between it and
the Midwest is not statistically
significant)— /J-O.O/.
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of the Northeasterners
were
Tnr^.
.
.
^ere Independents,
followed by
the Midwest (36.6/.).
the West (33.I/.) and
the South
The picture of
Independents which results
from
examination of their
socioeconomic

characteristics is

a ™ixed one.

While in some areas
Independents appeared,

as they did in
1968, to "out-Republicanize"
the

Republicans, in other ways
they seemed to fit more
into
the middle of the
socioeconomic scale. Educationally,
the 1972 Independents
continued their upward swing,
showing a mean educational
level of 12.2 years, compared
to 11.8 for the Republicans
and 10.7 for the Democrats.
As they had in the past,
more Independents than either
group of partisans clustered
near the upper end of the
occupational status scale, (the
professional and managerial categories) while fewer
of them were employed as
service workers and unskilled laborers.

When it came to actual income,
however. Independents
were not so prosperous, earning
less than the Republicans
but still somewhat more than the
Democrats— a fact
j-^^ Observed differences in this case are
significant at the .05 level. When race is
controlled.
Independents still come out on top educationally,
with
71. Oy. of the white Independents high
school graduates
compared to 67.^/0 of the white Republicans and
55.9%
of the white Democrats.
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partially explained by
the relative youth
of the
independent category i„
1972.
.6.3^ of the Independents
xn 1972 considered
themselves middle or upper

class-a

perception shared by
37-6^ of the Democrats and
51.5^
Of the Republicans,
with race controlled.
Independents
remain in the middle, with
of the white Independents
considering themselves middle
class, compared to ^0.8^
Of the White Democrats
and 52.0^ of the white
Republicans.
Virtually the same percentage
of Independents as
Democrats
(approximately 30f.) were members
of union households, and
both those groups were
more than twice as likely
as
Republicans to be union members.
It appears, on balance, as
if 1972 Independents
exhibited a mixed socioeconomic

profile-surpassing

even the Republicans in some
areas while conforming
more to their traditional
"middle" image in others.
(If Independents are disheartened
by their backslide
in some of the socioeconomic
categories in I972. they
can take heart from the news
that they are still-as
they do doubt expected— the
country's "beautiful

people."

In a question probably designed
as a check
on the survey interviewers'
objectivity, more Independents
than either group of partisans were
classified by the

interviewers as "beautiful" or "extremely
handsome").
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In 1972. the Independents
solidly backed Richard
Nixon's re-election campaign.
They supported
him, too,

on most Of the campaign's
major issues.

And in many
ways they exhibited a
socioeconomic profile extremely
similar to that shown by members
of the Republican
party.
The extent to which this
'Republicanization'
of the Independent vote may
or may not be more than a
temporary phenomenon (and its
possible consequences and
implications for the future) can
best be examined from
a broader time perspective,
viewing 1972 as but one
example of the Independent vote as
it has evolved
during the past twenty-five years.
To do this, we

must examine the charges and trends
which have
occurred in the Independent vote since
1952.

Directions

I

1953 to 1972, and Beyond

Talking about shifts and trends among the

Independent voters over a period of twenty years is,
at best, a tricky business.

The growth and changes

which have affected the country's population during
that time play havoc with attempts to discuss the

Independents as an isolated group and make fairly

meaningless any efforts to depict them as a solid,

•closed, .ody Which has
undergone changes over
ti»e.
Because short-term forces,
such as a

particular

presidential candidacy or
a political scandal
involving
one or both of the
parties, „ay cause large
numbers of
voters to enter or leave
the Independent categorythus changing the very
composition of the group's
membership-the Independent vote
acquires an added
volatility that makes
inter-election comparisons
extremely difficult.
(On the basis of
Table

i

1

and

the related discussion,
however, it would seem that

precipitous shifts of this nature
are-with the possible
exception of 1968 Independents
who may have been
attracted to the category by
the Wallace oandidacynot common). Consequently,
this section will simply
discuss the differences among the
groups of Independent
voters as they appeared in each
of the six electorates
under study. Thus, while it may
be misleading to
conceive of Independents as a 'constant'
and say that
they were more likely to vote Republican
in 1972 than
they did, say, in i960, it is proper
and defensible to
argue that the Independents of 1972 were
more likely to
vote Republican than were the Independents
of I960.
(In fact, it is also true that the Republicans
of I972

were more likely to vote Republican than the i960
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Republicans voted Republican
in that year. All
electoral categories
experience shifts in
.e^bership
over ti»e. Unless
these shifts are shown
to affect
the category wildly-and
our data suggest that
they do
not-analysis of the categories
over time can be a
useful enterprise).
Hereafter, when the
'Independent
vote' is referred to
and compared from one
year to
another, it will be
understood that the reference
is
to two different groups
of voters (though
the same

people may constitute a
large part of the membership
Of both groups). That
said, it is possible to
refer
to the Independent vote
as a vote which does,
for
practical purposes, undergo
changes over time

(much as

the

'Republican vote' or-Democratic
vote' does), and
analysis of those changes is
a viable method for discussing the independent vote's
history and speculating
on its future course.
It is no secret, as the
preceding descriptions
of Independents have made
clear, that there are many
more
Independents today than there have
been in past years.
The data indicate that the
recent increase in their
numbers occurred rather
abruptly-probably, as Walter

Dean Bumham argues, sometime
between 196^ and 1968.^9
/^^V/alter Dean Bumham, CriticalElections
^"^^ the
and
Mainsprings of American Pm ti n Muyn
o^'-^'^''
^
.

1

..

/

After holding steady
at ZZt
1952 to 1964

^^^^
the

"

the ddimensions of that
increase.
•

"

-

9

Show

^-^1- and Figure indicate,

the rise
has been a sharp
one,
one
P
and it
1+ appears
to have hurt
the
Democrats somewhat
more than
„
^^^"^
Republicans. Prom
1964
to 1972, Republican
identifip=+.
^aentification
dropped from 24.3/.
to
33.6^ with the Slight
drop (30, to Z^)
outside the
south Virtually
nullified by a slight
increase (18^
to 22^) in the
Southern States,
during that time the
ejocrats also lost
strength outside the
South (W. to
33^) but that loss was
increased, not balanced,
by the
south Where democratic
identification dropped
from 63/.
to
resulting in a nationwide
drop i„ democratic
identification from 50/. to
^n during the period.
Chapter IV offers some
explanations for the
especially
rapid increase of
Independence among Southerners
from
1964 to 1972.

"

.

.

The surveys indicate
that, while Independence
increased during the period
among all groups of voters,
'
the increase was most
pronounced among the young.
It
has long been an assumption
in voting research that
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TABLE II - 8

PARTY IDENTIFICATION,
1952-1972

Strong Democrat
V7eak

1952

1956

21.6

20. <^

Democrat

00

rr

i960

Qf^L

lyoo

1972

26.5

20.3

14.3

1

7

2^.8

24.5

25.1

24.7

10.1

6.3

6.3

9.2

10.0

10.6

Independent
(no preference)

6.14'

8.8

9.3

7.7

10.6

12.8

Independent
(leaning Republican

7.6

8.3

6.7

5.6

8.8

10.0

Weak Republican

13.8

1^.2

13.7

13.^

14.1

12.8

Strong Republican

13.9

1^.8

15.1

10.9

9.7

9.8

2.0

^.3

3.8

2.2

1.4

5.0

.

Independent
(leanine: Democrat^

Other
Total
Total Number of
Cases

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
I6O8

1606

2917

1383

1382

2730
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TABLE II

- 9

PARTY IDENTIFICATION,
I952 to
BY REGION (WHITES
ONLY)

1952

1956

I960

27
35

39
25
3^

10-70

196^1

1968

1972

38
29
32

33
39
27

1

1

100
1911

Non-Southern Whitet
Democrat
Independent
Republican
Other
Total
N

26

3^

—

26
30

2

100
1220

1178

100
1995

69
13
1^

63
16
17

60
18

100

100

100

100/f

984

63
18
18

48
36
15

46
30
22

1

1

2

100
379

100

100
819

Southern Whites

Democrat
Independent
Republican
Other
Total
N

4
100

100

388

428

19
3

100
922

398

Note
er

16?
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young people are .ore
Independent than their
elders
This fact is confirmed
by our analysis.
Figure II - lo
displays the 'Independence
profile- of the voters
in
various age groups for
each of the electorates
examined,
one of the observations
we can glean fro.
these graphs
IS that the .gap.
(m ter.s of percentage of
Independents)
l>etween the young and
the old voters see.s
widest in the
-St recent years. The figures
for the electorates of
1952. 1956. I960, and 196^ see»
to reveal a more
gradual
decline in Independence
with age (the decline is
Virtually negligible in the
1952 sample).
This gradual
decline is caused, not by
the higher levels
of

independence among older voters
in those electorates,
but by the fact that the
youngest voters in those
griups
were not as highly Independent
as the younger voters
of
later years,
effect, the decline in those
years is
gradual since the level of
Independence among the older
voters has a -shorter- distance
to

m

-fall.-

Another point which these graphs
demonstrate
(if only suggestively) is that
political

Independence
seems to -persist- more today
than it did in earlier
times.
In the figures which represent
the 1956, i960
and 196k electorates, an initial
flirtation by young
voters with Independence is followed
by a return to
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FIGURE II

-

10

PERCENT INDEPENDENT BY
AGE GROUP, 1952-1972
1952
5(

^0

li- II-

r u- 2- s- ;r g- r g- - «- §•
1956

^0

21- 25- 29- 33- 37- /n24 28 32 36 40 4/. 4^

/w- 53,
5I II II

^1

.

-

11:11'%'
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I960

li- II-

It

II- II- 1\- II-

1

II- II- II- II- ^i-

1964
50.

30
20

10-

21- 25- 29- 33- 37- M- ^5- ^9- 53- 57- 6l- 65- 6924 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64 68 72
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1968
50.

4o

30
20

10.

J

L

21- 25- 30- 33- 37- 41- ^4-5- ^9- 53- 57- 61- 65- 6924 29 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64 68
72
1972

10

L

18- 21- 25- 29- 33- 37- 4l- 45-49- 53- 57- 61- 65-6920 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64 68 72
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"normal" levels as
soon as we
v»B a.eave
leave th.
the youngest
category of voters.
The 2-;
?H ,
^^2^
gr°"Ps in all those
,
electorates show levels
of Inaepenaence
of less than
in 1968 and
25^.
1972. however. IndepenCence
see»s
to hold its
attraction even after
voters have left
the youngest age
group,
1972 in

^

m

fact. i. the 25
to 28 age group
(that electorate's
first group of

potentially -seccnd timevoters) the level of
Independence decreased not
a whit. More data
from
subsequent elections are
necessary, but the
-straight
Une. of independence (at
nearly 50%) which
represents
three age groups of voters
could indicate, conceivably
that the propensity to
give up Independence
after
exposure to one or two
elections .ay no longer be
operative.
That such a tendency is
not automatic is
Obvious in Table II 10. a cohort analysis of
Independents
in SIX presidential elections
from 1952 to 1972.
Though the graphs in Figure
II - 10 show drops
in the levels of Independence
with aging, the cohort
analysis does not confirm that
assessment at all.
In fact, the cohort analysis
provides almost no evidence
that Independence declines as
voters advance in age.
The contradictions evident
in these two measures boggle
the mind (especially since
the same data sets were used
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TABLE II - 10

Election Year
Voters Born
in
I

188^-8?
1888-91
1892-95
1896-1899
1900-03
190^-07
1908-11
1912-15
1916-19
1920-23
192^-27
1928-31
1932-35
1936-39
19^0-^3
19^8-51
1952-55

1952

1956
11%

15
18
17
18
21
17

27
23
28
26

13
26
21
25
15
19
21
22

26
23
30
35

NOT

I960

1972

NOT IN ELECTORATE
10
23
18
16
30
22

23
28
23
28
26
29

IN

10^
17
18
13
18
20
21

28
23
29

2k
32
32

ELECTORATE

^12

1968

26:^

IN

Total Number of
Cases
391

1964

^37

353

LARGE
21;^ NUMBERS
19
18
Zli

22
23
27
26
29
28
21
^1
50

kl2

16;^

2^
25
24
2k
27
32
33
37
37
39
51
49
50

935

17^
to construct both
Figure 11 - lo and
Table II - lo)

can partially be
explained „hen the
1968 and 19,2
electoratec are deleted
fro. Table II - lo.
if this
done, a decrease of
Independence with increasing
age can be perceived
(though barely, and
not for all
year groups) between
I952 and 1964.
The overall
increase in Independence
(for all ages) in 1968
and
1972 throws the progression
awry, but reading down
the columns, we can
see that even in those
years
independence is most prevalent
a^ong the younger voters
in sum. it can be stated
that while, in a given
year,
independence is more prevalent
among the young,
l^ut

"

the

overall jump in Independence
in 1968 and 1972 makes
it
impossible to prove definitively
(at least by cohort
analysis) that Independence
tends to drop as people
advance in age.
One possible compromise
solution to this

complex question is suggested
by E. M. Schreiber.50
Schreiber's analysis suggests
that the increase of
Independence (1964 to I968) was
confined, outside the
South, to voters und er thirty
but that among Southerners

(1971).

"Where the Ducks Are."
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the increases occurred
in all age groups.

Schreiber-s nnai„gs.51
are reproduced here
as Table II -

Some or

^^^^ ^^^^^^^^

n.

TABLE II - 11

PERCENT INDEPENDENT

BY AGE AND REGION.
196^ and I968
(V/HITES ONLY)

1964

South (over 30)
Non-South (over 30)

16
23

South (21-30)
Non-South (21-30)

29
32

Percent Independent

1968

30
25
60

There is. in short, in
Schreiber-s analysis the
suggestion that while Independence
may still be tied
to age (and decrease as
age increases), the increase
of
Independence in recent years is
by no means solely

attributable to young voters.
from

196>, to

and from

Independence increased

1968 (according to Schreiber's
analysis)
to 1972 (according to our
own analysis)

among nearly all age groups and
all voters.
Though
the increase was most marked
among the young and—
because there were a great many more
young voters than

Tables it^^dl!

^^^''^^

^""^

reproduced from Ibid.

.

suax

the 1972 eleotorate-.a.
an e«eot aisproportionate to what „e
™ight have expected
had the young
not been so numerous,
there
is still indisputable

evidence that the overall
level of Independence,
regardless of age, has
risen sharply i„ recent
years.
Chapter V assesses the
livelihood that Independence
wxll continue at its
present level, but it
can be
said now that the
currently high rate of
Independence
not solely attributable
to the young voters,
and
(even if it were) we
have no guarantees that
young
voters will discard their
Independence as they
advance in age.

-

If Independents (who
tend to be young) differ
greatly in age from
Republicans (who tend to be
older),
their respective socioeconomic
profiles are much closer
together.
The Independents we
observed in the past
six presidential electorates
bore a striking resemblance to Republicans when
it came to occupational
patterns and levels of income
and education,
each
Of the years we studied,
the Independents consistently
Clustered near the "upper end"
of the occupational
status scale at least as frequently
as Republicans,
and more than the Democrats,
some years, nearly
one fourth of all Independents
held professional or
managerial positions.

m

m

WhUe

date on the income
levels o. Indepenaents
are less impressive,
they still present
a -.iaaie class'
P-ture Of that group,
fact, though Republicans
Often outnumbered
Independents in the very
highest
income categories through
the years, the
Independents
consistently had fewer of
their number in what
could
be termed the -poor"
income categories
(categories
Whose upper limits shifted
upward during the period)
than did either group of
partisans. If. on balance,
independents are said to occupy
a middle income position
between Democrats and
Republicans, it should be
stated
emphatically that they are. in
this area. much, much
Closer to the members of the
GOP.

m

In the area of education,
the Independents also
display rather high levels of
achievement. With the
exceptions of 1952 and 196^ the
Independents displayed
the highest mean educational
level in every election
year.
Though in some cases the
differences between

Republicans and Independents were
not statistically
significant, the pattern is clear
enough to allow us
to say that the Independents,
over the years, have been
at least as well educated as Republicans,
and better
educated (at least in so far as that can
be measured

by number of school years completed)
than Democrats.

Hgure

II -

u

presents the .ean
educational level.
year, for Republicans.
Democrats, ana Independents.
FIGURE

11-11
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educational
level
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In addition to these
mean figures, a closer
look at the educational
data shows us that the

independents' educational
attainments were rather
'evenly, balanced.
Fewer Independents than
Republicans
were college graduates,
but fewer also had failed
to
complete a grade school
education.
In sum it can be said that
in the election
years we examined the
Independents resembled Republicans
far more closely than Democrats
on the demographic and
socioeconomic characteristics.
The only anomaly, in
fact, was age, where Independents
appeared considerably
younger than either group of partisans.
As noted
earlier in this chapter,52 there is
some controversary
surrounding the hypothesis that
Republicanism increases
with age, and, as Table II - 10
makes clear, there is no
definitive proof that Independents discard
their
Independence as they ret older. Nonetheless,
there is
some evidence to suggest that these
two phenomena do
Occur53 (though to a degree that is not
determinable

very precisely),

and— given

tJie

socioeconomic and

'52

See Glenn and Hefner, "PYirther Evidence on
Aging and Party Identification" (1972).

^3see Figures II - 2 and II - 11. Though the
general thrust of Figure II - 11 is called into question
by the cohort analysis (Table II - 10), the graphs
do
show a decline of Independence with age in almost
every
electorate.
*^
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demographic similarities
between Independents and
Republicans-it is possible to
suggest, tentatively,
that many of the Independents
who do select a party
later in life select the
GOP.
This suggestion must
be only tentative, however,
since definitive data
confirming it are lacking.
The case can be

strengthened a bit if it can be
shown that, in addition
to their socioeconomic
similarities. Independents
resemble Republicans in their
political attitudes.
Between 1952 and 1972. a wide
range of political
issues were discussed in American
presidential campaigns.
From the controversial Taft-Hartley
Act of the
19/fO's

and 1950

's

to American involvement in
Korea and Viet

Nam to the 'social issue' to 'acid,
amnesty, and
abortion. Americans have been faced
with a myriad of
political questions on which to take sides.
Over those
years, however, there have been two
political
•

issues

of such persistence as to have been
examined by each
of the SRC surveys, thus enabling us to
assess the

shifts in attitude which may have occurred
during the
period.
These issues have been the proper role
of

the federal government in the lives of its
citizens,

and the question of civil rights.

By examining their

opinions over time on these two issues, we can perhaps

181

gain the clearest perspective
on where the Independents
stand (relative to partisans)
on the issues of

American politics.
By looking first at their
views on the proper
size and role of government,
and how those
views have

changed over the years, we see a
definite and clear
movement by the Independents away
from enthusiasm for
federal government intervention in
the daily lives of
the citizenry,
I952, we observed the Independents
as the group most supportive
of the federal government's
••doing more" to make pleasant
the living conditions of
the people.
In I956 and i960, the Independents
were

m

the group in the middle on this
question— giving 'big*

government more support than it got from the
Republicans,
but less than the Democrats. By 196^, the
Independents
had moved closer to the Republican position,
feeling,
almost as strongly as did members of the GOP,
that

government was becoming "too powerful."

This Republican

leaning continued in I968 and, by I972, Independents
had actually outstripped the Republicans in their
distaste

for government intervention in the everyday affairs
of
the people.

The trend, on this issue, is unmistakable

1

over the years we have examined, the Independents have

moved in a 'conservative' direction— relative to partisans—

in their view of the
proper size and role
for the
federal government,
(v/hile the entire
eleotorate
became more convinced
that the government
was becoming too powerful during
the period-43.655.
55.2^ and
of the respondents
voiced such as opinion
in
196^.. 1968. and I972
respectively-the important
point
here is the Independentrelative movement away
from
the Democrats and
toward the Republicans.)

A similar trend is
apparent when we examine
the
Independents, attitudes on
civil rights questions.
Though they were less
enthusiastic in their support
of
civil rights progress in
1952 than were the Democrats,
by 1956 they had taken
the 'lead- in that area,
and
supported civil rights goals
more frequently than did
either Republicans or Democrats.
They maintained their
•progressive- civil rights stance
through i960 and ^^^k.
By 1968. however. Independents
had shifted and-only
four years after exhibiting
the most progressive
attitudes on civil rights-became
the group most convinced that civil rights progress
in the country was
moving "too fast." This shift
occurred during a period
when the overall population's
attitudes on civil rights
progress remained essentially unchanged—
in V^dk,
67.

of all respondents said they felt
civil rights progress

was being made "too
fac,+
coo fast,

»

\compared

to the 65.1%

expressing that opinion
in I968.

This
inis lact
fact suggests
.
that, as „e noted
earlier, the 1968
Independents „ay
have included a nu.ber
of conservatives on
the race
issue Who entered the
Independent category in
that
year to vote for Wallace
(or to escape the
Democratic
party). As Schreiber
(1971) and Sundquist
(1973)
remind us, a large part of
the 196^^-1968 increase

occurred in the South, and.
as Sundquist states,
"...the growth Of independent
political attitudes. . .is
entirely among those opposed
to government action
to
enforce school integration. "S'^
If this is so. the influx
Of civil rights conservatives
into the group may have
had more of an affect on
the category's civil
rights
posture than did changes in
the attitudes of
the

Independents between 1964 and I968.

As if to show that

their retrenchment on civil
rights in I968 was not
simply a temporal abberation.
(or that the conservatives
who entered the category in that
year had not departed)
the Independents of 1972 showed
themselves to be in. solid
opposition (80^) to the forced busing
of school children
to achieve racial balance.
Though this percentage
is

(1973),

p^571?''^^'^'

"^^^^^^^

"^^^

American Party System?"

not appreciably higher than
that of either of the
parties,
it does not place the
Independents in the forefront
of
civil rights -progressivism*
they held in 196if.
These figures certainly do
not answer all our
questions on the political
beliefs of Independent
voters.
They do, after all, represent
the Independents'
views on only two general
political issues, and, as we
discussed above, the period
1952-1972 has been alive
with many other important
questions. Nonetheless, there
have certainly been no political
questions with greater
enduring significance than the two
just discussed, and
the Independents* responses to
them cannot go unnoticed.
On the basis of the data we have
available, it appears
beyond question that, at least on
these two issues, the
Independents have become more 'conservative'
(relative
to their partisan counterparts)
during the past twenty
years, and now are very close to being
the most

conservative group in the electorate.
There is apparent, then, in two of the
three

areas we are examining, a 'Republicanizing'
trend among

Independent voters during the past twenty years.

In

terms of their socioeconomic traits and their
positions
on a number of important issues, the Independents have

become ever more similar to the voters who call themselves

Republicans.

The trn*>

•Renubli
Kepublicanization'
•

^r.->

-

^-

Significance of this
can ha
be ™„
measured by examining

the
way the Independents
have voted in recent
years.
There are. depending
on the

perspective one

sazd about the
Independents- voting
patterns during the
past twenty years.
To begin, we can
say that in the
3XX elections between
1952 and I972, the
Independents
supported the Republican
candidate five ti.es.
The
only exception, of
course, was in 196/.
when 69,^ of the
Independents voted for
President Johnson. Over
that
period, the Independent
vote averaged 38.5^
Democratic.
6U2f, Republican. At the
same time, though, it
can bo
argued and shown that in
five inter-election
periods.'
Independent support of the
Democrats has been on an
upward swing on three
occasions. Figure II 12 shows
the Democratic vote of
the Independents in the

presidential election years from
1952 to 1972. However
one wishes to interpret it.
this chart demonstrates
one
thing definitively, the Independent
vote is capable of
fluctuating wildly from year to
year.
The fluctuation
is all the more impressive
when we recall that Table
i - 2 seemed to indicate
that— except for I968— the

membership of the Independent category
does not appear

to vary wildly from
election year to election
year.

Though some changes in
membership do occur, (as
they
do with the parties)
the volatility of the
Independent
vote can not be attributed
solely, or even largely,
to those changes.
Though the 1964 to 1968 drop
was
no doubt accentuated by
the fairly large number
of

Independents who. having recently
deserted the Democrati
party, were not about to
vote for its candidate, a
decline of 43/. in Democratic
support in four short years
is still rather mind-boggling.
FIGURE II

-

12

JE^CENTAGE OF INDEPENDENTS SUPPORTING
THE DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE.
1952-1972
m^.r,

ELECTION YEAR
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We must remember, nonetheless,
that the Independent
vote does not exist in a
political or historical vacuum,
the percentages of Republicans
and Democrats supporting
the Democratic nominee also
dropped quite a bit from
196^ to 1968. One way in which these
temporary fluctuations in overall popular sentiment
can be controlled
for— thus giving us a better relative picture
of the
Independents* vote— is to use the measure
of 'political
contribution- developed by Robert Axelrod. 55
Axelrod's

formula is designed to measure the
political "contributions" of various groups to each of the
major

parties,

independent of how well the parties are faring
in any
given election. This 'contribution' (which
has no

inherent meaning other than its definition) is
deter-

mined by calculating the group's size, turnout,
and

loyalty to a party, and comparing it to the turnout
and loyalty of the entire electorate.

Thus, all things

being equal, a large group will make a greater contri-

bution than a small one, and a highly loyal group will
contribute more than will a 'lukewarm' one.

Also,

a group's contribution will be increased in proportion
to the amount by which its loyalty exceeds that of the

^5Robert Axelrod, "Where the Votes Gome From: An
Analysis of Electoral Coalitions, I952-I968," American
Political Science Review 66, March 1972, pp. 11-20.
.

national electorate.

Using Axelrod's formula the

•contributions' of the Independents
to the
Democratic party during the past
six presidential
elections are presented in Table
11-12. As the
Table shows, the Independents
made their largest
•contributions' to the Democrats in
196/^ and I972.
In 196k, the Independents were
actually more loyal
to the Democrats than was
the national electorate
as a whole (196^ was the
onlx year of the six we
studied in which that was the case).
In
I972 the

contribution was relatively large because
the size of
the Independent 'group' had increased
so much

over its

size in the fifties and early sixties.

One other fact

the tables make clear is that in
most of the elections
the Independents have been less 'loyal'
to the Democrats

than has been the electorate as a whole.

In fact, the

percent deviation away from the Democrats
(i.e., the
percent of Independent support for Democrats
subtracted
from the support given Democrats by the entire

electorate)

for the six election years has been
13%, 17^,
(in 196^),
8.6fo,

19^;^,

and

7fo.

l^o, -Qfo

The mean deviation has been

In short. Independents have been

8,6fo

less

Democratic than has the national electorate in the
six presidential elections from 1952 to 1972.

.22 X .60 V
r64 X .50

ZtA

_.23

X .61 V .^Q
.62 X .61

,.27

X .60 y .p<

.56 X .39

= 18.
_
" ^-^'^
-

1/.

/,

^'-^

Part of our effort in describing
the Independent
vote has been directed toward
demonstrating its

volatility-in an effort to suggest that,
while the
Independents often resemble the Republicans
in terms
of their socioeconomic profiles
and positions on certain
political issues, they are by no means
always certain
Republican voters, while their loyalties
of the past
twenty years have a definite Republican
flavor,
the

case of 1964 (and, to a lesser extent, i960)
shows

that the Independent vote is
a highly mobile vote.
While it seems Republican in
general disposition, and
while Independents resemble
Republicans in some very
important ways, it seems likely that
Independents
will continue to remain politically
flexible so long
as they remain Independent.
In order for the GOP to
take more than temporary advantage
of the current

Republican flavor of the Independent voter,
it will
be necessary for the Republican party,
as a

party, to

become more attractive to the conservatively
disposed
Independent voters. The extent to which this
may or

may not be happening can be gauged by looking
at the
various 'types' of Independent voters in the
national
electorate.

If it is true that the GOP itself is not

attracting many of the Independents, despite their
apparent Republican 'flavor' (and this must be true
since the GOP's ranks are currently at an all-time
low), it may be possible that many voters calling them

selves Independents are, when pressed, expressing a

preference for the Republican Party.

Since the survey

questionnaires ask Independents the partisan direction
if any, in which they 'lean* we have been able to con-

struct a chart which graphically presents the growth
of the various 'types' of Independents during the
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past twenty years.

That chart is presented as
Figure

II - 13.

FIGURE

11-13

GROWTH OF TYPES OF INDEPENDENT VOTERS.
I952-I972
ELECTION YEAR
15-
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INDEPENDENTS LEANING TOWARD THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY
INDEPENDENTS LEANING TOWARD THE
DEMOCRATIC PARTY
INDEPENDENTS EXPRESSING' ABSOLUTELY
NO PARTISAN PREFERENCE-

While it does appear from the chart as if the

percentage of Independent-Republicans has risen somewhat
since 196^ (the year, if we can point to any single

'

instance, that marked the beginning of the conserva-

tizing trend among Independents) the percentage of

completely unaligned Independents has risen even faster.
Even the percentage of Independents with Democratic
leanings has increased somewhat.

The chart simply does

not suggest that the Independents are becoming

*

closet

Republicans. -if by that

tern, we

Mean that Independents

are retaining only the
Independent label, but
expressing a strong preference
for the Republican party
For that to be the case,
we would need to see
evidence
of a much sharper increase
in the percentage of
Independent-Republicans in these
times when the overall
percentage of Independents is
rising so rapidly.
It may be that Independents
are nearly as wellto-do as Republicans, and
that they are quite conservative on some issues, but the
data do not suggest
that they have any special
allegiance to the Republican
party itself. Consequently,
while the Independent vote
may in future years continue
to exhibit the Republican
orientation it has in the past, it
is by no means in
the Republican party's pocket.
As far as the Republican
party is concerned the Independent
vote will continue
to remain a tentative ally.
It is probably a vote which,
under normal circumstances, with
traditional issues at
stake, will lean in a Republican
direction. But its
demonstrated volatility, and the fact
that the

£e^

Republicans cannot call on the Independents'
'party

loyalty

to stand with them in difficult
times, indicate

that a massive defection of Independents
from the GOP
is still quite possible in times of Republican
crisis.
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When the Independents' vote in
the 197^ election is available for analysis, the data
should show us the extent to
which the Watergate scandal
represented such
a crisis.

By way of summation, it can be said
that,
since 1952, the Independents have
exhibited an increasing tendency toward conservativism
on political issues—
at least they have moved closer to the
Republicans and away
from the Democrats. On some issues,
especially in
the

more recent years, they actually appear
more conservative than their Republican contemporaries.
If political

conservatism can be tied to the relative comfort of
one's
social and economic position in life, the
Independents'
conservatism should come as no surprise.

Since I952,

we have seen the Independent climb to a position,
in

terms of occupation and education, near the top of the

American success scale.
The actual voting patterns of the Independents

do not yield us a picture quite so clear as to their

attitudes and socioeconomic characteristics.
less, some general tendencies are observable.

NonetheThe

Independent vote is generally a Republican one, and it
is isually more loyal to the GOP than is the electorate

as a whole.

But there persists a lingering doubt as

to how much confidence the Republicans can place in

their ability to retain
the Independents' loyalty.
Regardless of the Independents'
socioeconomic and
ideological Characteristics,
it must be very difficult
for the GOP to have to
count for election on the
support
of a group which gave
President Johnson
of its

W

electoral support in 196^.

And, while Independents

today seem even more conservative
than ever, there
is no assurance that their
conservatism will continue
to translate itself into
electoral support of the
Republican party.

With the GOP in its contemporary
state of
shambles, and with the number of
Independents rising
so rapidly, the continued
support of Independent voters
may very well be the Republican
party's best hope for
survival as a viable major party. And,
by virtue
of

their political beliefs and socioeconomic
character,
the Independents appear logically to
be 'attainable'

Republican votes.

But the demonstrated volatility of

the Independents' voting patterns must give
the

Republicans cause to shudder.

It is perhaps the best

testimony to the contemporary importance of Independent
voters to say that, with their support, the Republican

party is still very capable of winning important electionseven by landslide margins; without that support, the
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current state of the Republican
party is such that it
could conceivably cease to
exist as a major force in
national politics.
(Frankly, the same can be said
of
the Democratic party, though
perhaps not so definitively as it can be said of
the Republicans.)
It is unlikely that the
Republican party will
disappear. On too many occasions
in the past have

pundits and prophets talked about
the impending death
of political parties only to be
embarrassed by that
party's resurgence of power four
years later. My
observation of the Independents leads
me to believe
that the support they have given the
Republicans

during the past twenty years will
probably continue
to be forthcoming— but to a precise
degree that is

still unpredictable pending their reaction
to the
Watergate affair, and the affect of that
reaction
on their voting habits.

CHAPTER

III

POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY
In political science, and
in American political
lore in general, there are
two different and conflicting

assessments of the 'political
responsibility- of
Independent voters. Political
responsibility,

in

this sense, refers to a host of
attitudinal and

behavioral traits generally considered
consistent
with what we might term 'ideal
democratic citizenship.'
It includes political interest and
awareness,
a

knowledge of (and. generally, an opinion
about) the
important political issues of the times,
and a concern
for the general interest.
In behavioral terms it means
the desire and ability to participate
actively in
the

political process— through voting, involvement in
political campaigns, membership in politicallyoriented citizen groups, or some other participation

mechanism appropriate to the interests and goals of
the person in question.

Whether— and

to what

extent-

Independent voters are 'politically responsible' (at
least when compared with partisans) is the subject of
this chapter.

196
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Accorain. to traaitional
wisao„. independent
voters are regaraea
as a»o„, our
™ost responsive
political Citizens.
Hi,.x, interestea
ana involvea
politics, they are
picturea as .ein.
untaintea by
e M..
^^^^^^^
^^^^
^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^
amxrs a oalculatea,
dispassionate assessment
'

-

of the
a fair, objective
estimate of the public
interest.
Implicit in this
position
^-^o" is the
th» »
^
assumption
that only the
Independent can approach
politics and

-sues ana

political decisions with
the detachment
necessary to
ensure fair consideration
of each issue on
its -merits,
ana avoia the narrow
pettiness of partisan
prejuaice.
Thus the Inaepenaent
is heia in the role
of arbiterjudging each case and
each candidate carefully
and
seriously on the basis of
merit and tipping the
political scales (hopefully)
in the direction of
just
cause.
(That such a laudatory
view of Independents
would spring from the
American popular culture is
not
surprising when we consider
that culture's general
and traditional aisaain
for political partisanship.
Whether they are Inaepenaents
or not, many Americans
believe that a vote cast for.
"the man. not the partyis a vote in the best
traaitions of democratic
politics).
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The second image of
Independents-the more
recent one-began to
arise once political
scientists
had an opportunity to
examine the results of
survey
research, and to explore
the nature of
political
participation in our society
on an empirical basis.
Almost as if its main
thrust were solely to
refute
the laudatory traditional
image of Independents,
this
more recent assessment
of their character has
been

drawn in very critical terms.

Generally, the social

•

scientists have argued that
their data cast the
Independents in a far less
favorable light, and
indicate that strong partisans,
not Independents,
most closely approach our
conception of the 'responsible
citizen.' Numerous researchers
have contributed to
this 'revisionist' view of the
Independents, but the
most influential presentation is
given by Angus Campbell
and his associates in The American Vnt.^-r
citing
.

relatively low political interest and
concern among
Independents, the authors of The American
Voter claim
that)

if the usual image of the Independent voter
is
intended as more than a normative ideal, it
fits poorly the characteristics of the Independents
in our samples. Far from being more, attentive,
interested, and informed, Independents tend as
a group to be somewhat less involved in politics.
They have somewhat poorer knowledge of the
issues, their image of the candidates is fainter.
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,

coL'ern"o':?r^he"ou?:o:^'"I'^tS"i^ 1-^. their
and their ohoici be^w^^ ^^l^t^yely slight,
although it i^Lde^T^ad
°K"fn*=r"^^^^'
^"
campaign, seems much lesH +i
»
discoverable evaluationfol ^-^^''^^'^ ^^"^
elements of
national politics"!
•

^

The image of the
Independents presented in
this
passage (and argued by
most survey research
oriented

social scientists) seems
to be in serious tension
with the traditional image
discussed above. It is
the goal Of this chapter
to see which of these
images
is the more accurate,
or if there is any way
in which
these two apparently
contradictory assessments can
be

reconciled.
In the surveys we have
available there are a
number of ways in which the
political concerns and
activities of Independents can be
observed. A good

p.

83.

^^^"'P^®^^'

et_al.. The American

Vnt.p>^
,

(1964),

To attempt a reconciliation
views IS not to ignore the possibilityof these two
tha? bo^h the
describing^some Independents.
They undoubtedly are, since the
^hev'undoubt^^?
research so far has
are
a
highly varied category
J^^^P^'-^^^
of voters. ^tI
S°^terf
It is not enough, however, to simplv
state
that there are different kinds of
Ind^penden^sf ?ha^
statement should be true on its face. Our
purpose here
IS to try and describe the Independent
vote-a
while not monolithic, may be shown to exhibit vote which,
some
general characteristics that students of politics
should
find more helpful than a simple declaration
that all
Independents are not alike.
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Place to begin is with a
look at the voting
turnout
rates of Independents
(compared with party
identifiers)
in the six presidential
elections from I952 to I972.
While a number of factors
other than political
responsibility can be cited to
explain differing rates
of voter turnout (these
will be discussed below),
it
remains a solid and easily
measurable index of political
participation. The turnout rates
for Democrats,

Republicans, and Independents in
each of those six
elections are presented in Figure
III

l.

From the figure, it is clear
that, on this
important measure of political
involvement. Independents
appear to lag rather badly behind
their partisan counterparts. 3 Though in 1952 and I956
the Independents voted
a bit more frequently than
Democrats, in the four most
recent elections they brought up the
rear and in none
^The figure confirms one element of
'traditional
to vote more often
than Democrats.
The figures are based, however, on vote
recall
post election interviews. As might be
expected, more voters in all categories claimed
to have
voted
those elections than actually voted.
(The
turnout rates of the total electorate were
71%,
Sn^^-'-JfS
66%, and 62% in i960, 6k, 68, and 72 respectively/
70J0,
when the actual turnout rates were 6k%,
63%, 63%, and
5070) '
For practical purposes, however, we can assume
that the rate of "over-recall" was about equal for
all
groups of voters.
^

wisdom'— namely that Republicans tend

m
m
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Of the Six cases were
Independents as likely
to vote
as were partisans as
a whole.
Even when class is
controlled, middle class
Independents voted less
frequently than middle class
Democrats or

RepuUioans,
though-as expected-the
middle class members of
all
three groups voted more
often than their working
class
counterparts,
the six elections observed,

m

participation by the middle
class averaged about
twelve percentage points
higher than that of the
working class.
(This difference was observed
among
Republicans. Democrats, and
Independents

and the interclass participation differential
was unrelated to party
identification)

Besides voting turnout, the
surveys also examine
several other indices of political
participation, and
in these areas too the
Independents seem
less involved

than either Republicans or Democrats.

When asked

about the likelihood of their donating
time or money
to a political campaign, or wearing
a political
lapel button, or attending political
meetings.
Independents appeared slightly but consistently
less

1
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are aeviations

witMn su.,roups-an
In.epenaent „no

leans toward the
Republicans is slightly
„ore -active.
than a "weak" Democrat,
for
or example—
exan^nio
^. I
when the groups
are considered in
their entirety.
Independents are the
.roup least likely to
be involved in these
aspects of
the two-party electoral
process.
v,

It is premature, however
luwever. tn
^
,
to r.^>.^n
conclude
solely on
the basis Of electoral
turnout that Independents
possess
less political
responsibility than do party
identifiers.
Even if one is willing
to concede that
participation in
the two-party electoral
process can be equated
with a
developed sense of political
responsibility (an assu.ption Which is open t o
question)5 it is possible
that

stated tl!ey TtttS^l'oAUirrJ;^'' °' '"^^ Independents
of the Democrats and 10 ol
"^^^ 6.5^
o? th»
Independents, said thev wmnJ 1^ Republicans, 9.5>5 of the
campaign button, as
did 12.0% of the Demoorate
ind 1 f,?
6.6%. of the Independents Ltd
°L'^'^f Republicans,
^^""^ """^y *° a
campaigning candidate as ttd ^
°^
Democrats and
12.7JS of the Republicans!

their°pollt!ca^'so:L'r''^

'°

20^

certain interveni.,
.ariaUes can .e seen
to e.p.ain
part 0. t.e
ai..erentiax in turnout.
One sue. potential
var.a.xe is t.e part,
support-.usterin, e„ort
lieH
precedes elections.
..ese e«orts are
aireote. „ore
at party identifiers
(31, of who™ were
..contaoted.. ,y
the parties in
1972. for example, than
at Independents
(Zo,% contacted in 1Q7?1
_
1972) and appear
to have some impact
on turnout. 6 i^ven
Even thm.o-h
though the percentage
of contacted
Independents voting in
1972 (76,) was lower
than the
percentage of contacted
partisans who voted
(86?0. the
disparity was smaller than
that which existed
between
the turnout rates of
those groups as a whole
(68;J for
the partisans,
52?? for the Independents).
Though the
aata do not indicate that
this variable substantially
redresses the partisan-Independent
turnout disparity,
they do suggest' that some
external forces may

m

be at

work in causing the observed
turnout differences.
Since it is possible that
certain external
variables may be affecting the
Independents' low rate
of participa tion, we must
explore other areas if we

^ ^z^-:^

:^re-n:r::st*-t£-
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are to gain an accurate
assessment of the Independents'
political responsibility,
each of the election year
surveys, respondents were
asked to describe their
general level of interest in
the events of the
campaign.
The percentage of the voters
expressing
a -great deal- of interest
are reflected in Figure
III - 2. and those reflecting
-hardly any- interest
are presented in Figure III - 2

m

(a).

Though there are a few variations,
both figures
show that the Independents exhibited
less campaign
interest than either Republicans or
Democrats.
In

almost every case, the Independents
had proportionately
fewer of their number in the 'high
interest' category
than did the partisans, but more
expressing
'low

interest.'

When social class was controlled, little

changed as regards the relationship between
partisanship and interest. However, as we observed
earlier

regarding turnout and participation, there were wide
disparities in the interest levels of the middle and

working classes.

On the average, the number of -highly

interested" working class respondents was thirteen
percentage points less than the number of -highly

interested" working class respondents in the six

election years examined.
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FIGURE III

- 2

ELECTION YEAR

35

25
15-

L-

1952

1956

Percentage Expressing
"a great deal** of
Interest

i960

196k

1968

1972

INDEPENDENTS
DEMOCRATS
REPUBLICANS
FIGURE III

- 2

(a)

RESPONDENTS INDICATING LOW CAMPAIGN INTEREST
BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION, 1952-1972
ELECTION YEAR
55-

^5
35
25
15-

1952

1956

Percentage Expressing
Little or No
Interest

i960

196-^

INDEPENDENTS
DEMOCRATS
REPUBLICANS.

1968

1972
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A similar picture
emerges when we
examine the
extent to which the
voters professed to
be concerned
about the possiMe
outcomes or the
presidential elections
question,
each of the six
electorates, the
Independents were consistent!
onsistently
v +ho
the group which
professed
to care least about
how the x-aces
races might
m\^hi- +
turn out.
Over
the six election
years, a mean ux
of 39.
55^ of the
th. Independets
t .
jjyo/Claimed to care only "a
little." or "not at all"
about
the outcome, while
similar rates of indifference
a.ong
the Democrats and
Republicans were Z8.6f, and

m

respectively,

m

Zk.Zf.

no election did the
Independents
equal the members of
either party in their
demonstrated
concern about the outcome,
and when class was
controlled
and only middle class
respondents were considered
the
Independent-partisan differences
actually increased
slightly.
The Independents' low level
of campaign con-

sciousness is demonstrated in
other ways. If interest
in elections can be gauged
by expressed attention to
.nedia coverage of the
candidates and issues,

Independents
again rank as the group least
involved in the electoral
process. Though the amount of
attention varied greatly
over time for all groups (due,
no doubt, to the medium's
growing popularity with the public).
Independents were
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consistently less li.ely
than either .roup of
partisans
to have been regular
watchers of television
programs
dealing with the campaigns.
They were also least
attentive to radio and
magazine political coverage
and.
though somewhat more likely
than Democrats to

have
followed the campaign closely
in the newspapers, they
were, overall, the group
least concerned with the
political events unfolding around
them.

On at least two counts, then,
the Independents
seem to resemble the 'revisionist'
image of them
painted so darkly by the social
scientists. They
appear to be the group least likely
to participate in
the electoral process or to
be interested in and

concerned about the candidates and
elections of the
times.
It is still possible, though, to
keep the

question of the Independents' political
responsibility
an open one if we choose to view both
participation
and interest as dependent variables,
stimulated more

by partisan sentiments and attachments than
by any
inherent political awareness or sense of citizen

duty.

In short, other factors may be at work
affecting the

differences we observe in these areas between

Independents and party identifiers.

one such variable ™ay
be the relative
extent
to Which the respondents
believe there is a
great deal
at stake in the outcomes
of two-party elections.
If
one perceives nothing
crucial in the outcomes
of these
contests, one's interest
and participation therein
will probably be not as
high as it would be if
one
believed the outcome of
the election would make
a
great deal of substantive
political difference. We

can attempt to explore this
possibility and get some
impression of the voters'
estimates of the stakes
involved in two-party elections
by looking at how
much difference they perceive
between the two major
political parties, if a voter
perceives little or no
difference between the principals
in an electoral
contest, it is difficult to see
why he should perceive
the outcome (in this limited
context) as especially
crucial. If the Independents are
less likely than
partisans to perceive important inter-party
differences
this fact may partially explain
their lower levels of
turnout and involvement. We can test
this hypothesis
by examining the respondents' perceptions
of important
inter-party differences, and the effects of
those

perceptions on electoral turnout, in the presidential
elections we have been looking at.

For example, in
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every survey since
I960 the voters were
asked if they
saw a noticeable
difference in the extent
to which the
two parties believed
that government,
"...should see to
it that every person
has a job and a good
standard of
living." The percentages
of Democrats. Republicans,
and Independents who
stated they saw "no
difference
in the stances of the
parties on this issue are
reflected in Figure in 3.
^s the figure shows,
Independents on the whole tend
to be the group least
persuaded that there exists
a fundamental difference
in the parties, positions
on this issue.

Only in i960,
when proportionately more
Republicans than Independents
held the parties indistinguishable,
were members of the
latter group exceeded in their
perception of the sameness
of the parties.
This perception of sameness,
however, was
probably not, by itself, responsible
for very much of
the partisan-Independent turnout
differential since
even among respondents who perceived
"a great dealer -some" difference between the
parties, the turnout
rate of Independents was lower than
that of party

identifiers.

Between i960 and 1972, the turnout rate
of Independents who perceived inter-party
differences
in this area was averaged twelve percentage
points
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lower than that of the
partisans who perceived
such
dx«erences-a difference only
slightly smaller than
the average difference
in turnout between
Independents
and partisans in
general, while the
assumption that
their tendency to perceive
inter-party differences
less frequently than
partisans might be responsible
for the Independents,
generally low turnout rates
has
much to recommend it on common
sense grounds, it is

not supported by the data
available.
Besides their inability to
perceive major
differences between the parties
(or. phrased another
way. their insight into the
essential sameness of
those parties) there may be
other variables which go
toward explaining the Independents'
low interest and
participation levels without forcing
us to subscribe
to the theory that they are
inferior political citizens.
It may be that Independents spurn
participation in the
two-party system because they feel that
electoral

involvement in our system is little more than
an
exercise in futility. In short, their sense
of political
efficacy may be so low as to make political
participation
a worthless enterprise in their estimation.

If one

perceives (however correctly) that the political system
is so unresponsive to one's concerns as to make
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participation in that system useless, one is entirely
sensible not to participate.

Though political efficacy— and the lack of

it-

will be examined in a later chapter as a possible

explanation of political Independence— a brief look
at it here will help us decide if its absence can be

seen as a partial explanation for the Independents*

low political involvement.

To gauge the relative

efficacy of the different groups of voters, we can
examine a question presented to respondents in each
of the six samples

—a

question which asked them to

register their agreement or disagreement with the
statement,

"I

don't think public officials care much

what people like me think."

Though this question does

not specifically measure the respondents' views on
the efficacy of their participation in the electoral

process (a low score on which could conceivably be used
to explain the Independents' low participation) it is
a question which was asked of all six electorates, and
the respondents' answers reveal an interesting chrono-

logical pattern.
As Figure III - ^ shows, the Independents have
the lowest sense of self-efficacy in only two of the

six electorates, with their feelings on this question

2U
FIGURE III

-

BELIEVING,
™Bflc''n?.??Tr?"^^^
OFFICIALS DON^T CARF
i^^S^-'-*^
BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION
/l952f:i972

ELECTION YEAR

10.

1952

Percentage in
Agreement

1956

I960

1964

1968

1972

REPUBLICANS
DEMOCRATS
INDEPENDENTS,

usually somewhere between the
Democrats and Republicans.
The figures are mixed and appear
to demonstrate no
definitive relationship between efficacy
and party
identification, but they clearly do not
suggest that
Independents perceive themselves to be the
least
efficacious group in the electorate— a fact
which
would have to be shown conclusively if we
were to

ascribe the Independents' low participation
levels to
their demonstrated sense of political powerlessness.

Perhaps the single most interesting aspect of the

-^SU.e is the almost
.eteoric rise in
..ine„ioac,..
whxch see^s to have
occurred between
ana 1968 '
and continued at
^uXi .peea into
1972.
WMie-as

th- n.ure Shows-there

is no definitive
relationship

•^etween poXitioal
Independence and this
one measure o.
political inemcacy.
it is interesting
that the

electorate's perception
that officials do
not care
about them should rise
so iipiaxy
rapidlv ir. a
= +
time when the
rate of Independence
is also rising
sharply. As
mentioned above, a later
chapter win discuss
the
possible relationship
between efficacy and
Independence
in greater detail.

m

Besides gauging their
perceptions of the
extent to which public
officials care about them,
the SHC surveys have
attempted to measure the
electorateemcacy in other ways. i„ several
cases, the voters
were asked to record their
agreement or disagreement
with the statement. "People
like me don't have any
say about what the
government does." The responses
of the Democrats, Republicans,
and Independents to
that question for the election
years I952. I956. and
1972 are recorded in Table III 1.

216
TABLIi III

1952

1

^yj'^t

*

--

-

iy3o, AND 1972

1955

1972

27.2
^^=^32)

22.4
(N=ll^)

?^.:J96)

27.3

21.3

Democrats

Republicans
Independents

^

r

Lo o
(n:383)

(1^4)

Besides showing us that the
overall level of discontent
rose sharply between I956
and I972, the Table
offers no
evidence that the Independents
are the group most
convinced they have no say in
government action.
Over the three years, a mean
of 30.2/. of the Independents
expressed such an opinion, compared
to 27. 1/^ of
the

Republicans and 35.2;^ of the Democrats.
In the 1956 and 1964 studies, the
sample surveys

included groups of questions? which were
combined into
indices of political efficacy, both in
inr^
19j6 andJ'^]^^,f^
1964, were developed from the respondents'
answers (indicating agreement or disagreement)
to four
questions.
The four statements to which the respondents
were asked to agree or disagree were
a) People like
me don't have any say about what the government does;
b; Voting IS the only way that people like me
can have
a say about how the government runs things; c) Sometimes
1

•efficacy indices, for the
voters of those years.
On
these indices, respondents
were rated 'high.,
'low.,
etc.. on the basis of
the number of 'ef
facacious
responses they gave to the
battery of questions,
1956. k5.e% of the Independents
were rated 'high* or
•very high' on this efficacy
index, as were ^6.0/.
of the Republicans and
37-9/. of the Democrats,
196/f. comparable figures
for the Independents.
Republicans, and Democrats were
35.6/..
and -30.6%,'
respectively, if political efficacy
is tied to rates
of participation (a seemingly
sensible connection) its
absence apparently cannot explain
the low levels of
Independent involvement, since Independents—
who
appear no less efficacious than Democrats—
have the
lowest participation rate of all the
three groups
under study. Though high efficacy may
be an important
factor influencing political involvement, we
apparently
cannot ascribe the low involvement of
Independents to
'

•

m

m

any lessened sense of political efficacy on
their
part.

politics and government seem so complicated that a
person like me can't really understand what is going
on d) I don't think public officials care much what
people like me think.
J
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In this chapter we have
developed the following
scenario,
Independent voters are
considerably less
likely than party members to
participate actively in
the electoral process.
Part of the reason for this
is that they are less
likely than partisans to be
contacted during campaigns by
party support-mustering
efforts; part is that they are
the group least interested in and attentive to the
campaign, and that
they are the group least concerned
about the outcome
of the election.
This demonstrated lack of concern
may be attributable to the Independents'
perception
(to a greater degree than that of
party members)

that there is very little difference
between the
parties, and, by implication, that there
would not
be much difference should one or the
other party win
a given election (though there is little
evidence
in

the data to support the contention that
these beliefs

directly affect the Independent turnout rate).

The

lack of Independent interest and participation can
not,
however, be directly attributed to their low perceptions
of their political efficacy since Democrats— who exhibit
a lower sense of political efficacy—seem to participate

more frequently than they do.

The conclusion
whioh ^serges-hazy
as it may
.
be-is that independents
T
participate less in th
party electoral
process h»
''^^^"^e they are
relatively
^ n^
te
,,,,

/

.

^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^
relatively unconcerned
xnea abont
about the outcomes
of twoparty elections
I'J.ons.
n,,>,
^
u.
Our data would
suDDort
+v.o
^'upport the
essential
accuracy o. Willia™
Paanigan-s contention
in .he

...independents are not
™uch interested in
politics
an government and
are certainly not
much concerned
wxth partisan
politios-they are not
involved in
party clashes. "8 StUl
q+fn to be
v
investigated, however.
is the question
of whether or not
Independents possess
the political
-sUlls. necessary .or
viable participation. When and if
they deem the
political issues
Of the day to merit
their attention. If
they do. it'
would vindicate the
other half of Pianigan's
description
Of Independents, namely
that. "On the other
hand
independents appear to have
the information and
the
perspective on political
affairs necessary for
an evaluation Of issues and
candidates as competent as
could be
expected of partisan s. -9
examine this, we can look
.

MericanJSSaS^^if
9lbid.

ff^^^Politioal B.h.vlor of rhn
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at the Independents' degree
of interest in political
affairs in general (rather
than in specific campaigns),
their demonstrated knowledge
of their political environment, their level of political
knowledge as perceived
by the SRC's field interviewers,
and the general

development of their political issue
orientation.

To

judge the first of these areas, the
survey respondents
were asked in 196k how closely they
followed "what's

going on in the government. . .whether there's
an election
going on or not." Table III - 2 presents
the responses
of the Democrats. Republicans, and
Independents to that
question.

TABLE III - 2

ONGOING INTEREST IN GOVERNMENT,
BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION, 1964

PARTY
IDENTIFICATION

Democrat
Republican

INTERESTED

All of
the Time

Some of
the Time

Now
and Then

Hardly
at All

27.3?^

4l.l^

18. 5^;^

13.1/t

Total
100;^

(N=758)
39.1^^

k0,2'/o

13.6^

7.1^

100^^;

(N=352)

Independent

28.9^

^3.3^

16.2;^

11.6^

100^^

(N=3l4)
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Though this table
yields no startling
results.
It IS interesting to
compare it with the
196^ observations Of Figures in Z and in - 2
(a) .^ove.
Those Figures, whioh
depict in part the levels
of
interest in the 196/. campaign
itself, show Independents
to be lagging behind
both Democrats and
Republicans.
While Table III . 2
indicates that the Independentsoverall interest in politics
(at least in
196^) was

actually as high as that of
the Democrats.
are only suggest!
ve-especially

The data

since they record

observations from a single
year-but they do indicate
the possibility that the
Independents- low levels of
interest in campaigns do not extend
to a lack of
interest about government and
politics in general.
Though we have no comparable
measures of ongoing

interest from the I968 or 1972 surveys,
those studies
do provide us with some questions
we can use to explore
this possibility a bit further.
In the 1968 and 1972 surveys,
respondents were

classified on the basis of the SSC
interviewer's

perception of their general level of knowledge
and
awareness about politics.
Theoretically, the interviewer based this

assessment on the respondents' answers to the survey's
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battery of questions, and,
while it is entirely likely
that some interviewers were

more 'generous' than
others

in their estimates of the
respondents' knowledge levels,
we can assume (at least
for practical purposes)
that

Independents, Republicans, and
Democrats were all
exposed equally to this possible
survey bias.
In the 1968 electorate sample.
42.9^ of the
Independent voters were considered to
have exhibited
•fairly high' or 'very high' levels
of political information. 42.9/. of the Republicans
and 33.1/. of the

Democrats were similarly assessed.

On the other end

of the information 'scale' 7.8/. of
the Independents

were described as having 'very low' levels
of political
information, as were 8.3/. of the Republicans,
and
13.2/. of the

Democrats.

In 1972. 3^-5?^ of the Independents

rated in the 'fairly high' and 'very high'
categories,
as did 39. 6?^ of the Republicans and 30.3;^ of the

Democrats.

The percentage of Independents exhibiting

•very low' information rose slightly from I968 and
^.rfo
of the Independents were listed in this category, as

were 1 .Vfo of the Democrats and

3.8;^

of the Republicans.

While these figures reveal no neat pattern, and
while the 1972 results are not nearly as 'impressive'
for Independents as those of I968, we can conclude from

them that the
Independents' consistently
consistent!, poor
showings
on the campaign
interest questions
are not accompanied
by similarly low
levels of political
knowledge.
(The
Phrase political
feowled^ ^3. of course, a
ris.y one
Since it is based on
an interviewer's
subjective assess".ent. but it is
noteworthy that when asked
in the postelection interviews in
1972 which party had won
the
most House of Representatives
Seats in the recent
election, more Independents
than either Republicans
or Democrats gave the
correct answer). Of course,
it
may be that Independents-who
occupy higher status
occupations and possess higher
educational levels than
Democrats-are better able to
impress the SRC interviewers than are the less
articulate Democrats,
thus

inflating the interviewers'
perception of their
political awareness.
i„ this

instance, we can simply

hope that the SRC's interviewers
were properly forwarned
of such a possibility, and that
their findings reflect
their awareness of this potential
difficulty.

Other measures— such as the question
dealing
with the House of Representatives-fortunately
indicate
to us that the interviewers'
assessments were at least
moderately accurate. In the development of
their
issue orientation (if 'development' in this
case can

22^
be said to mean
the ability tn
on the i..
issues and the
tendency

in the 'don't

positions

not
ii2:t

know category)10

to be .1
classified
•

t,.,

,
Independents
seem to
oe at least the
eauai
equal of party
members as a whole.
On selected questionq
in *he
+v,
^"
SIX surveys from
1952 to
1972 independents claimed
as often as
partisans to
agree or disagree
"strongly., to
statements which
outlined a possible
stance on a political
issue.
Also on questions
dealing with both
domestic and
foreign affairs.
Independents as a group
were no more
likely than partisans
to state they
Midn't .now- what
thexr position was,
and on many questions
they were
actually less likely
than partisans to be
without an

,

development, of Independents

with here?Snf"^L'?
are dealing
a^:ays'\^°„"ar*^^r?^e"S
attitude"— the resDon<!P rr^„^^ + ^
"manufactured
to avoid classi?ic^?i
,
^Pr'^-^^^^^
fnlSe*°don?rkn
we must assume that
category. Again
manufactured
a?ti+,^?
about equally in the resDon^e? ./ 1 "''^^ ^'^^ present
°i voters,
For a thorough discussion
on ?h5
encounter wifh manS^cCed"^^!
tSdes'^^L^^M? f'f."^
1

y

«B was,

xo say the least, hazy.

The possibility
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is not conclusive by
itself, but when coupled
with the

high levels of political
information ascribed to them
by the SRC interviewers, it
leaves us with the
impression that Independent voters
are, after all,
not so politically unaware as
their low levels of
participation and interest might suggest. 12

At the beginning of this chapter,
we spoke of
two conflicting images of the
Independent
voter.

Our

hope at that point was that the
current research might
enlighten us as to which of the two
descriptions was
the more appropriate, or tell us
approximately what

proportion of the Independent vote was accurately
described by each.

Looking at the data, it has gradually

become clear— as it has in so many areas of our
investi-

gation of the Independent— that the question of the
Independent voter's political interest and involvement
is not simply an

'either-or' proposition.

This is not

exists that well-knovm party positions on issues may aid
partisans in the formulation of their own ideas a good
deal more than they aid Independents. If this is true,
the demonstrated issue development of Independents is
all the more impressive.
12

Robert Agger, "Independents and Party
Identifiers! Characteristics and Behavior in 1952" (1959)
also observed a strong issue orientation among
Independents, even when education was controlled, as
discussed in Chapter I.
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simply to say that some
Independents conform to each
image-i.e., some Independents
are highly involved,
while others are not.

In dealing with. a group so

large and heterogeneous as
Independents such a revelation is obviously a truism and
contributes little to
our knowledge of the Independent
vote. Rather, our
research has shown that, even when
considered
as a

group. Independents tend to conform
to parts of both
the images which have been painted
of them through the

years
In terms of their participation in,
concern
about, and interest concerning two-party
political

struggles in America, Independents tend, as a
group,
to conform to the

'revisionist' image in that, as

The American Voter states,

"...their interest in the

campaign is less, their concern over the outcome

relatively slight. -13

in almost every case examined.

Independents were less likely to vote, or to participate in the electoral process in other ways, than were

party identifiers of either stripe.

They exhibited

less interest in the campaign (and paid it less

attention in their media habits) and considerably
less concern about its possible outcome.

13Campbell et al .

,

This lack

The American Voter (1964)
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of interest and involvement
was not attributable
to
lower perceptions of political
self -efficacy among
Independents, since they were no
less efficacious
than Democratic partisan voters.
On the other hand, when queried
on the extent

of their interest in the affairs
of government other
than two-party campaigns. Independents
appeared no
less interested than partisans as
a whole and somewhat
more interested than Democrats in
particular. Their

demonstrated levels of political awareness and
information were in no way inferior to those of
partisans
and in the I968 survey their information
level the

highest in the electorate.

Additionally, their issue

orientation seemed as well-developed as that of
the

party members.
If there seems to be a bit of contradiction
here, we should not be overly surprised.

research

— especially

Social

when it is directed at a 'target*

as large as the Independent

vote— rarely yields

neat,

compact solutions.
Though they exhibit a distinct lack of concern
for and involvement with the two-party electoral process,
the Independents appear to be a group solidly grounded

in political knowledge with well-developed positions on
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the important issues of the
day.

They seem to possess,

in fact, a very solid
intellectual f oundation-as solid
as the party-identifiers
'-for eventual political
participation, should the mainstream
two-party system
begin to excite their fancy. There
is little evidence
to suggest, however, that the
contemporary state of

partisan politics is any more appealing to
Independents
than it has been in the past. And, barring
any major
changes in that state, we can probably expect
to see

Independents remain at their lower- than-average
levels
of interest and participation for some time
to come.

CHAPTER

IV

EXPLAINING INDEPENDENCE
If one chooses to view American
electoral politics

from a '•psephological,

"

or long range perspective-

focusing on general movements of voters
rather than
specific issues and candidates in campaignsl—

one of

the most important political 'facts
of life' in recent

years has been the presence, in increasingly
large
numbers, of self -identified Independents.
By virtue of
the sheer weight of their numbers, their
impact
on

American politics is quite substantial, and their
influence on the traditional balance of political
power
is so great as to make anachronistic any
further concep-

tion of that balance solely in terms of Democrats
versus

Republicans.

According to the most recent survey data

available Independents now constitute forty-one percent
of the national electorate— and their numbers show no

signs of declining.
1

The term 'psephology' is borrowed from Richard
The Real Majority (1970)

Scaramon and Ben Wattenberg,

Chapter I.

2ln January of 19?^ the Gallup Poll published
results of a group of surveys taken between September 1973
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Considering these observations,
it becomes
increasingly necessary for
political science to gain
a thorough understanding
of the Independent

vote if we
are to make any claims to
understand comprehensively
the realities of electoral
behavior in contemporary
times.
In the two preceding chapters,
we have looked
at the sociological, attitudinal,
and political behavior
profiles of Independents between
1952 and 1972, as well
as the question of their
general interest in and knowledge
about the affairs of politics.
Now we turn our attention
to the question of why it is
that people choose to

identify themselves as Independents,
and why their
numbers have increased so rapidly in
recent times.
and January 197^.
These surveys showed the rate of
Independence at 3^/. of the national electorate.
On
University of Michigan's Center for
tn^^ldU
IV^-'^^^ published
Political Studies
the results of its latest
poll.
Their surveys showed that 1^1% of voters
called
themselves Independents, 36% Democrats, and
21/.
^
Republicans
.

-^^^^
y^^'^ Independents 'choose the Independent
io>.^T IS crucial
label;
this context since it relates
question of voter self-identification. As mentionedto the
in
the introduction to this study the concept of
selfidentification is an important one since it can indicate
more than simple behavioral traits. To define
Independents
solely in terms of behavior assumes that the phenomenon
is strictly a dependent variable and gives little
consideration to the possibility that identification itself
may play a role in determining the character of one's
political behavior. Such an assumption neglects the
wisdom of many studies which have shown us the importance
of party identification in political behavior, as well as

m
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In trying to examine
the possible explanations

Of self. identified
Independence, the data
available
from the SRC surveys have
been supplemented with
a
number of personal interviews
with Independents in
several geographic areas of
the country,
since political
identification is often a very
personal choice, these
interviews can help by showing,
in the words of
Independents themselves, what sorts
of factors are
operative in a person's decision
to identify as an
Independent. Because the interviews
are not random,^
their findings are offered only
in a supplemental waydesigned more to exemplify, in
personal terms, the
phenomena to which the survey data point,
rather than
serve as conclusive empirical
'evidence.'
The best place to begin an attempted
explanation

of political Independence is with
a look at how the

voters— particularly the Independents— view
political
the findings of Chapters II and III of this
study
demonstrate that Independents do act differently which
ically than Democrats and Republicans. It seems politto overlook the fact that self-identification does make
a
difference, not only in one's political behavior, but
in
the way one perceives and relates to the political
world.

^An effort has been made not to draw the
respondents from a homogenous group. Interviews were
conducted in six eastern states, among Independents
ranging in age from nineteen to sixty- two
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parties in this country.

If a certain portion of the

electorate chooses not to align itself
with a political
party, it is plausible to suspect that
there is something about our political parties which
a number of
those voters find somewhat unattractive.
In Chapter III, we discussed one component
of the Independents' view of the two major
parties—

namely, the differences they perceived to exist

between them.

We concluded that, by and large.

Independents perceived smaller inter-party differences
than did Democrats or Republicans.

In 1952, ^3.3^

of all Independents claimed they saw "no difference"

between the two major parties, and in the presidential
electorates from i960 until 1972, a mean of 37.3^ of
the Independents perceived no inter-party differences

on the issue of how much the federal government should

be involved in providing a good standard of living

for the people.

The percentages of Democrats and

Republicans with like perceptions were similar in the first
case but lower in the second.

5ln 1952, kl,5fo of the Republicans saw "no
difference" between the parties, as did 39.5^^ of the
Democrats. The mean level of Democrats perceiving "no
difference" in the parties position on government involvement between i960 and 1972 was 2^.8^; among Republicans
it was 28.5^.
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Besides differences between
the parties which
the voters .ay or „ay
not perceive, there
are a nunber
Of other party-related
voter attitudes which
the surveys
have examined,
1952, for example, the
voters were
asked if they approved
of nominating conventions
(perhaps the most visible
symbols of our parties in
action) as means for selecting
presidential and vicepresidential candidates. The
k6.lf. of the Independents
who expressed approval of
the conventions was slightly
lower than the 51.7^ of the
Republicans or the

m

55,

1;^

of the Democrats who voiced
such approval, 6 Though
the differences are relatively
small, these figures
suggest a less favorable reaction
among Independents
to the quadrennial party
'happenings than is present
among party-identifiers. When
the voters were asked
in that same year if they believed
one should vote a
"straight" party ticket in an election
(a belief which
could be interpreted as a tacit
recognition of
•

the

importance of parties in the political
system)

,

less than

one-fourth of the Independents agreed, though
straight-

^The observed difference in this case between
^
Independents
and Republicans is not statistically
significant (p. .07) that between the Independents
and
Democrats is significant at the .01 level.
T

;
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ticket voting had the endorsement
of
and very nearly half {1,9.2%)

of the Democrats

of the Republicans.

In a later survey in

respondents were asked

if they believed that political
parties were generally
helpful in solving the problems of
our society. 7

m

their responses. 1,1.3% of the Democrats
indicated a
belief that political parties help
"...a great deal.as did 38. If. of the Republicans.
Such an endoresment
of the importance of parties was
expressed by 30.3;;^
of the Independents.

While the 'admission' by thirty

percent of the Independents that parties help
a great
deal is surprising, it is still true that
the percentage
of Independents expressing such an opinion is
consider-

ably lower than that of the parti sans. ^

Looking at the

figures another way, 27.2^ of the voters who felt that

parties were not helpful were Independents in 1964
(a year when the overall rate of Independence was
22.5:^), while 18.2;^ of the voters who felt parties

—

7a similar question one
especially helpful— was asked in
yet, the respondents' answers to
been made available for analysis

which would have been
the 1972 survey but, as
that question have not
by the SRC.

o

Young Independents were considerably more
enthusiastic about the worth of parties than were their
elders.
Of the Independents who felt parties helped a
great deal, 40.2^ were under thirty years of age. Of those
believing parties to be useless, l^.O;;* were under thirty.
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helped a great deal called
themselves Independents,
is problematical, of course,
as to which of th<lese

it

phenomena-party identification or
the worth one sees
in parties-is truly the
'dependent'

variable in this

case, but the figures suggest
a positive relationship

between political Independence and
a rather dim view
of the political parties* worth.
If we consider these data9 in
connection with
our findings in Chapter III concerning
the Independents'
perceptions of inter-party political
differences, a

picture of how the Independents view the
parties begins
to emerge.
It appears that Independents by
and large

see relatively smaller differences between
the parties

than do party identifiers.

They also are less suppor-

tive of party-related concepts and seem to
see the

parties as being less useful political agencies, and

somewhat less helpful to the country in the solution
of its problems.

In fact, on every measure we examined,

Independents were less supportive of political parties
and their associated trappings than were the members of

^An important consideration here is the consistency, rather than the magnitude, of the differences
between Independents and partisans on these questions.
While the differences in most cases are small, the trend
we observe is consistent.
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the parties.

Though in some instances the
differences

were small, the pattern was
consistent.

While it may seem a bit of a truism
to argue
that party members are more supportive
of political
parties than non-party members, it is
important
to

point out that such differences exist, if
only to show
that antipathy toward parties can be used
to explain
some of the phenomenon of self-identified
Independence.
One Independent, a school administrator
from

Pennsylvania, explained his Independence as "...the

least of three evils.

I'm just fed up with corrupt

and dishonest politics, and corrupt and dishonest

parties."

Many of the Independents whom

I

interviewed

expressed animosities toward parties which were not

readily apparent in the SRC data.

One of the most

common complaints was that party membership tied one
too closely to the platform and philosophy of the

party's leaders, leaving too little room for individual
discretion.

This position was best articulated by a

Marine Gunnery Sergeant from North Carolina..

Empha-

sizing the belief that party identification entails
(even requires) voting the "straight ticket"

—a

belief

which seems somewhat pass^ in contemporary times, but

which was held by nearly all the
Independents interviewed-he described his Independence in
this
way,

I don't know... a person who
is registered
IS tied to a party.
I don't like to be
tied... to be tied to such a big organi-'
zation.
I like to make up my own mind.
I think If I were in a party,
I'd feel an
obligation to vote a party ticket. My
wife is from Minnesota and up there they

real strong organization. Everybody voteshave
a party ticket, and I just don't want to
have other people making up my mind for
me •
The notion, as expressed by the Sergeant,

that party membership leads to having one's political

decisions made by others was held by many of the

Independents interviewed.

One man, a printer from

Alabama, explained his Independence by describing

himself as "...a free thinker— I don't like to be led
by the crowd or people who would make choices for me.
Both parties are corrupt.... I want to pick only the

best of each."

These sentiments were shared by his

wife who emphasized the 'man, not the party' concept
in explaining her Independent identification*
I want the right to choose for myself the man
best suited to the moment's needs... and
hopefully he will do the best job for everyone.

Though the SRC surveys do not afford us the

opportunity to check the impressions gained from these
interviews (that is, support the interviews with

empirical data derived from a
random sampling of the
population) two things whioh emerge
from them are the
Independents' beliefs that party
membership confines
one and reduces decision-making
autonomy, and that
an Independent stance best equips
one to vote 'the
man, not the party*— a laudable
tactic in the
Independents* eyes.

While many Independents may fit none of
this
description, and others fit only parts of
it. Independents
as a group tend to conform more to this
model than do

party identifiers.

They conform at least enough to

say that, as a group, their antipathy toward
political

parties offers us a partial explanation of their
non-

alignment with those parties.
In addition to their apparent distaste for

political parties, another commonly offered explanation for political Independence is the presence in

Independents of attitudinal or sociological "cross-

pressures,"

Patrick Horan has characterized the dominant

interpretation of the (sociological) "cross-pressure"
thesis as connoting that, ".,. certain combinations of

social background categories may. by virtue of their

associated partisan orientations, exert severe stress
on the individual occupants and that this stress will
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result in attempts
xo es^^ano
P » to
escape
area of politics. "10

m
i.^

,

,
various
ways from the

If one views the
Independent identification
as something of an
escape mechanism (or.
perhaps, as
a neutral ground sought
by persons receiving
conflicting messages from their
environment) . such an identification might-according
to Koran's characterizationbe a viable course, say,
for a union member (a
category

with Democratic orientations)
who earns a great deal
Of money (a category with
Republican orientations),
an even more direct sense,
the Independent category
might be a comfortable haven
for a person whose mother
is a Democrat and whose
father is a Republican,

m

or

vice versa.

Though Koran's analysis is wisely
skeptical
Of efforts to prove the validity
of the cross-pressure
thesis in toto,n we can here
examine a number of possible
cross-pressures and observe the ways
in which they
appear to affect the rate of
Independence.
Pa*=^ioI^

rr.„».
t,
Cross-Pressures,'

Horan, "Social Positions and Political
A Re-examination," (1971), p. 652.

11

After a thorough discussion of
pressure models and their application in various crosqHoran concludes that the croL-pressure social research
belongs
^...m the same category as the theories thesis
of status
inconsistency and mobility effects— that
category
^""^
plausible theories whose empirical support
h«?^if
has
been cut out from under them." Ibid.
,
p. 659.

'
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Perhaps the 'classic' case of sociological

cross-pressure occurs when, as just described, one's
parents are supporters of different political parties.
Table IV -

1

compares rates of Independence among

voters with 'mixed' partisan backgrounds (those whose

parents were of different parties) and voters with
'consistent' partisan backgrounds (those whose parents

belonged to the same party) in 1952, 1964, I968, and
1972.

The table shows that the rate of Independence

is somev/hat higher among these

'cross-pressured'

voters than among the population as a whole, and con-

siderably higher than among the voters with 'consistent'

partisan backgrounds.

The mean percentage of Indepen-

dence among the cross-pressured voters is roughly

eight points higher than among voters whose parents
share or shared the same party affiliation.

It would

seem that this obviously direct instance of cross-

pressure does exert some influence on the rate of
Independence.

Conflicts in the partisan affiliations of one's
parents are not, however, the only source of potential

political cross-pressure.

In 195^, respondents were

asked their perception of their own social class, as

well as the social class of their family background.

TABLE IV -

1

RATES OF INDEPENDENCE AMONG 'MIXED,' 'CONSISTENT
AND ALL VOTERS IN 1952. 196^^, I968, AND I972'

ELECTION
YEAR

RATE OF INDEPENDENCE AMONG

•Mixed*

Background
Voters

•Consistent*
Background
Voters

•

1

All
Voters

1952

26.1^ (N=^0)

17.1?^ (N=199)

21.1% (N=391)

196^

22.6^ (N=19)

16.1^ (N=150)

22.5% (N=353)

1968

32.7% (N=3^)

20. 6;!^ (N=188)

(N=M2)

1972

(N=77)

28.

(N=935)

(N=^56)

The rate of Independence among middle class respondents

with working class origins (a possible source of crosspressure) was 33'7fo, while among middle class respondents with middle class backgrounds it was

Similar tendencies were not observed among Republicans.
While ^1.7% of the middle class with middle class
origins were Republicans in 195^1 the rate of Republi-

canism among middle class people with working class

backgrounds was 30«0/^»

It appears that a trans

generational shift (upward, in this case) in perceived
social class had a positive impact on the rate of

Independence, at least in 1956.

These findings are

supported by Kenneth H. Thompson's
1971 analysis of
social mobility and party
identification. Using the
1952 to 1968 presidential election
years SRC surveys
as his data source, Thompson
reports that "...over
the period for which data are
available the hypothesis
that upwardly mobile citizens
are more 'Independent'
in political orientation than
class stables is

generally supported. . .in those five samples,
the
proportions of respondents identifying
themselves as
•Independents' rather than as partisans
of the two

major parties, average five percentage
points greater
among upward mobiles than among the
"12
class stables.

When the social class of one's family
and the
status of one's occupation are viewed
as possible
sources of cross-pressure tensions, the
results are
inconclusive, but they point in the same general

direction.

In 1956, the rate of Independence among

•professionals and business managers' with working
class origins was 30.1^.

Among those employment

categories, people with middle class origins were

Independents 29,6% of the time.

When the categories

l^Kenneth H. Thompson, "Upward Social Mobility
and Political Orientation" A Re-evaluation of the
Evidence," American Sociological Review (April 1971),
pp. 223-23^.
.

were compared in the 196k
survey, the "working class
professionals" had a rate of
Independence of 25.0fo,
the "middle class professionals"
had a rate of
Independence of 15.0;^,
The concept of attitudinal or
ideological

cross-pressures is very similar to the
sociological
variety. For example, if a person
believes strongly
in federally sponsored programs
to aid the jobless
and poor (a position which, like

certain sociological

traits, has partisan orientations—
this time in the

direction of the Democrats) but also feels
strongly
that the federal government should play
little or no
role in the de-segregation of state schools

(a questic

which is not associated with the national
Democratic
party), that person might have difficulty in
deciding
on his party affiliation.

True,

our party system is

loose enough to permit these inconsistencies
to be

overlooked or to be (with some justification) ration-

alized away.

Nonetheless, the general thrusts and

philosophies of the two major parties are still clear
enough to present possible sources of tension to the

cross-pressured voter.
The suirvey questionnaires give us a number of

opportunities to try to test this assumption on an

empirical level.

In I956, respondents
were asked the ir
opinion on whether or not the
federal government should
involve itself in the
de-segregation of public schoolsa position identified with
'liberal,' if not Democratic,
politics in that year. They were
also asked to
register their agreement or disagreement
with the
proposition that our government should
"give help to
foreign countries, even if they
are not as much against
communism as we are." (once again,
a suggestion
identified with 'liberal' politics).
Considering
only those who opposed aid to such
countries, (i.e..
took a conservative position), the
rate of Independence
was 26.6^ among the 'liberals' on
the school

de-segregation question, and

23.9?S

among those who

gave a 'conservative' answer on de-segregation.

In

other words, among those expressing possible
conflicting
or cross-pressured opinions (at least on this
one

dimension) the rate of Independence was slightly

higher than among those with more 'consistent' issue
orientations.
In i960, voters' positions on several

potentially cross-pressured issues were tested by the
survey.

In one instance, they

v/ere

asked whether or

not the government in Washington "...ought to see to
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it that everybody who wants
to work can find a job."

They were also asked if the
government should
stay out of the question of whether
white and
colored children go to the same school."
Looking
only at 'conservatives' on the 'jobquestion (e.g..

people who did not agree that the
government should
find everyone a job) the rate of
Independence was

25.0^ among those who believed strongly that
the
federal government should stay out of
school

de-segragation (again a 'conservative* position),
and 30. 9^^ among those who felt the
government should
be involved.

Again, the cross-pressures appear to

be exerting at least a small influence.

In 1964, respondents were polled on their

attitudes toward federal aid to education and their
opinions on the rate of progress of the civil rights

movement.

Among 'liberals' on the education issue

(those who favored federal aid) the rate of Independence

was 9.5% for people who felt civil rights progress was

being made too slowly (also a liberal position in 1964)
and 22,9/0 among those who thought things were moving
too fast.

Again where liberal and conservative issue

positions coexisted, the rate of Independence appeared
to be positively affected.

All of these findings
point to relatively
minor differences,
many cases the differences
(in terms of rates of
Independence) between crosspressured and non-cross-pressured
voters are so small
as to be statistically
insignif icant . What

m

is

impressive about the data, however,
is their
consistency. Again, in every case
examined, the rate
of Independence was higher,
if only slightly, among
the cross-pressured voters
than among those who did
not experience the specific
cross-pressures examined.
It is impossible, with the
almost infinite
number of variables involved, to
state that Independents exhibit "more" cross-pressures,
or, in Robert
Agger's terms, that they are "more
cross-pressured"13
than partisans.

What we can say, though, is that on

the basis of our analysis of several
possible cross-

pressure situations (both sociological and
attitudinal)
the presence of cross-pressures seems to be
associated

with higher rates of political Independence.

In the

cross-pressure situations we observed, the rate of
Independence was higher among the respondents who
were cross-pressured than among those who were not.
13

^Robert Agger, "Independents and Party
Identifiersi Characteristics and Behavior" (1959), p. 316,

While it is not possible to say that
cross-pressures
"cause" political Independence (especially
since, in
the case of attitudinal cross-pressures,
it is possible

that they may actually be due to lack of a
party

affiliation— and the attendant philosophy it can provide
as well as reflect),!^ it would be unwise to
overlook

the relationship between the two.

Other phenomena which appear as plausible

explanations of self-identified Independence are
political ambivalence, or the general lack of concern

about things political, and political indecisiveness.

With regard to the former, findings in Chapter III
make clear that Independents do exhibit much less

concern about the outcomes of two-party elections
than do party identifiers.^^
hov/ever

— and

What is problematical,

what makes it impossible to decide if

political ambivalence explains Independence

— is

the

possibility that Independence may explain the political
ambivalence.

As Chapter III indicated, it is not at all

It is entirely likely that some partisan
voters develop their issue positions inferrentially
by internalizing the pronouncements of party leaders.
This would be most likely when the position of the
party leadership was well-known, and the issue in question
of rather low personal salience to the voter.

^^See Chapter III.

clear that the Independen to

•

demonstrated lack of

political concern is tied to any inherent
lack of
citizen responsibility-especially
when we remember
that Independents were just as interested
as Democratic
identifiers in governmental affairs other
than specific
campaigns. 16 It may well be that
non-identification

with a party and the associated belief that
the outcomes
of elections are of little consequence,
are themselves
the cause of the Independents* apparent
ambivalence.

If this is the

support

case— and there

it— I'^it

is much evidence to

makes little sense to argue that

political ambivalence be included as one of the major
explanations of political Independence.

While it may

be a factor of consequence in some people's decisions

not to affiliate with a party, it is more likely to
reflect the attitudes of non-partisans that the outcomes of two-party struggles are not particularly

important.
In trying to decide whether or not political

indecisiveness is a major factor in political
l^In 196^, 28.
of the Independents claimed
an interest in politics "all of the time," as did 2? ,y/c
of the Democrats and 39. 1^^^ of the Republicans.
11.
professed to be interested "hardly at all," as did i;).l'/o
of the Democrats and 7.1;^ of the Republicans,
^"^See

Chapter III.

2k9

Independence, we must first make a distinction
between
the indecisiveness of young voters just
entering the

electorate, and indecisiveness that refers to people's

inability to come to grips with important political
questions.

In many ways, the indecisiveness of the

young is a special case and may reflect the problems

inherent in the unsettled conditions of their lives
as well as the difficulties which many of them face

should they decide to break away from the partisan

tradition to which they have been socialized.

It

does not, by itself, reflect an inability on their

part to take definitive stands on important political
questions.

voters

— and

Independence

Accordingly, the special case of the young
the way youth affects the rate of

—will

be discussed separately in a section

below.

With consideration of the special situation of
the young thus deferred, we can examine whether a more

general political indecision

— the

inability or unwilling-

ness to take stands on the issues and make political
choices

— affects

as a whole.

the rate of Independence among voters

On the face of it, the choice to identify

oneself as an Independent is by itself evidence that
the voter has opted not to identify with either of the
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major parties.

To ascribe that choice to
political

indecision would, however, (in
addition to being
tautological) effectively exclude
the possibility
that the Independent identification
is something more
than a rather negative 'non-decision.'
Such an exclusion
and the assumptions it implies
fail to account for the
very positive value which many voters
place on their
Independence. As stated in The American VntPr,

"...we do not suppose that every person
who describes

himself as an Independent is indicating
simply his
lack of attraction to one of the parties...

it seems

likely that a portion of those who call
themselves
Independents are not merely reporting the absence
of
identification with one of the major parties.
Though
simple indecisiveness may motivate some
Independents
to refrain from choosing a party, we must
go further

and examine other areas if we are to cite it as
a

major explanation of Independence.
In Chapter III two measures of political

decisiveness— the strengths of the respondents' issue
positions, and their propensity to hold issue opinions-

were examined.

In no way did the data suggest that

Independents were any less decisive than party identifiers.
Campbell et al .

The American Voter (1964), p. 69.
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In fact, when we consider
that Independents had
issue
orientations virtually as developed
as partisans
without the aid of the general
party philosophies on
which some of the partisans may
have been relying,
their very decisiveness is quite
impressive.

If one defines political decisiveness
as the
propensity to take sides on political
questions, and
if one further defines those
'sides' as being encompassed
by the two major parties, the
demonstrated indecisiveness
of Independents becomes a tautological
truth.
But if
decisiveness is described as the ability
to hold and
express definitive views on the important
political
issues of the times, Independents are
certainly no
less decisive than are party identifiers.
The concepts of political self-efficacy
and

alienation are often discussed in terms of the
effects
they appear to have on political attitudes and

behavior.

Since Independence represents, by definition,
effective

estrangement from one aspect of the American democratic

system— the two-party framework— these two phenomena
suggest themselves as possible explanatory factors
behind self identified Independence.

Since both

concepts are effectively defined by the SRC surveys
as being embodied in positive answers to a number of

pre-determined questions-a
definition
v
aeiinition wkwhich
is someWhat xnaae,uate .ut.
alas. aU we .ave
to wor. withWUI not awell on their
meanings here but si„ply
•

concepts than meets
even thp
qpp
the SRC's
watchful eye.
Nonetheless, the measures
of ejiicacy
efficacv and
p.h alienation,
i
•

Of these phenomena
in a random sample of
the national
electorate. As such, they
are at least available
and
useful, if not especially
rich or subtle. Effectively,
the concept of political
efficacy has been defined
for
us as that phenomenon
which is present in a
person who
gives -positive- responses
to a number of questions
designed to test the voters'
feelings about their
relative importance in the
political system. Similarly, political alienation
is said to be evidenced

by people who give -negativeresponses to a number of
questions designed to measure the
way they view the
government and political leaders around
them. 19
l^The efficacy questions included
the followingi
A.

B.

C.

(Agree or Disagree) People like me
don-t
have any say about what the government
does.
Voting is the only way that people like me
can have a say about how the government
runs things.
Sometimes politics and government seem so
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In Chapter III we observed
that Independents
were no less efficacious
than their partisan
counterparts.
This observation is
supported by research on
political efficacy and political
alienation conducted
by sociologist James Wright.20
bright concluded,
after an extensive examination
of the subject that
"...alienation and party identification
are
unrelated. "21 Table IV - 2 (which
appeared in Wright's
study as Table 3.822) reflects
the percentage of white,

non-Southern voters "highly alienated"
in I970.
complicated that a person like me
really understand whafs going on. can't
think public officials care much
Ltl
what people like me think.
The political trust questions
included ones
similar to the following!
A.

B.

C.

States

I

How much of the time do you think you
can
trust the government in Washington to do
what IS right— just about always, most of
the time, or only some of the time?
Would you say the government is pretty much
run by a few big interests looking out for
themselves or that it is run for the benefit
of all the people?
Do you think that quite a few of the people
running the government are a little crooked,
not very many are, or do you think hardly
any of them are crooked at all?

20
Wright, "Political Alienation in the United
.y.f^^^
I956-I97O" (1973).

21lbid., p. 211.

22 ibid .. p. 212.

25^

TABLE IV

- 2

WHITE. NON-SOUTH
OMLY?"97o

Efficacy
.Middle

Strong Democrat
Democrat
Independent, leaning
to Democrat
Independent
Independent, leaning
to Republican
V/eak Republican
Strong Republican

N

25.6
22.5

41.9
36.6

71

17.2
23.7

32.8
31.6

58
38

28.6
29.5
23.1

54.3
45.0
40.0

35
88
65

^5.3
^7.1

44.2
51.9

86
104

50.0
58.0

41.7
50.0

36
50

51.7
36.8
37.9

34.5
41.2
44.8

29
68
29

43

Cla.ci.c;

Strong Democrat
Democrat
Independent, leaning
to Democrat
Independent
Independent, leaning
to Republican
V/eak Republican
Strong Republican
V/eak

Trust

CIp^s.c;

V/eak

V/orkin^

'

Class is determined by occupation
of head of
respondent's household. Middle
class
includes
"white collar" employees
(clerical, sales
manager, etc.); working class
includes manual
and service workers and farmers.
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In terms of party identification, the
only

observable significant difference here is between
working
class Republicans and working class Independents
on
the

efficacy measure.

The other differences are so small as

to have led Wright to conclude that "...no
important

relationship between alienation and party identification
emerges. "23

j-t

appears that efficacy and alienation are

unaffected by party identification and, conversely, that

party identification is relatively unaffected by political
alienation.

Thus no case can be made supporting alienation

or inefficacy as major explanations of self-identified

Independence.

This revelation undercuts any notions that

the recent rise in Independence (to be discussed fully

below) is attributable to the currently high levels of

inefficacy and political alienation

— at

least as those

phenomena are defined by survey analysts. 2^

While it

23ibid., p. 211.

^The Louis Harris Poll released in December
1973 (a poll commissioned bv the Senate Subcommittee on
Intergovernmental Relations) indicated that political
alienation has increased in the country during the past
seven years. The absence of any relationship between
alienation and party identification makes it impossible
to cite that alienation is responsible for the rise 'in
Independence which also occurred during that same period.
Wright, "Political Alienation in the United States"
(1973) also observed an increase in alienation and a
drop in political efficacy during the period. Relying
on SRC sample data, his research revealed "...sizable
declines in efficacy beliefs for all groups from i960 to

—

—
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does appear to be true that
these phenomena are quite
widespread in contemporary times,
when Independence is
running high, the absence of a
relationship between the
two makes it impossible to
explain one by reference to
the other.
One other possible explanation of
Independence

can be seen in the fairly young ages
of many Independent
voters. It is possible that recent
exposure to
the

electorate, and the desire to 'test the
political

waters

slowly cause many young voters not be align
themselves with a party, but to call themselves
•

Independents.

This is the 'indecision' of the young

referred to above, but it is a special kind of
indecision
related not to the inability of the young to make

political choices, but their inability to determinedue to their often rapidly changing lifestyles and their

uncertainty about the future— which party best represents
their philosophical and material interests.

This

uncertainty can be especially widespread among
upwardly mobile college students, and it is complicated
by the fact that some younger voters may be in the

process of breaking away, however tentatively, from the
196^," and "...sizable increases in alienation. .for all
groups... in the 1964-1970 period." (Chapter 4, p. 273).
.

I
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party to which their past has
socialized them-itself
a potentially wrenching
political experience .25

m

short, one's first exposure to
electoral politics
often occurs in a very turbulent
time of life—
time when adoption of the
Independent label probably
seems a comfortable, if only temporary,
haven.

There is much evidence to support this
thesis.

In the concluding section of Chapter II,
Figure II

-

10

included a number of charts depicting the
Independence

profile for the various age groups of voters in
the

electorates from 1952 to 1972.

That Figure demon-

strated that younger voters were more likely than
their
elders to be Independents in each of those election
years.

In each electorate a drop in the rate of

Independence was observable in either the 25-to-28 or
the 29-to-32 age groups.

While the cohort analysis

conducted in Chapter II does not support the notion
that Independents "lose" their Independence as they
^^The influence of parental direction and
childhood experience on the development of political
attitudes and attachments is widely reported in the
literature. See, for example, R. E. Dawson and
K. Prewitt, Political Socialization (Glencoe., Ill.i
The Free Press, 1959) K. D. Hess and V. Torney,
The Development of Political Attitudes in Children
(Chicago! Aldine, I967.)
>

'

increase in age, neither does
it dispute the fact
that, in each electorate,
younger people are more
Independent than their elders.
This fact alone
strongly suggests that youth
and Independence are
positively related.
While we would not argue that
the Independence
is simply a non-decision
which reflects no positive
values, the data suggest that
it does represent for
some young voters a postponement
of the decision they
will make later in life. There
are certainly many
young Independents who, for a
host of reasons, will
retain their non-alignment throughout
their lives.
The data indicate that nearly
two-thirds of the young
Independents fall into this category. 26
But
there are

also other Independents who do
select a party as they
advance in age after exposure to one
or two major
political campaigns, and after their life
style has
steadied into a pattern which they are
able to

favorably associate with the philosophy and
goals of
one of the two major parties.
Though the increased
^^ReferenQe to Figure II

be the case.

-

10 shows this to

overall level of Independence
observable in 1964 and
1968 makes it impossible to conclusively
demonstrate
this by cohort analysis, the
extremely consistent
pattern of the graphs in Figure II lo indicates
that it is indeed the case.

In many ways young voters are a segment of
the electorate whose lives and political
views are
in a state of uncertainty and transition.

In such

a highly changeable environment, the
Independent

identification affords them the opportunity to stop
and rest, as it were, in a position of relative

neutrality before moving on to their selection of a
partisan affiliation.

Young voters, however, are

not the only people whose life experiences leave
them with a sense of uncertainty that is comfortably

accommodated by adoption of the Independent label.
Voters in the process of shifting their allegiance

from one political party to the other are also in a

fom

of transitional period.

Knowing what we do about the importance, in

psychological as well as political

terras,

of party
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identification, 2? it is not difficult to understand
the personal problems that can be associated
with an

inter-party shift, and the consequent desire to keep
that shift as painless as possible. If one is
reared
and socialized in the traditions of one political

party (and simultaneously indoctrinated about the
odious traits of the other) a change of party

affiliation is not a step taken lightly.

Whether

the partisan shift is made as one enters the electorate

or later in life, a temporary 'layover* in the Inde-

pendent category can often serve to soften the

psychological blow and to make more gradual this
fundamental disassociation with an important part of
the roots of one's past.

The Independent identifica-

tion can provide a comfortable resting place for the

person who has opted out of the party to which he has
been socialized, but is as yet unable to identify with
the party that socialization has led him to distrust.

One Independent, a young architect from Atlanta,

expressed this feeling when asked why he had chosen
to become an Independents
^''see Campbell etal., The American Voter (196^),
esp. Chapters 3, 5, and 6j and Franz Alexander, "Emotional
Factors in Voting Behavior," in Burdick and Brodbeck,
American Voting Behavior (1959), PP- 300-308.

^ ^^^^^ ^^'^ j^^-t because I've
t life-long
nad a
subliminal aversion
Democrats. Even though I'm now left to
of
the Democratic party politically,
it's still
anathema to me, because of my father's
influence.
I can't call myself a
Republican anymore because I disagree
theraso much, but I still have this oldwith
feeling that Democrats are scurrilous
and
crooked... That's a laugh this year.

Though the Atlanta architect represents
something of an unusual case (being a Southerner
with

Republican roots turning Democrat in a time when
many
Southern Democrats are becoming Republicans), his
comment illustrates well the socio-psychological
pressures which can sometimes be involved in shifting
one's party allegiance— pressures which affect both

young people rejecting their parents' party and older
voters turning away from the party of their earlier
years
The thesis that political transition

positively affects the rate of Independence gains
credence if we can show that the period from 1964 to
1972

—a

sharply

period when the rate of Independence rose

—was

a period of transition for many voters.

This demonstration depends on our ability to portray
the 196^-1972 era as a "realigning" one in American

politics, and its undertaking carries us into the

problem of deciding what factors have been responsible
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for the increase of Independent voters
we have witnessed
in the past decade.
Thus far our attempt to explain
self-identified

Independence has been drawn in essentially
ahistorical
terms.

V/e

have focused our attention on rather

universalis tic variables and have tried to explain
Independence without reference to specific historical
circumstances.

By and large our discussion indicated

that such factors as alienation, lack of political

efficacy, political ambivalence, and political

indecisiveness could not be cited as major causal
factors in the Independent identification.

There

appeared, on the whole, to be very few important

relationships between these variables and the rate
of Independence.

V/e

did determine that youth, certain

sociological and ideological cross-pressures, and
expressed antipathy toward political parties all were

associated with higher rates of Independence.

And

we argued (though without empirical verification)

that the transition of allegiance from one party to
the other often leads voters to pause in the Indepen-

dent category.
Now it is necessary to view the political
Independents in a more particular historical context
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and see if there are some
temporal factors which may
be affecting the rapid
increase of Independents
which we are currently witnessing.
A good place to
begin is with a look at voters in
transition, and how
that transition may have been
affected by events of
the past decade.
In recent years, a number of
political

scientists have written books and essays
arguing
that the past decade has constituted
a period of

fundamental realignment in American electoral
politics. 28

Political realignment, in this sense,

can be defined as the shakeup and resettling
of the
political power— as well as the constituencies—
of
the two major parties, and the emergence
of new

political issues around which partisan loyalties

crystallize in something other than a temporary
manner.

There is much evidence to suggest that

realignment is indeed occurring in America at this
28

See, for example, Walter Dean Durnham,
Critica l Elections and the Mainsprinpis of American
Politics (1970); Kevin Phillips, The Emergin,": Republican
Majority (New Hochelle, N.Y. Arlington House, 19^9);
James Sundquist, "Whither the American Party System*?"
(1973). pp. 559-581.
j

2Q
^A good description of the forces at work
during realignment is available in V. 0. Key, "A Theory
of Critical Elections," Journal of Politics 17
(February 1955)» pp. 3-18.

26^

time.

This evidence can be observed by
comparing

contemporary events with conditions which
are claimed
by political scientists to occur during or
preceding
periods of political realignment. 30 sorae of
these

conditions (followed by their exemplification in

recent times) are as follows
1.

Realignment periods tend to occur every
32 to 36 years or roughly every generation..:'^
(The last period generally
considered to be a realigning one was
1928-32, approximately thirty-six years
from the middle of the time we are
discussing.

2.

Realignment periods include or are
preceded by strong third party movements..^^
(The American Independent
Party candidacy of George Wallace in
1968 constituted such a third party
movement.

3»

Realignment brings? to the fore new issues
around which new partisan cleavages are
developed.
(The I968 and I972 election
years elections which highlighted the
"social issue" and "acid, amnesty, and
abortion" may have given us an inkling '

—

30

These indices are a compendium of those
suggested by Key, "A Theory of Critical Elections"
(1955)» Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings
of American Politics (1970). and Sundquist. "Whither
the American Party System?" (1973).
3 ^Burnham,

Critical Elections and the Mainsprings
of American Politics (1970). p. 8.
32 Ibid., p. 10
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of these new issues. 33

Though the iqyL

^h^economy to
it w^nid
It
would be most unwise to prominence,
neglect th^
4.

vary widely from patterns
o? ?he^pasi!
the timeliness of^^hi^
conteS'^"'" ""^^"^
^i^^ the case
o? ^n^^rtK^""^

terms
Of
?aw vote
vo^p totals and numbers
01 raw
of partv
loyalists elected to office,
the Sou?h
today IS considerably less
''nemocraUc"
than It was prior to 1964. )3^

Parties' internal coalitions,
i.e.,
constituencies shift during periods their
of
realignment.
(Analysis of the 1972
election returns-and the support
given
both parties by selected groups
of
voters— shows wide differences from
past
patterns, even when we "control"
for the
dimensions of the Nixon landslide )35
.

.pSoth these issues areas (the 'social issue'
o A
and
'acid, amnesty, and abortion'
are reJaUvely new
)
to American politics.
The importance of the 'social
issue' and its impact on the
1968
by Scammon and Wattenberg, The Realelection is discussed
P/laj or^t.y MQyn^^^^^
.

^^^^"^^^^ Fenton reports the increase of Republican
+
strength
in "An Analysis of the Results of the
I972
Presidential Election," (197^), pp. 116-128.

^^^^^^ ^® determine the extent of their conto the two parties, as we did in Table
II - 9, page 166
a technique which controls for
in the parties overall strength— the contributionschanges
of
oatholics, union-members, and Jewish voters was
lower
1972 than
any of the three previous elections.
.-u 4.+
tributions

,

m

m
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6.

In times of realignment, presidential
elections often exhibit relatively high
"ideological" content. 3° (The elections
of 1964 and I972 conform to this pattern,
at least in relative terms.) 37

7»

In realigning elections voter interest
and participation are relatively high. 38
(This is one phenomenon which does not
seem to be exemplified by the elections
of this period.) 39

The effect of ideology on campaigns and the
way the 'ideological' content can vary from campaign
to campaign, are discussed in Philip Converse, Aage R.
Clausen, and V/arren Miller, "Electoral Myth and Reality
The 1964 Election," American Political Science Review
59 (June I965), 321-336, and John 0. Field and R. E.
Anderson, "Ideology in the Public's Conception of the
1964 Election" (1971).
.

37The id eological content of the 1964 election,
and the ways in which the voters 'perceptions of their
ideologies helped or hurt the candidates are discussed
in Converse ejtal .
"Electoral Myth and Realityi The
1964 Election" (I965).
,

3^Burnham, Critical Elections and the
Mainsprings of American Politics (1970) p. 6-7.
1

3^While turnout levels in 1964 and I968 were
roughly equal to the fairly high rates we have known
since the 1950 's, they in no way constituted a
precipitous rise in turnout. 1972, of course,
witnessed a drop in turnout to approximately 56^ of
the eligible voters, the lowest percentage since 1948.
On the question of respondent interest in the election
there appeared no sharp rise (even a slight decline)
In i960,
in interest during the period in question.
"very
much
themselves
called
respondents
36.9:^ of the
while
campaign,
24.7:^
presidential
interested" in the
claimed to be interested "hardly at all." By 1972, the
percent highly interested had dropped to 31*5/^ and
the percent interested "hardly at all" had risen
slightly to 27.4^. In any case, no precipitous rise
is observable

8.

When realignment occurs,
the nnmir^oi
eJ-eotoral purposes at
lGa<!+
ieast,
the ma.iority party— a
uattprn
which persists, in V. 0.
Key's words
succeeding elections "'tO
fso
(So far as presidential
politics is
have been the
*°
t-ase
lTsriTl968'l
196b and 1972.
it i
rii-p-P^^,
'^'''
!

m

<?

^\-g^L. to\pLu

a't
a? thL"'
""^^^^ ^^^^ P^^^ern will
parses? ?oJ''Lf
persist
for several succeeding
elections.
Though there are exceptions
in contemporary

politics to the conditions here
described (the
exception of interest and turnout
is particularly
puzzling) a strong case can be
made that realignment
has occurred or is occurring
at this time,
it would
seem, in retrospect, that
the foundations
of the

realignment were laid in

196/f,

and that its full

ramifications were evident (at least
on the presidential level) with the re-election
of President
Nixon in 1972. Whether the underpinnings
of the

realignment will be strong enough to
withstand the
outpouring of anti-Nixon (hence, anti-Republican)
sentiment precipitated by Watergate and associated
scandals, and whether the 'new' issues around
which
the realignment has crystallized will retain
their

prominence in voters' minds in light of the nation's
''Key, "A

Theory of Critical Elections" (1955),

faltering economy will
probably not be evident
until
1976.

If it is true that
realignment has occurred,
or is occurring, one
would expect to find
large
numbers of voters in inter-party
transition during
the period in question.
Since we argued above that

transition positively affects
the rate of Independence,
we can thus expect to find
more Independents in these
volatile contemporary times
than in periods of
political "normalcy." We can
partially test this
assumption by examining the
particular case of
Southern voters during the past
decade.

In terms of electoral realignment,
no area in
the country is undergoing so
fundamental a political

transition as are our Southern states.

Until quite

recently it was common for political
analysts to refer
to the "solid South" in terms of
that area's propensity
to vote Democratic with amazing
regularity.

Today

any reference to the "solid South"— if
it referred
to presidential elections— would
probably be describing
that region's newfound Republican orientation.
Since the South— historically a Democratic

region— seems now

to be "going Republican." at least

in presidential elections, we can assume that
many
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Southern voters, especially whites,^! are
in transition
in terms of their loyalties to the
national political
parties.
If transition affects the rate of Indepen-

dence, we should expect to find an increase
in the

number of Southern Independents during this realignment period. In fact, that is exactly the case,
In i960, only

IQfo

of the white Southerners called

themselves Independents— eight years later,
the white Southerners were Independents.

of

3&/0

During the

same period, the percentage of white Southerners

calling themselves Democrats dropped from

60fo

to kQfo

and the percentage of Republicans dropped from 19^
to

15'fo,

As E. M. Schreiber has pointed out,^^

-j-^g

increase of Independence among young (under 30) white

Southerners was even more startling, jumping from
in 196^ to

60fo

in I968.

Z9fo

James Sundquist has argued

that the new Southern Independents consisted almost

entirely of people with segregationist attitudes on
Black Southern voters are still quite loyal
to the Democratc.
In neven heavily black South Carolina
counties in 1972, Senator McGovern polled a higher proportion of the vote than polled either by Hubert
Humphrey in 1968 or John Kennedy in i960. This
McGovern support reflects the enfranchisement of many
black Southern voters in recent years as well as their
continued loyalty to the Democratic party.

^^Schreiber, "V/here the Ducks Are." (1971 )•

on the race issue.-^3
attitudes which precipitated
the break by .any with
the national Democratic
party.
Whatever the reasons for
Southerners' defection
away from the Democrats,
the important thing,
in our
context, is that the South
during this period was

undergoing realignment and
simultaneously experienced
a sharp increase in the
number of Independents, it
is
extremely interesting to note
that by 1972. when
Republican dominance in the
South (at the presidential
level) was solidified, the
percentage of Independents
dropped Slightly to ^0.^, and.
while the percentage
of Democrats continued to
decline (to l^S.l^/o)
the

percentage of Republicans rose
almost seven points
to 21.9^.
These data support our contention
that

realignment (thus transition) positively
affects the
rate of Independence and they
further suggest that
the 196^-1972 period was one of
Deraocratic-to-

Republican realignment in the South.
the

Other areas of

country— where realignment was probably also

occurring, but less profoundly than in
the Southalso saw their rates of Independence go
up during the

nineteen sixties, but not so sharply as it did
in the

(^Qn'>\

Sundquist. "Whither the American Party System?"
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South.

Between i960 and 1970, the
percentage of
Independents among white voters
rose from 2V« to
Wo in the Northeast, from 26f. to 29% in the
Midwest
and from Z5% to

28/.

in the West.^^

Though the 196/^.

1972 rise was not as abrupt outside the
South, it
was a substantial one nonetheless
and the 38.5^ rate
of Independence in non-Southern
states in I972 was

higher than ever before.
While realignment may have been most
noticeable in the South during the nineteen
sixties and
early seventies, by no means has it been
confined to
that area. Realignment, and the uncertainty
and

transition which accompany it, have been responsible
for a not insignificant part of the increase
in

Independence which this country had experienced in

recent years.
In Chapter II and in an earlier section of
this chapter, we noted that age appeared to play an
iPJ-q *
The huge increase apparent
p. 572.
in the Northeast is of some interest, and may reflect
a different phase of the realignment period in question
since it has been accompanied by an erosion of
Republican as well as Democratic strength. It may be
(though data in support of the contention are tentative]
that as the once-Democratic South drifts ever closer to'
the GOP, once-Republican New England is beginning to
lose its Republican character.
t

^
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important role in the Independent identification—
i.e., younger people seemed somewhat more likely
to

be Independents than did older people.

If this is

true, it may be that part of the increase in Indepen-

dence during the past decade can be attributed to
the relatively higher proportion of young people in
the electorate today than in past years.

Table IV - 3

displays the percentage of voters under the age of

thirty in the samples of the presidential electorates
from 1952 to 1972.
TABLE IV - 3

PERCENTAGE OF ELECTORATE
UNDER 30 YEARS OF AGE,
1952-1972

Percentage
of
electorate
under 30

i960

1964

1968

1972

17. 0';^

13.7^^

N=270

18.3^
N=324

18. 4^^^

N=300

N=28l

27.4^
N=738

1952

1956

16.8^
N=326

It is clear from the table that the percentage of

voters under thirty was considerably higher in 1972
(a year of high Independence) than in any of the other

electorates examined.

Even when the 18-to-21 year old

voters are removed from the sample, the percentage of
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the electorate aged 21 through 29 in 1972 was 22.1^,
a figure higher than in the previous years.

Given

the demonstrated propensity of the younger voters
to call themselves Independents, this influx of

under-thirty voters certainly explains part of the
high rate of Independence in 1972.

Determining what

part it explains is somewhat more problematical.
Since younger voters in recent years have evidenced
rates of Independence close to 50^

— as

they did in

1972—^5 it follows that half of the general increase
of young voters has consisted of young Independents.

Since the 27.4^ of the electorate under thirty in
1972 is

10.^ higher

than the mean level of under-

thirty voters in the five previous electorates, the

contribution of these new young Independents to the
overall rate of Independence is quite considerable.
It would be unwise, though, to over-emphasize
the role played by the young in the rise of Indepen-

dence in recent years.

For one thing, Table IV - 3

shows no appreciable rise in the percentage of young

voters between 1964 and I968— a period when the rate
of Independence rose from 22. 5^;^ to 26.5^ of the

^^In 1972, voters aged 18 to 20 had a rate of
Independence of 50.3^; those 21 to 24, 48.8^5 those
25 to 29, 50»7J^.

electorate.

For another, the cohort
analysis in
Chapter II demonstrated vividly
that Independence
rose between 1964 and 1972 among
all age groups of
voters, and when we compare the
1964 and I972 samples
we see that even among voters
over thirty the rate of

Independence rose sharply from 20.2^
in 1964 to 28.7/.
in 1972.
In short we can say that the increase
of
younger voters in the electorate~with
their attendant
proclivities toward Independence— positively
affected
the overall rate of Independence
between the nineteen
sixties and 1972. but that they by no means
account
for all of the difference.
Besides the transition associated with
realign-

ment and the influx of young voters into the
electorate
there are a number of other historical circumstances

which can be seen as influencing the rate of Independence in recent years.

James Sundquist has argued that

the "apartisan" nature of the issues of the 1960's
is partly responsible .^^

Sundquist theorizes that

Viet Nam, civil rights, and the 'social issue'— the
three most salient issues of the sixties

— did

not

readily lend themselves to absorption into traditional

System?"

^^Sundquist, "Whither the American Party
( 1973) » pp.
564-68.

275

partisan frameworks.

In short. Sundquist contends

that the parties were viewed by the
electorate as

virtually indistinguishable on these extremely
important political issues, and essentially
irrelevant
to their most salient political concerns. ^"^

With the

parties on the political sidelines as these three
issues were debated, many voters

— especially

those

entering the electorate when these issues were 'hot'—
could see relatively little value in the concept of

partisanship and no reason to align themselves with
Sundquist 's argument that the voters' perceptions of inter-party differences on these issues
increased the rate of Independence is only partly
supported by the data. In 196^, the beginning of the
period he describes, ^7-9?^ of the respondents claimed
they saw no difference as to which party was likely to
keep the country out of a bigger war. In I968, the percentage seeing no difference on this question had risen
to 57*3%,
When asked which party they felt was most
likely to escalate the Viet Nam conflict in I968 ("... take
a stronger stand, even if it means invading North Viet
Nam"), 3^*1/^ of the respondents saw no difference between
the parties.
When viewing the parties' positions on
civil rights, the voters' perceptions of differences
were not substantially smaller in I968 than they had
been in 196^. Asked which party was more likely to
press for federal involvement in school desegregation,
39*7% of the electorate saw no difference in I968, as
36.9^ had seen no difference in 1964. When asked which
party favored federal involvement in efforts to see to
it that negroes got equal treatment in obtaining jobs,
3Q,2'/o saw no inter-party difference in I968, compared
to 32.2^ in 196^.
In sum, there appeared to be a small
decrease in the voters' perceptions of the party
difference between 196^ and I968, but a large part of
that was probably due to the absence, in 19 68, of Barry
Goldwater at the head of the Republican ticket.
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either of the parties.

The Independent category

afforded these voters an
acceptable altemativeperhaps permanently, or perhaps
until such time as
the concept of partisanship
appeared more relevant
in their eyes.
Though there are flaws in
Sundquisfs
analysis (it is difficult, for
example, to ascribe
the defection of white Southern
Democrats toward the
GOP as being precipitated by
anything other than their
perception of a difference in the two
parties'
positions on the civil rights issue)
it does make
some good points. Even though, as
we have
noted,

the voters' perceptions of 'no
difference- between the

parties on civil rights and war issues
increased only
slightly from 1964 to I968, we should recall
that
voter perception of inter-party differences on
other
•traditional' issues, seems to have declined in

recent years. ^8

Whether the parties' failure to

relate to and present alternative proposals concerning
the voters' most important concerns is due to their
ho

^°In Figure III - 3 of Chapter III we noted
that the perception that no difference existed between
the parties on the issue of the proper role of government in people's lives rose between 196*4- and I968
among Democrats and Independents, and among all groups
of voters from 1968 to I972.
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being out of touch with the people,
or (as Sundquist
argues
their inability to keep up with
the pace

of the country's realignment, these
failings seem
to have an indisputably adverse effect
on the parties'

ability to attract identifiers.

It thus appears that

the parties themselves— due to circumstances
which

are perhaps beyond their control— may be
responsible

for at least part of their current difficulties.

A

South Carolina businessman echoed the views of
many
of the Independents I interviewed
I think the parties have just become
too much
alike. Everything is diluted. You never hear
them talking about anything that means anything
to people... not to me, anyway.
The problem
is that they don't really care .. .they're not
responding to what people think and care
about.
They do what the leaders tell them to
and the people don't get any say.

There are other ways as well in which the

parties have in recent years become the architects
(however unwitting) of their own dilemma.

In Critical

Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics .
V/alter Dean

Bumham argues that

the rise of Independents

during the past decade has been but one more stage of
the "onward march of party decomposition.

"•^^

Bumham 's

^^Sundquist, "Whither the American Party System?"
(1973), pp. 579-80.

^Bumham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings
of American Politics (1970). Chapter

5.
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thesis is that for a variety of reasons51
political
parties have been in a state of decline in
this

country since the turn of the century.

Accordingly

the parties have lost a great deal of
their former

usefulness— both in fact and in the perceptions of
many voters.

While Burnham, himself a strong supporter

of vigorous parties, laments this tendency, he
sees it
as partly responsible for the increase of Independents

during the nineteen sixties and seventies.
Though attributing the increase of Independents
to the decline of parties seems, on one level at least,
to be tautological, there is more to Burnham 's con-

tention than a simple truism.

It is unquestionably

true that with the advent of direct primaries, the

Australian ballot, non-partisan elections, city
managers and the like, political parties have lost

power and are less important in the public consciousness than they once were.

With parties and the concept

of partisanship so widely derided by some 'reformist*

groups and efficiency-oriented 'good government* types,

^^In his Chapters k and 5» Burnham cites a
number of historical, demographic, and political trends
which have been responsible for the decline in parties.
He claims this 'disaggregation* began in the late
nineteenth century and he uses it to explain what he
sees as the declining rate of voter turnout in recent
history.
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it is easy to see how some voters are
dissuaded from

aligning themselves with a political party.

Whether

this trend is a healthy one. as some would
argue, or

whether its implications spell trouble for the

American system, as Bumham contends, the important
thing, at least in this context, is that the
conditions

do exist and that they appear to have an adverse
effect
on party strength.

What is not clear, however, and what makes
acceptance of Burnhara's thesis questionable (in terms
of its ability to explain the current increase in the

number of Independents) is the question of whether or

not these forces are more in evidence today than they
were a decade ago.

I

would argue that they are not.

While the 'institutional' reasons Bumham cites in

explaining party decomposition have obviously weakened
the parties over the years, there is no evidence to

suggest that they are responsible for the recent
increase in the percentage of Independents .52
^ In states where

i

agree

registration is by party.
Independent registration is often quite low (lower
certainly than Independent identification). One reason
for this is that some states penalize Independents by
prohibiting non-party members from voting in primary
elections. There is no evidence, though, to suggest
that a relaxation of any of these laws has been responsible for the recent increases in Independence. Though
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with Burnham that 'party
decomposition' has been
responsible for more and more
voters selecting the
Independent label. But I differ
somewhat in where
I would place the origin
of that decomposition-not.
as Professor Burnham argues,
in the external,

institu-

tional mechanisms which have sapped
party strength in
the past, but in the parties'
inability, in contemporary times, to relate to the issues
which concern
the

voters53 and to avoid the taint of
scandal and corruption which we have gradually come
to associate with
them.

It is sad commentary on the parties—
or at

least on their public relations efforts-when
seventy
percent of the respondents to a recent
Harris Poll
reveal their belief that •'corrupt politicans"
are a

major problem in this country. 5^

In case after case

the SRC samples are not randomized by state,
a quick
comparison of voters in states with party registration
and
those without it produces no observable difference
the rate of Independent identification.

m

m

^^As noted earlier there has been a decline in
recent years of voters perceiving it would 'make a
difference' which party wins the election— a small
decline when that question is directed toward civil
rights and war/peace issues, and a more noticeable
decline (see Figure III - 3) when directed toward the
size and role of the federal government.

5^Louis Harris Poll, December 1973, reported in
Newsweek Magazine December 10, 1973.
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in the interviews I
conducted. Independents
revealed

their revulsion at the corrupt
nature of our two
political parties. It is
attitudes like these which
have helped in driving party
identification to its
lowest point in recent history.
In these pages we have attempted
to patch
together an explanation of why
people call themselves
Independents and why so many more
people are doing
so in contemporary times,
dealing with a category
so large and varied as Independents,
a definitive

m

•once-and-for-all* type explanation is
obviously not
possible. Nonetheless, political
Independence is not
simply a random occurrence totally
unrelated to

environmental factors or historical circumstances.
There do appear to be a number of phenomena
which

positively affect the rate of Independence.

Both

the survey data and interviews revealed a
distaste

for political parties (and their associated concepts
and trappings) greater among Independents than among

party-identifiers.

Almost all the Independents

interviewed expressed the belief that party membership
had confining implications and would prevent them from

making up their own minds on political questions.
Sociological and attitudinal cross-pressures seemed to

affect (slightly, but consistently)
the rate of
Independence. Also, the uncertainty
attendant to
entering the electorate for the first
time or to

making the transition from one party to
the other
seemed to increase Independence among
population
groups experiencing those phenomena.
Looking at the dramatic rise in the number
of Independents in recent years, it is possible
to

cite a number of historical factors as being
partly

responsible.

The relatively higher percentage of

young voters in today's electorate seems to have an
impact, as does the transition precipitated by the

political realignment the country— especially the
South

— seems

to be experiencing.

The voters* per-

ceptions that the parties are not very different from
each other and the fact that the time's most important
issues are unrelated, as Sundquist argues, to traditional party cleavages undoubtedly reduces the

importance of partisanship in the voters' eyes.
The general decline of the parties as viable political

agencies

—a

decline precipitated, in Bumham's terms,

by institutional 'reform' mechanisms, but fueled by
the voters

*

perceptions of party corruption

made Independence a more attractive choice.

— has

also
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As this is written the rate
of Independence

stands at forty-one percent of
the national elec-

torate-very nearly double the mean
rate between
and 196if.

mo

it is a phenomenon which gives
party

strategists-as well as political
scientists-cause
to stop and think.

The sheer number of Independents

after all, not nearly so important as
the
implications that they may have for the
American
political system.
is,

CHAPTERV
INDEPENDENTS AND FUTURE POLITICS
In the preceding chapters the Survey
Research
Center data have afforded us the opportunity
to observe
and assess, in some detail, the character
of Independent
voters in the American system. Chapter II
introduced
us to the socioeconomic, attitudinal, and
behavioral

traits of the Independents as they have appeared
in the
samples of the presidential electorates from I952
to

1972.

One of the chapter's conclusions was that while

their vote is quite volatile. Independents over the

years have shown a rather strong orientation— both
in philosophy and behavior— toward the national

Republican party and its candidates.

Chapter III

discussed the 'political responsibility* of the
Independents.

It was there suggested that while

Independents are demonstrably less interested and
involved in the two-party electoral process and its
trappings, they are just as well-equipped (in terms
of their knowledge about politics and their interest
in the ongoing affairs of government) for political

participation as are the partisan voters.

In
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Chapter IV we looked at some
of the reasons why people
Choose to call themselves
Independents, and attempted
an explanation of why their
numbers have risen
so

dramatically in recent years.
Of all the facts we have
uncovered to this
point about Independents, undoubtedly
the most

important-in terms of its implications
for the future
of the parties and the political
system-is the

phenomenal growth in their numbers which
has occurred
during the past eight to ten years,
in 196k, they

constituted 22. kf. of the electorate, now,
ten years
later, they are
of the electorate. This increase
might not be so startling if the percentage
of
Inde-

pendents in the electorate had a history
of fluctuating widely from time to time. As a matter
of fact,

however, wide fluctuations in this area are not
at all
common.

Between 19^0 and 1964 the level of Independence

held rather steady in the electorate at around
22^.

never deviating more than three percentage points in
either direction.^

When we compare this rather steady

4

^Rates of Independence as detennined by the
Gallup and SRC surveys between 19^0 and 196-4 were as
follows
I

19^0-20^; 1944-20?^;

1947-21^,

1956-2^1 1958-19^1

1960-23^2

;

1952-22^, 1954-22^,
1962-23^; 1964-22^.
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pattern of the past to the recent trend

3^

in 1972, and

l^lfo

(2??$

in 1968,

today), the difference is sub-

stantial, and it gives us cause to wonder about
the

effects these Independents— if only by virtue of
their
sheer numbers— will have on the American politics of
the future.

If two of every five American voters

now have no party affiliation, that fact alone
necessitates a re-thinking of some of our traditional
ideas about American politics, and an examination of

what effects the phenomenon is likely to have on the
two parties and the political system in general.

If the rate of Independence continues to

escalate or even remains at its currently high level
(the likelihood of which will be discussed below),

one probable consequence could be a further weakening

of the political parties.

While it is true that most

Independents still perceive American electoral

politics as a two-party enterprise, 2 and while few
^There is no evidence to suggest, in the data I
examined, that Independents represent a potential core
of support for a new "third party, " or that they respond
very enthusiastically to third party candidacies. V/hile
the 17% of the Independent vote received in 1968 by
Gov. George Wallace was higher than the support he got
from party-identifiers, it is still true that Qy/o of the
voting Independents in I968 stayed inside the two-party
framework. Schreiber, "Where the Ducks Are" (1971) argues
that it is especially unlikely that the Independents constitute a potential core of membership for a new party of the
Our data support his argument.
left.
.

287

observers would argue that the near
future will witness
an end to the parties* traditional
functions of recruiting leaders, structuring the vote,
etc., the two

parties' inability to win the nominal
allegiance of
more than forty percent of the voters
is, de facto a
sign that the parties are not as strong
(or at least
as relevant) as they once were. While
American
,

parties have never been dependent on active
•memberships,* in the classical European sense of the
term,

they have traditionally represented 'constituencies'
of identifiers— constituencies which they have
relied
on both for electoral support and for legitimation

of their role in the political process.

With two of

every five voters now opting out of the parties'
constituencies, the parties may soon reacli a point

where their effectiveness is seriously threatened.
One of the most serious threats the Independents

pose for the parties is the extent to which they erode
and undercut their respective margins of 'safety.'

Historically, the viability of the two-party system has

been enhanced by each party's claim to the solid
^The concept of party membership, used in the
context of what he calls 'mass parties, is outlined by
Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New Yorki John
V/iley & Sons, 195^)»pp. 63-70.
'
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loyalties of certain sections of
the country (i.e..
the 'solid* South for Democrats;
the Midwest for
Republicans) to get them through even
the worst of
political times and ensure a fair
representation of
their interests in the national
legislature. Such
a representation~and the 'out*
party's consequent
ability to keep itself and its programs and
alternatives in national view— has prevented the
demise of

both the parties on occasions when their fortunes
(nationally) have been at a low ebb.

With the

currently high number of Independents (who, by virtue
of their demonstrated electoral fickleness, cannot
be relied upon as 'bedrock* support) it is conceivable

that a huge swing in national sentiment could seriously

damage one of the two political parties.

The presence

of so many Independents reduces the viscosity of the

electorate and lays open the possibility of a massive,

perhaps crippling defeat for one of the parties

without the probability of having it 'saved* by bedrock
support from one or more geographical areas.

The

situation in which the Republican party currently
finds itself is apropos.

Though the Southern states

now appear 'solid' for Republicans in national elections,
the GOP cannot count on the South to send Republican
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Senators and Representatives
to Washington, and is
currently in a seriously weakened
position as a
result of the 197^ elections.
Only time will reveal
effects that weakening may have
on the political
system.^
There are, no doubt, many who
would welcome
such a weakening of the parties. 5
There are also

many—and prominent political scientists are
foremost
among them-who look on such a possibility
with dismay.
The importance of parties (of one
kind or another) ^ in

Table II - 8 showed, the percentage of
4.
strong*
party identifiers in the electorate dropped
1972-possible evidence
'2 2^-^^
fh«?
^^f^ of
that ?^^>.'?
the 'bedrock*
support discussed above is disappearing. While most of this drop consisted of
a
Democrats, {26.5% in I968 to Ik. 3%
in 1972; It IS almost certain that post- Watergate
surveys
will reveal a sharp drop in 'strong* Republicanscreating a situation in which the Republican party could
be seriously damaged by a severe electoral defeat.
I

5There was expressed, by many of the Independents
talked to, the hope that the new rise in Independence
would lead to a dissolution or at least a severe
weakening--of the present party system. It seems evident
that partisanship is still viewed in many quarters as
being equivalent to bias or close-mindedness , The cry
of many reformist groups for a "nonpartisan" politics
implicitly contains the notion that the end of parties
would be beneficial to the society.
I

—

"The reference here is not to the distinction among
parties made by Duverger (*mass,* cadre, etc.) but to the
perpetual debate in American politics whether our parties
should remain 'loose* and unstructured or become more
responsible, like the parties in many parliamentcury
systems.
*

*

*

*
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politics has been argued in
a long tradition of
theoretical and empirical
studies.
In 19^2 E. E. Schattschneider
argued that
"...political parties created democracy
and... modern
democracy is unthinkable save
in terms of the parties.-?

Schattschneider viewed parties as
the essential element
in democratic government and
he contended that. -The
most important distinction in
modem political philosophy,
the distinction between democracy
and dictatorship, can
be made best in terms of party
politics. The parties
are not therefore merely the
appendages of

modem

government* they are in the center of it
and play a
determinative and creative role in it. "8

Eight years later, Professor Schattschneider
chaired a study committee of the American
Political
Science Association whose final report urged
adoption
of a more vigorous, responsible party system
in this
country, contending that,

Popular government...

requires political parties which provide the electorate
E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government
(New York! Farrar and Rinehart, 19^2}, p. l.
:

Qlbid.
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with a proper range of
choice between alternatives
Of action. "9
In 1966 John Fenton
concluded a study of the
effects Of inter-party
competition on the outputs
Of the public policy
process in six Midwestern
states. 10

Fenton argued-and contended
it was fairly well
establishedU that
two-party competition makes
^^^^Q^^^^?^ T wo-Partv Sy .ctPr., a
reDort ^f-^?!!!"','^^^
^^^^^^^
American i^oiitical
pSitig^^;^r^"
r^^^^^" ^^
Science Association
(New Yorki

Scan
Rmehart

^

and Company, 1950), p. i.

10

'^^^^^^^ Fenton, Midwest Politics
Hni+ Rinehart
" (New Yorki
Holt,
& Wins ton, ^19^6") .

11

"^^^ studies alluded
having established the contention to by Fenton as
that intlr-partv
^ difference' were his'^om'^
'?wrPa^trr'^°'?.5^^^
Two-Par ty Competition and Government
Expenditures
1962 Letinro?'the
^^^-^fr
American loiltfcfl%'
AmeScfn
Political Science Associations
New Eng land State Politics (Princeton, Duane Lockard
university PresSjTWlJhapter 3; and N j!? Prince^oA
RicAard E? DaSson
and James A. Robinson. "Inter-Party
Competition.
Economic Variables, and the Welfare Policies
in the
American States," Journal of Politics Vo.
25 (I963).
Other studies as well have called into question
assumption that non-partisanship is an automatic the
boom
to a political community.
In their studies of urban
renewal and public housing ("Community Structure and
Innovation: The Case of Public Housing," American
Political Science Review 3. September. I970.
pp. 843-864,
and "Community Structure and Innovation: The Case
of
Urban Renewal." American Socioloff:ical Review
35,
(August, 1970), pp. 650-664; Michael Aiken and Robert
Alford demonstrate that innovation in these areas is
negatively correlated with nonpartisan elections and
nonpartisan governmental arrangements.
4

.

.

.

.
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a difference in the
performande of government.
In general, Fenton's thesis
was that the role

.12
.

envisioned for parties and party
competition by
political theorists seemed to be
borne out of

empirical datai
...two party competition, according
to its
exponents, is the very heart of democracy!
It IS the means by which information
and
^''^ discussion of issues
(the lifeblood of democracy) are
pumped to
every part of society. And after
the debate
and discussion of the issues, the
people
express a majority will concerning the
issues
through their votes for or against candidates.
After the majority will has been expressed,
majority party assumes control of the govern-the
ment and proceeds to translate into public
policy the programs it advocated in the
election campaign. The minority party
serves an equally useful function after the
election through its criticism and surveillance
of the performance of the majority party, thus
assuring honesty, efficiency, and responsibility by the majority party while it is in
control of the government. 13

Reacting in 1973 to what he perceived as a
crisis in the party system— partial evidence of which
he saw in the high level of political Independence-

Walter Dean Burnham pleaded for a return to the party

viability of the past:
l^penton, Midwest Politics (1966),p. 2,
13ibid.
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It seems evident enough that if this longterm trend toward a politics without parties
continues, the policy consequences must be
profound. One can put the matter with the
utmost simplicity, political parties, with
all their well-known human and structural
shortcomings, are the only devices thus far
invented by the wit of western man that can,
with some effectiveness, generate countervailing collective power on behalf of the
many individually powerless against the
relatively few who are individually or
organizationally powerful. Their disappearance as active intermediaries, if
not as preliminary screening devices,
would only entail the unchallenged
ascendancy of the already powerful, unless
new structures of collective power were
somehov/ developed, and unless conditions
in America's social structure and political
culture came to be such that they could be

effectively

used.^*^'

With some dissent, ^5 most political scientists
who study the subject concur that parties do play a

pivotal role in the political process.

And, among

American political scientists of the liberal tradition,
there is general agreement that weakened parties would

adversely affect the interests and position of the
1 M,

,

Walter Dean Bumham, "The End of American
Party Politics," in W. D. Bumham, ed.. Politics/
America; The Cutting Edge of Change (1973), P« 132.
15Among those skeptical of the parties*
alleged importance in the political process is
Anthony King, "Political Parties in Western Democracies
Some Sceptical Reflections," Polity Vol. 2, No. 2
(Winter 1969)ipp. 111-^1.

now disadvantaged elements
of our society. 16
Whether or not the current

boo. of Independents

will continue and perhaps
increase even further is.
as
noted above, still open
to question.
For the „ost
part, the opinion prevalent
among leaders of the two
national parties is that the
level of Independence
has -topped off. and that,
while the large numbers
Of Independents present
the parties with certain
tactical difficulties, they
by no means threaten
their existence. Dr. Paul
Lutzger. Director of
Political Research for the
Democratic National
Committee, believes that
"...perceptual effectsthe

symbols-of the political parties
are too impor-

tant in people's minds for them
to let the parties
die.
The parties are always going
to be

theyil move wherever they have

around-

to. and make whatever

changes they need to stay in
business. "17

Lutzger's

°^ parties, per se comes not only
•fT-om American
ir.^t-'^^ff^
from
liberals. Edward Banfield. a noted
conservative, argues that the American
part^ system
...has played an important part...
in the production
of a society which, despite all its
faults, is as near
far than mos?.^"<^
nl^f^?! ''.f°°n S"^
American
°^
Party
System." in
Rnwt A.
a' r^J^f^^"^t
Robert
Goldwin. ed.. political Parties. U.S.A .
"
(Chicago Rand MoNally, 1964). p. 22.
.

1

Impersonal interview with Dr. Lutzger.
January 1974, Washington, D.C.

295

counterpart with the Republican
National Committee
argues similarly that, -...the
trend won't continue
to that ultimate conclusion
(i.e.. the parties'
disappearance).

The role of parties in nominating

candidates, crystallizing issues, organizing
voters
and encouraging the turnout of the
electorate is too

important to allow that to happen.

Party professionals and functionaries, of
course, have a vested interest in seeing that
the

parties continue to exist as viable political
agencies
and we might expect them to exhibit rather
optimistic

views as regard the parties* future.

Nonetheless,

the possibility still exists that if the rate of

Independence continues to increase, or even if it
becomes 'institutionalized* at its present level,
the parties may face serious difficulties in the future.

The problem now is to assess how likely it is that the

level of Independence will remain at

kofo

electorate, or perhaps climb even higher.

of the

Will the

number and percentage of Independents continue to
increase to a level where the parties will be

effectively stripped of all but their symbolic
^ ^Personal

communication from Dick Thaxton,
Director of Political Research for the Republican
National Committee, February 197^.

29,6

mechanical functions?

Or will the percentage recede

to a level where the political parties
will be able
to retain (or should one say 'regain?')
their place

of importance in the political process?
The vicissitudes of politics are such that

long-range predictions of this sort are undertaken

with a great deal of uncertainty, but

I

would

cautiously argue at this point that the latter is the
more likely possibility.

I

am not convinced, as the

two parties* Directors of Research seem to be, that
the demise of the parties "can't happen here," but

I

do

feel that the current high level of Independence is,
in part at least, a temporary phenomenon.

In Chapter IV we noted that, while there are
a number of 'ahistorical

•

explanations for political

Independence (distaste for parties and the concept of

party membership, the presence of cross-pressures,
etc.), there are also a number of temporal circum-

stances which seem to be inflating the level of

Independence in contemporary times.

The fact that

traditional (post-New Deal) partisan cleavages did not

mesh well with the issues of the 1960's and early 1970's
(or phrased another way, that traditional partisan

divisions were somewhat irrelevant to the voters*
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concerns during that period); the fact that the country

currently seems to be undergoing realignment, gener-

ating a degree of uncertainty among voters who may be
in transition from one party affiliation to the other;
the fact that the percentage of young voters (tradi-

tionally more Independent than their elders) in the
electorate is inordinately high at this time; the

fact that politics, politicians, and the parties the
voters associate with them are generally in disrepute
in light of Watergate and the problems associated with
the Viet Nam War

— all

these historical circumstances

have tended to push upward the rate of voter Independence.

Because these forces have all converged in a

single historical era, we are now witnessing a rate
of Independence unparalleled in our experience.

But

it is also a rate of Independence which will recede

somewhat once one or more of these circumstances has
passed into history.

Because the passage of the Twenty-Sxith

Amendment has enfranchised large numbers of young
voters; and because (due to the transitory and dynamic

pace and style of contemporary American life) a return
to the hardened, class-oriented partisan framework of

the New Deal variety is unlikely; and because, now that
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Independence is so prevalent,
it will to a certain
extent institutionalize itself
at a higher level
than in the past, it is
unlikely that we will again
return to a rate of Independence
as low as the ZZ%
common before I968. At the same
time,
however, it

is equally unlikely that
the rate of Independence

will climb a great deal higher
than it already is.
or even remain indefinitely at
its current high
level.
The passing of two of the historical
circum-

stances responsible for the current
inflation of

Independence— the transition associated with
realignment and the tendency for party cleavages
to be out of
•synch' with the prfessing issues of the
day— is almost
a certainty. Historical precedent, voting
theory,
and

the dynamics of electoral politics all
argue that

political realignment is more or less a temporary
phenomenon, followed historically by a re-drawing of
the political battle lines and a re-institution,
for

perhaps a generation, of electoral 'politics as usual. '^9
Too, it is unlikely that voters in the future will find

^^The case that realignments are temporary
phenomena is made strongly by Walter Dean Burnham,
Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American
Politics (1970) and Charles Sell f^rs/ "^hft T^gnii i h^i
Cycle in Two-Party Politics,- (1965)»pp, I6-38.
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the differences between the two major
parties to be
as meaningless as they appeared in
the 1960's.
This
is not to say that the parties are
growing

farther

apart, or that their issue positions are
becoming

any more distinct, but it is true that some
of the
issues which generated the confusion of the
1960's

(e.g., the Viet Nam V7ar) have disappeared.

It is

also true that the parties have accommodated themselves
to some of the newer issues generated in that era

(e.g., busing) and that some of the issues which
have

traditionally separated the parties in the past
(e.g., the economy) have been revitalized after a

period of relatively low salience in the 1960's. Also,
while the Twenty-Sixth Amendment assures a larger-

than-before percentage of young voters in the electorate, the passage into maturity of the "postwar baby

boom," and the current low birth rates, will undoubtedly combine to redress the disproportionately high

number of under- thirty voters— traditionally the age
group most Independent

— presently

in evidence.

Assessing whether the voters' currently low
opinions of politicians and the parties they command

will improve in the future is somewhat more problematical.

It may be that the public's estimate of the
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parties and politicians has
"bottomed out" now that
most of the grisly Watergate details
have been made
known. While it may be comforting
(and probably
accurate) to say philosophically that,

"...this, too,

shall pass," no one can know at this
point how
seriously public confidence has been
eroded by
Watergate and related developments,

or-perhaps more

importantly— how long it will take the wounds
of
Watergate to heal in the public consciousness.
In

sura,

it can be argued with some certainty

that a number of historical circumstances
are responsible for much of the current increase of
Independents,
and that while we can probably not expect
the rate of

Independence to drop in the foreseeable future to
pre-1968 levels, neither should we expect to see it
spiral a great deal higher or even remain permanently
at its present heights.

The convergence of circum-

stances responsible for the currently large number
of Independents will not last forever, and it may be

some time before we see a similar convergence

similar effects

— in

— with

the future.

To say that the rate of Independence will

shortly stop its upward climb, and even begin to decline.
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is not to say that it is likely
to return to its

traditionally lower levels.

As mentioned above,

there are a number of circumstances
and factors which
make that eventuality very unlikely.
Most probably,
the Independents will continue
at their present
strength for several years, and then
decline to a
level somewhere between the 22% of
pre-1968 years and
the hlfo of today. 20 ^hey will
then-certainly for
the next several years, and most
probably for long

after that— represent something of a 'new
force in
American politics. •SI ^s a new force in
politics,

they will unquestionably play a role in
the develop-

ment which the American political process is
likely
to undergo in future years.

Perhaps nowhere will that

role be more important, ironically, than in
affecting
the nature of the political parties and the
political

party process.
20 It

would be folly to try to estimate the
future rate of Independence any closer than this. It
IS quite likely that future politics will hold a
number
of historical circumstances that will have their own
effect— up or down— on the rate of Independence. An
estimate of the likely consequences of these circumstances,
or even what they might be, is obviously beyond our
capability at this time.
^^The phrase is borrowed from Walter De Vries and
A New Force in"

V.L. Tarrance, The Ticket-Splitter
American Politics (1972).

1
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we mentioned above that the
large numbers of
Independents, and the decline in
party

identification

which they represent, constitute
a potentially serious
threat to the political parties.
At the same time/
however, the Independents represent
a serious tactical
challenge to the two major parties
and somewhat
curiously, an opportunity for the parties
to develop
the responsibility and maturity
which, if it ever
existed, has been absent in our party
system for some
years. 22 p^^ simply, the presence in
large numbers of
Independents may force the American parties
to

articulate issues and offer alternatives that
will
seem responsible, sensible, and attractive
to the

many millions of uncommitted voters who will
be judging
these alternatives without the selective
perception

normally attendant to partisanship.
Paul Lutzger, from his vantage point at the

Democratic National Committee, argues that, "From a
22 An

argument is not made here for a dramatic
change in our party system in the direction of the
•responsible' British model sought by Schattschneider
and his American Political Science Association
colleagues. Though such an argument can well be made,
the thrust here is to encourage the parties toward a
more clear and developed presentation of the issues and
their positions on those issues, rather than the
attempted stimulation of old loyalties and symbolic
responses which has characterized the party system in
recent years.
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long-range point of view, they've (the parties)
got
to re-orient their policy positions to be
more

appealing to the people than they are now— they're
tied
now too much to the old New Deal thing. "23 Lutzger
feels the parties will be more issue-oriented in their

appeals to the electorate, since that electorate's
eventual decision now rests heavily on the actions of
the nominally 'uncommitted* Independents— a group not

easily stimulated by appeals designed only to activate

party loyalties.

Dick Thaxton sees the challenge

facing the Republicans in much the same way, claiming
that one effect of the new Independents will be to make
the parties "...work harder.

It forces the party to

spend an increasing amount of time csimpaigning to

attract what you might call the 'opposition'

— the

Independents and Democrats needed to win who aren't

going to respond to a call to rally 'round the party.
This places the premium on organization and on issues

and candidates that will get a positive response from
the public. "2^

23personal interview with Dr. Lutzger, January
197^ » Washington, D.C.

2^Personal communication from Dick Thaxton,
February 19 7^

30^
One ramification of the two
parties* current

need to "convert*' large numbers
of voters in order to
win elections is that campaign
propaganda will have
to be addressed toward other
goals than simply
stimulating and building enthusiasm for
old loyalties. 25
And. while it may be a bit of an
idealized assumption,
it is just possible that parties and
campaigners
in

the future will direct their efforts
toward addressing

the problems and issues of the day in
such a way as
to afford the Independents—and all

voters— the

opportunity to exercise their electoral choice
in
a more meaningful way than they have in
the past.

In an ironic way, it may well be that the
Independents-

many of whom left the party system because of their
distaste for parties and because of that system's

apparent irrelevance to their most important political

concerns— will, in the long run be responsible for
nudging that system back toward the role envisioned
for it in democratic theory.

Such a nudge would be a

beneficial one in the ongoing maturation and development
of our political system.
•^It may be that, with the advent of the
Independent voters, the old party tactic of avoiding
stances on the issues will become outmoded. With
partisanship itself at such a low ebb, it is no longer
efficacious for the parties to merely avoid offending
people.

Aristotle wrote in The Phvsin.
that, "Those
things are natural which, by
a continuous movement
originated from an internal
principle, arrive at
some completion...26
the ongoing development
of
America's political community,
the eventual role of
the Independent voters-especially
as they exist in
197/,-.is still not wholly clear.
But their presence
is, above all, 'natural*
and causes one to look
forward— not without some optimism—
to "some

m

completion."

26^3.j_g^Q^3_g^ The PhvsicR
iQ9a i^^b/. biq.oo
'
collected in W.D. Ros s, ed. Ari stQtL/^pioA+^^^
(New York, Charles Scrlbne^'s"
.

'
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